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Edited by
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"THE FATAL FLAW"

With this special topic issue, *Nationalities Papers* explores a relatively untouched region of ethno-intellectual political history - the role of ethnicity in the formation of a national communist party, in this case, in Poland. Despite its obvious centrality, its equally obvious controversial character has led the topic into being sidelined or treated with kid gloves in order to bypass unavoidable divisive ramifications were it given a full scholarly airing (a sentiment also expressed by Mark Levene in his review of Anthony Polonsky's [ed.] *My Brother's Keeper? Recent Polish Debates on the Holocaust* in the recent issue of *The British Journal of Holocaust Education*).

Relations between Poles and Jews in the twentieth century need no rehearsing here. The historic strains and tensions between the host majority and the long-resident minority, between two distinct religio-cultural traditions, came to a head in the interwar decades of rising Polish rejectionist mono-ethnonationalism and Jewish adaptive minority ethnopolitics. As an option for polyethnic pre-1939 Poland, communism, in theory (though driven underground), offered a distinct universalist formula for harmonizing national ethnic groups, not only within its own ranks but for the entire national population. Yet, in the end, it failed to bring about such a reconciliation, even within the party itself. Instead, Polish ethnocentrism prevailed after World War II, thereby, preventing the formation of a *bona fide* Polish Communist party, one representative of all ethnic constituencies of a still, though diminished, multi-ethnic Poland, in contrast to the illegal communist party of Poland prior to World War II in which Poles and Jews functioned relatively well together as "Communists from Poland," a self-descriptive term explicitly de-emphasizing national identity and underscoring an international, supra-ethnic orientation.

Unfortunately, a century-old Polish animus for Jews erected a psychological, implacable barrier, preventing what might have become a genuine post-war, meta-ethnic Polish communist movement. Instead, a profound internal schism characterizes the history of the party since 1944-5, a fact cynically exploited by Soviet communists. For the most part, ethnic Polish communists increasingly strove for a purely ethno-Polish party as a vehicle to minimize the influence of Soviet communism, as well as a covert instrument of exclusivist Polish ethno-nationalism as a means to ward off Soviet hegemony (something Stalin had always suspected, hence his initial reliance on an overly zealous and, for the most part, arrogantly authoritarian, heavily Polish-Jewish vanguard of pro-Moscow communists).

In the eyes of these Polish crypto-nationalist communists (as well as in the perceptions of the Polish masses), their Jewish Party comrades

automatically represented an alien universalist (anti-ethno-Polish) trend, more in sympathy with the goals of their expansionist Russian mentors. In ethno-Polish minds, Jews posed a potential threat to the Polish nation, a long-held fear which questioned the Jewish capacity for harboring true Polish patriotism. Given the preponderance of high-ranking Polish communists of Jewish origin who brutally sought to impose a Stalinist order upon the country after World War II, one must at least extend a measure of cautious sympathy for the current of *ressentiment* among Poles in general and Polish (non-Jewish) communists in particular for these agents of sovietization, Russian-style, regardless of their Jewish ethnicity. Predictably, though, the Polish response was less disciplined and expressed itself (also predictably) in virulent ethnic (anti-Jewish) terms, the most common being the iniquitous concept of *zydokomuna*, of a Jewish conspiracy. Thus, the poison of antisemitism profoundly flawed the integrity of the Cold War Polish communist party till the dissolution of Soviet hegemonic rule from Moscow and the subsequent collapse of Communist Party dictatorship in Poland.

An ethno-centered party unable to open its ranks generously to all segments of society necessarily becomes isolated, narrowly bureaucratized, and, eventually, even more alienated from the masses it claims to speak for. A party that could only sustain an open, multi- or trans-ethnic membership as long as it is an extension of a foreign power - as was, initially, the case with the party until *c.* 1953-1958 - such a political organization inevitably becomes cut off from its grass roots. What the articles in this issue illustrate is how consistently a Polish brand of antisemitism, sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly, marred the very core of the party and, in retrospect, must be held accountable as one of the many factors of the ultimate failure of the Polish Communist state. An additional cause hampering the party's credibility came in 1968 with its egregious antisemitic campaign in the guise of anti-Zionism, an episode for which Poland came to be known ignominiously as an example of a society infected with "antisemitism without Jews."

The position observers are left with in this post-Cold War Communist era in Poland is to ask: "Whither Polish antisemitism after Communism?" Will it surface sufficiently to influence a self-defeating, parochial, xenophobic Polish politics, or will antisemitisms from both the right and left be contained, allowing a more tolerant society to emerge after three-quarters of a century of political independence and quasi-independence - each stage marked by an intellectually stultifying climate, due in large measure to a chronic antisemitism against which not even the Polish Communist Party could defend itself? Which raises a final question: As much as the party inherited a pervasive undercurrent of antisemitism, has the Polish Communist era left its own peculiar legacy of antisemitism to

its post-Cold War heirs? So far the signs are mixed, but by no means encouraging. Poland's *bona fide* entry into an expanded community of European nations literally hangs in the balance on this issue.

It might be appropriate to rest one's *caveat* on the timely warnings of other observers, past and present. A century ago, the German Social Democrat August Bebel observed, "Antisemitism is the socialism of fools." His admonition went unheeded and was, somewhat bitterly, paraphrased most recently by Ruth Wisse in 1992, who, rhetorically, asked, "Is socialism the antisemitism of intellectuals?" As not only Poland but all of post-Soviet Eastern Europe stumbles out of the communist cage into an era of national independence fraught with uncertainties, the ancient vice of antisemitism becomes a seductive temptress. We can do worse than recall a slogan that emanated out of Moldova in the late 1980's: "We shall drown the Communists in the blood of the Jews." The echoes of the Horst Wessel song have barely subsided and the old piper seems to be preparing for a come-back at the threshold of the new millennium. The problem is clearly not Poland's alone, but, as it always has been and once again is, that of all post-Cold War Europe.

H.R.H

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THE POLYETHNIC STATE: NATIONAL MINORITIES IN INTERBELLUM POLAND

Gabriele Simoncini

Interbellum Poland remains an important example of a polyethnic state and society in European history. Its short existence between the wars does not diminish the importance of its many peculiar aspects, nor does the fact that it can be defined as an unsuccessful example in organizing, institutionally and socially, a polyethnic community. The theoretical definition of the Polish experience has puzzled historians in the past. Polish historiography substantially ignored or steadfastly marginalized the nationalities in the Second Republic and in earlier historical times, an attitude echoed by Marxist historians in post-bellum Poland.[1] Now, indirectly, the topic is attracting attention again as a consequence of the new problematic caused by current European historical events both in the East and West.

The present interest in nationality issues is increasing, though it still remains essentially somewhat marginalized.[2] A well-known exception is the extensive body of studies on the Jewish national minority in interwar Poland and in earlier times, which in a way pioneered studies on minorities in general, although not from the more modern perspective of ethnopolitics.[3] Certainly, a study focusing on ethnic problematics is needed, and using nationalities as a fundamental interpretative element may produce new discoveries, as may the study of Polish nationalism if viewed from the peculiar perspective of ethnonationalism.[4]

Interbellum Poland can be characterized as a mosaic of nationalities and, consequently, as an ethnopolitical mosaic, a definition which can be derived, although indirectly, from a former popular study by Holzer.[5] More recently, definitions by Tomaszewski indicate an increasingly elaborate approach with the suggestion that Poland be defined as a "Republic of many peoples" and the "Homeland of not only Poles."[6] Certainly Rothschild's is an appropriate ethnopolitical definition: the idea of a dominant central ethnic core opposed to peripheral ethnic segments in which "the core views itself as the historic, institutional, and symbolic creator, and hence appropriate hegemon, of the state, while the leaders of each of the peripheral minority segments must decide whether to pursue their respective group's goals and protect its interests through an alliance with other minority segments or through a separate bilateral arrangement with the dominant core's ruling elite."[7]

Elaborating along these same lines one could see the Poles occupying a central position not simply in terms of power, but also exercising the function of conservation of power from a conservative (anti-progressive and anti-democratic) vantage point, and finally, expansion of power

through the phenomenon of polonization, viewed here as an expression and product of ethnonationalism. The peripheral ethnic segments could thereafter find themselves in a position of promoting, usually but not always, progressive political agendas in opposition to the conservative and authoritarian ones of the central power. Moreover, they constituted a fixed and increasingly real body of "subversive" forces in their relation to the central ethnic core and its power, the Polish Second Republic, and, also by extension, to the question of the survival of the Polish nation-state itself. Boycott and sabotage, and active opposition, were the evident expressions of revolutionary or nationalistic subversiveness, and defined all the peripheral ethnicities.

Basically, two different categories of ethnic minorities or peripheries can be defined if equal weight is given to both territorial and political criteria. The territorial ethnicities had a majority or, at the very least, a high demographic concentration in specific areas. Politically, they produced claims for separation, independence, or possibly reunion with an already existent motherland. This was the case with the Ukrainians, the Belorussians, and to a more limited extent, the Germans. The non-territorial minorities were usually dispersed, even nomadic. They had no majority in a specific area, or the area was limited in extent. These minorities did not produce claims in relation to territorial issues, and sought neither independence nor territorial autonomy. They could not refer to a possible motherland with which to be reunified. In this sense they can be defined as non-territorial. Such was the case of the Jews, in spite of the fact that they had a demographic majority in several specific localities. In very different terms such was also the case of the Gypsies (the Roma people), who focused on maintaining their nomadic and semi-nomadic pattern of life.

Given the realities of the Polish political arena, Poland's peripheral ethnic segments had a difficult time elaborating viable political agendas and strategies with which, on the one hand, they could successfully integrate themselves fairly into mainstream society, or, on the other hand, separate themselves at least in terms of relative autonomy. A realistic agenda for an ethnic minority was to seek some agreement with the dominant Polish core, which implied first of all arriving at institutional agreements with the government (the ruling elite of the central core). This strategy clearly had limited objectives, for it did not guarantee that the central core, the Poles as a people, would respect the government's concessions.

A less common strategy was that of first forming strong alliances and forging compromises among the minorities themselves, and then presenting a somewhat unified front or political agenda to the opposition and the ruling core. This choice was clearly a defensive maneuver, and many thought it would be better to protect their interests in stronger ways. The

Jews, however, more than any other group, understood the viability and the strength of this strategy and tried to create a strong political party bloc composed of the minorities in the Parliament. But, the strong vertical division of the minorities was a reality unfavorable for a bloc's formation.

A political strategy based more on attack, than on defense implied a moving toward social, rather than exclusively ethnic, issues and would constitute an "unholy" marriage of subversives of diverse natures. Such a strategy implied a fight aimed at the destruction of the existent political order and regime, and the subsequent achieving of total liberation, first socially and then nationally. This option meant seeking an alliance amongst the revolutionaries whose aim was complete social change. Thus, the "subversive" potential of the strategy would begin to constitute a real and explosive menace. Yet of the two strategies it was the less realistic, for the minorities were not only vertically divided in social terms, but also in strong political disagreement with each other. Furthermore, the political arena offered only a small revolutionary force, consisting mostly of the Communist Party, which was confined to underground life and whose Comintern-driven internationalism could not appeal to large strata of the nationalities, including the peasants. Moreover, in Poland the Communist theorems of internationalism negated national and ethnic issues altogether.[8]

A limited socialist movement was ideologically fragmented and expressed diverse attitudes toward the minorities. Polish nationalism was still the trademark, and anti-semitism was still present amongst socialists. Here again, the Jews were able to produce the most original political solution to the necessity of producing a political force that might conjoin and articulate both social and national (ethnic) advancement, namely, the Bund.[9]

Encounters between revolutionaries or socialists on one side and national minorities on the other sprung from specific and temporary conditions in the political arena and to moments of mass radicalization or revolutionary moods, and they all ended without success. The mass moods were fragmented and not sufficiently channeled, the revolutionary agendas were not viable, the socialist tendencies lacked dedication to the cause, and the ethnicities remained a microcosm that reflected many of the contradictory characteristics of the Polish central core.

It can be stated in general that only limited sub-strata of ethnic elements made strong social demands, either by becoming attracted to socialist or revolutionary elements or remaining attached to their own isolated agrarian radicalism.[10] In such cases, the ethnicities became particularly stigmatized by the society. For example the term *żydokomuna*, that is, Jewish Communist Conspiracy, was an extremely powerful label created by the media and immediately assimilated into the Polish mentality; it was a definition which welded together historic Polish anti-semitism

and the recent widespread fears of communism in Polish society.[11]

The Polish central core and its governments did manage to maintain a dominant position in a society which remained Polish and hostile to integration of minorities on equal terms. Polish politics moved increasingly toward the right during the interwar period. Many Poles still saw the nationalities as the most serious menace to the survival of the young state as well as the element responsible for the destruction of the old Polish Lithuanian state. With Piłsudski in power in 1926, conditions became better for the nationalities, but Piłsudski's vision of political federalism and to an even greater extent his idea of ethnic pluralism remained underdeveloped within the Polish state.[12]

That is to say, the regime remained at all times based on a strong ethnonational perception of its power; ironically that sentiment was paralleled by an increased sense of ethnonationalism in all nationalities, including the non-territorial ones. On the other hand, the ethnic minorities often were not able to abandon the narrow confines of their own ethnonationalism for more sophisticated, practical, and realistic political platforms. They never achieved even a sense of cross-horizontal solidarity, even a purely defensive perception, operative solely on an emergency basis.

Compromises and agreements with the Polish central core never really attained a level of security or stability for the national minorities, remaining always temporary, fragmented and dispersed. The ethnic peripheries remained a loose mosaic of different ethnic tesserae. One must also remember that the territorial integration of the new Polish state was not achieved until a few years after independence, and territorial settlements were certainly not considered to be definitive by the regime, which knew that its powerful neighbors thought the same but with opposite objectives in mind. Therefore, the ethnic core viewed minorities as objective obstacles to national integration as well as a constant source of social disorder and ethnic conflict. The issue of territory was extremely delicate. Minorities physically occupied a vast part of Poland. Indeed, they posed the danger of her territorial disintegration given their specifically territorial claims and demands for autonomy, independence, and/or reunion with a motherland which by definition was always an enemy of Poland.

The Polish state (the political ruling elite of the central dominant core) treated the ethnic minorities as cultural, political, and institutional inferiors suitable for polonization. This paralleled the historical phenomenon of germanization, emanating from the west, of which the Poles had been and were still the targets. Furthermore, the state championed national culture not only to preserve Polish identity but clearly to assert and vindicate cultural hegemony within its extant borders and beyond.

Religious principles were strongly integrated with cultural elements. Catholicism as a religion and the Catholic Church as an institution were

supported by the government as the state Church of Poland, in clear conflict with the different religions of the ethnic minorities. Polishness and Catholicism paralleled and expressed the interests of Polish farmers and the more rapacious of the Polish landlords on the *kresy*, the Ukrainian- and Belorussian-populated eastern provinces.

Within the urban environment, the recently formed bourgeoisie, possessing limited skills, could expand only at the expense of minorities such as the Germans and the Jews, who were already well-established and capable elements of the national economy.

In short, it was necessary for the central core to maintain its dominance over the peripheries, since the acquisition of its national independence was still recent, uncertain, and clearly problematic. From the very first moment of the new state's existence, the Polish government was conscious of the dangerous complexity of its heterogeneous ethnic composition and was also driven to address the ethnic problem by outside powers.

Polish Minority Policies

Poland signed the Minorities Protection Treaty in June 1919, thereby committing itself to full respect of the national minorities and their political and legal rights. The Treaty immediately became infamous among the Poles who judged it an external imposition aimed at limiting or questioning the sovereignty of their reborn state. Another story that gained notoriety was that the Treaty was nothing but an international Jewish plot against Poland. In 1921, the new Polish state's first adopted Constitution itself contained the provisions of the Treaty, a result certainly related to pressures from the Allied Powers.[13] In the same year, the Treaty of Riga, which concluded the war of Poland against Soviet Russia, provided mutual assurances for the protection of the rights of the national minorities residing within the two countries' borders.

The following year, the status of Upper Silesia was defined in an international convention with Germany that also provided guarantees of political and legal equality to the local national minorities whose parties soon after gained twenty percent of the total vote in the general elections, quite a feat considering that abstention or sabotage was the measure adopted by some segments of the minorities.

The institutional legal guarantees did not, however, constitute strong enough support for peace. The regime itself, together with Polish society on the one hand and the ethnic minorities on the other, lived in a distrustful atmosphere marked by increasing friction and conflict. Furthermore, at an institutional level, the so-called Lex Grabski was passed to the satisfaction of the chauvinism of the Polish elites. The bill introduced a body of institutional and political measures that inhibited minorities, with the result that relations with the peripherical ethnic segments were exacerbated and pushed toward deeper hostility.[14]

The response of the ethnic peripheries to such policies was manifested in the idea and then creation of a political bloc of their parties. Though the project certainly represented much progress for the minorities in their ability to provide themselves with organized political representation, the bloc did not, and could not, effectively oppose the government's ethno-majoritarian policies within Parliament and their enactment throughout the country.[15]

The increasingly authoritarian policy of the government fell heavily upon the minorities. Generally, the policy negated any real autonomy of the minorities with respect to the Polish central core. In the economic sphere, for example, the urbanized Jews were the primary target, and efforts were made to reduce their presence, influence, and visibility in the metropolitan markets, among artisans and in industry. The growth of anti-semitism was accepted and favored. In territorial terms, the minorities, especially those in the *kresy*, started suffering from Polish colonization, and the areas noted for their German demographic concentration were targeted for fragmentation.

Far from approaching a realistic and workable solution to the problem of the ethnic minorities, these policies increased, or even generated where it did not already exist, an active reaction by segments of these minorities. Boycotts and terrorist activities manifested growing antagonism against the government. In 1922, Gabriel Narutowicz, the first president of the new Polish republic, was assassinated by a fanatic rightist who (together with the Polish right) saw him as a man of the national minorities since they had contributed with their votes to his election. The Ukrainian nationalist Fedak was responsible, in 1921, for a failed attempt on Piłsudski's life.

A change in the central core's attitude toward the minorities started immediately after the Piłsudski *coup d'état* of 1926. Piłsudski presented himself as a friend of the minorities. They too saw him as such, and supported him accordingly. The result was the creation, a few weeks after the coup, of the Committee of Experts on the Eastern Provinces and National Minorities, with, as an additional sign of good will, Leon Wasilewski, a socialist with a pro-minorities orientation, placed in charge. The *Sanacja* regime's effort to establish a new order, in both social and ethnic terms, tried to gain favor with the minorities without providing many concessions. Within about a year, the new regime removed the barrier of the *numerus clausus* quota system in higher education and recognized the full autonomy of the *kehilloth*, the Jewish communal bodies.

As a consequence, the regime succeeded in inducing various segments of the minorities to cooperate with the Bloc of Non-Partisan Cooperation with the Government (*Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem*), a new political formation intended as a broad coalition of forces aimed at controlling Parliament and implementing the *Sanacja* political agendas. The type of cooperation sought was, however, limited, submissive, and instrumental to the goals of the regime itself, goals that saw the minorities as constituting no threat, challenge, or obstacle.[16]

The cooperative spirit of the minorities, then, remained mild and their initial goodwill declined sharply. At the political level, most minorities' parties chose not to join the regime's political bloc in the 1928 general elections. They opted for presenting separate lists which, with over twenty-five percent of the vote for the *Sejm* and for the Senate, demonstrated a remarkable success.[17]

The result shocked the regime and caused it to move rapidly toward more authoritarian policies. The political relevance and visibility acquired by the minorities were moving in exactly the opposite direction that the regime had desired. This turn of events clearly imperiled the centralization of the regime. It was, moreover, a clear sign of ethnic and political disintegration which was institutionally untenable and therefore unacceptable.

Technically, an ostensible although partial solution, even from the narrow institutional viewpoint, was the implementation of more openly authoritarian policies. The newly elected Parliament was dissolved and elections rescheduled for 1930. This time the regime did not want to risk similar results and from the beginning tried to minimize any kind of opposition. Political opponents, ethnic and non-ethnic, were faced with institutional limitations, legal persecution, intimidation, and naked terror. The political parties of the minorities, territorial and non-territorial, fell victim to the regime's strategy. Nevertheless, these parties still managed to obtain over fifteen percent representation for the minorities in the national parliament.[18]

The regime's strategy had again failed. Minority representation was still too high, especially considering the limitations imposed. Attempts to reconcile the peripherical minorities with the dominant core became sporadic, inconclusive and undesirable. The time to search for a compromise was now over and the regime moved further toward the right. The lack of willingness to compromise at the political and institutional level reflected and mirrored the turmoil within a society where ethnonationalism was mounting. In the *kresy*, Belorussians and Ukrainians experienced, as early as 1930, a campaign of bloody pacification. Finally, little doubt was left about the future when in 1934, the Polish government suddenly and unilaterally abrogated the Minority Protection Treaty signed in 1919.

In the wake of Piłsudski's death, a new electoral law passed for the 1935 general election prevented any possible challenge to the regime by opposition forces; thus, the possibility for minorities to gain political representation was virtually abolished. The reaction of the minorities ranged from voting abstention to boycotts and sabotage. Different strategies arose according to the varying levels of politicization and radicalism of the various minority segments.

Within this climate of opposition, however, the regime did compro-

mise with some moderate minority elements, thus allowing them to present their own candidates. From the government's standpoint, a few individual representatives from the minorities were quite acceptable and innocuous, and twenty-four were elected to the *Sejm* and five to the Senate. But the ethnic minorities as a whole had to continue to struggle for cultural survival against the regime. Suffering violent assaults, particularly in Wolynia, the Ukrainians underwent polonization in various spheres of their life. Belorussians experienced intensive colonization and polonization of their culture, while Jews suffered from mounting anti-semitism and persecution in their economic life. Germans, in contrast, found themselves substantively protected due to the rising power of Germany and the pressure it imposed on Poland's western borders. Poland and Germany signed an agreement of non-aggression in January, 1934. Wanting to avoid any sources of conflict, the Polish regime allowed Nazi ideology and anti-semitism to grow freely within the German minority and in Polish society throughout the 1930s.[19] Now that voiding conflict with the ethnic minorities was not the regime's policy, its practices resulted in increasing conflict with time. But the regime's ability to carry out "any" ethnicity policy, even an authoritarian one, remained fairly ineffective. Thus when the Nazis and Soviets occupied the country in 1939, the Polish government did not enjoy strong allegiance from as much as one-third of its population, its non-Polish citizens.

Poland's Ethnic Minorities

The ethnicity question in interwar Poland is complicated both in statistical and political terms. Although official census data recording ethnic minority populations had been routinely manipulated by the regime, existing figures do constitute a workable reference and may serve as a basis for further and more reliable estimates.[20] Analyzing how the censuses and statistics were organized and put to use provides valuable political insight. At the very beginning of the new state's existence, the Civil Administration of the Eastern Territories conducted a preliminary census of its populations. The data established by this preliminary census, despite substantial falsification, revealed very strong ethnic constituencies. A remarkable example is the case of the Kobrynsk district, where religious criteria were employed. In this census, 43 percent of the population declared itself of Mosaic convictions, 36 percent Eastern Orthodox, and only 21 percent Roman Catholic.

The census of 1921 had a limited scope as well. National territorial integration was not yet complete. Poland had not yet acquired the Wilno region and Upper Silesia. In addition, migratory phenomena had not been stabilized. The falsification of data varied depending on the region. For central Poland it was minimal, while for the eastern provinces it was significant. The census was conducted according to the criterion of self-definition of nationality. The structure and wording of the questionnaires left considerable room for ambiguous interpretations. The answers also

tended to confuse nationality with residence.

In the census of 1931, the criterion of "mother tongue" was substituted for that of nationality. Still, the ambiguity remained. It was easy to confuse and to manipulate the difference between the actual "mother tongue" and the language of daily use. Furthermore, the term *język tutejszy,* "local language," was used in the questionnaire. This term was extremely vague for it obscured the respondent's nationality. "Local language" was given as their language by 707,000 people, or 2.2 percent of the entire population. This answer was given primarily in the eastern provinces and thus represented a population of Belorussians and Ukrainians. In Silesia, a relatively common response to the question of mother tongue was "Silesian." This term was unsatisfactory since the Silesian language did not exist. In this instance, Poles, Germans and Czechs tried to qualify themselves as Silesians in an ethno-regional sense.

To summarize the official statistics as corrected by some more recent, more reliable estimates, the data of the early 1930s are as follows: Poles 20,640,000 or 65 percent; Ukrainians 5,110,000 or 16 percent; Jews 3,110,000 or 10 percent; Belorussians 1,900,000 or 6.1 percent; Germans 780,000 or 2.4 percent of Poland's population.[21] Other minor ethnic segments may be added to the foregoing major ethnic groups: Lithuanians; Russians; Czechs; Slovaks; Gypsies; Armenians; Tatars; and Karaims. Finally, it is necessary to keep in mind that with the exception of the Germans, the ethnic minority populations grew considerably during the 1930s.[22]

1. The Ukrainians constituted the most crucial ethnicity of the Polish state, and it was a territorial one. The Treaty of Riga, in March 1921, sanctioned the division of the Ukrainian lands. The census of 1921 put at about 4,000,000 the number of Ukrainians defined as Ruthenians. In 1931, using the criteria of mother tongue, and both the terms Ukrainian *(ukrainiec)* and Ruthenian *(rusin)* to create an artificial division, the number of Ukrainians was estimated at over 4,000,000. Less realistic appear estimates placing the number at over 7,000,000. Tomaszewski's estimate of over 5,000,000 (16 percent) in 1931 is more realistic, with definite growth occurring during the period of 1931-1939.[23]

The Ukrainians lived in the southeastern territories, primarily in the *województwo* of Wolynia and the Southern Polesie, former Russian-occupied areas; and in the *województwo* of Lwów, Tarnopol, Stanisławów, former Austrian-occupied territories. Within the city of Lwów they numbered about fifty thousand or sixteen percent of the inhabitants.[24] They formed an almost entirely rural and relatively indigent population. The policies of the central government tended to keep them in poverty.[25] The Ukrainians, however, were capable of producing well-organized social institutions, and political aggregation developed along rural and populist ideological lines. A network of cooperatives constituted the focal point of

activity and the preservation of national life.[26]

The schools did not have sophisticated curricula and were limited in numbers, but a Ukrainian intelligentsia, although small, developed and became an active vehicle for national identity.[27] The city of Lwów was the center of Ukrainian cultural and spiritual life. Yet, urban life in Ukrainian areas, limited to a few cities, remained dominated by Poles and Jews.

Religiously, the Ukrainians were divided mostly between Eastern Orthodox (the majority being former Russian subjects) and Uniate (former Austro-Hungarian subjects), with some of Roman Catholic faith, all in competition with each other. The Ukrainians joined with Poles in anti-semitic activities and programs, yet resisted the polonizing pressure of the Roman Catholic Church. In Wolynia, the Ukrainians (about 70 percent of the population) were Orthodox Christians, and in Eastern Galicia they were Greek Catholic Uniate. The conflicts between these two groups and the Polish Catholic Church were in both cases rather marked. The Greek Catholic Uniate Church was menaced with extinction, and the Polish Catholic attacks on it were constant and vicious.[28]

Politicization among Ukrainians was very high although extremely fragmented among various political formations and parties. The rebirth of a national consciousness had occurred not long before in the context of the polyethnic structure of the Habsburg monarchy. All political groups except the revolutionaries focused on independence as the supreme objective, and as a minimal program tried to gain autonomy and independence in various degrees.[29] The most important legal organization was the National Democratic Ukrainian Union (UNDO), formed in 1925 with the political agenda of unifying all Ukrainians in one, independent state. In 1935, the organization compromised with the Polish regime and participated in the general political election, but its representatives at the Sejm were limited, and the temporary compromise soon came to an end. In all, the Polish regime did not change its policy toward the Ukrainians.[30]

The nationalists and the irredentist-nationalists were very active and dynamic and sabotaged Polish elections on a regular basis. A Ukrainian Military Organization existed underground (basing its activities substantially on terrorism,) spanning a legitimate political arm in 1929, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. This kind of political formation employed terrorism and use of pseudo-military and political organizations akin to guerilla bands, some of which fought on the Nazi side during the war.[31]

A minor but active political force was the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine. It existed under the Communist Party of Poland's ideological and organizational umbrella although it operated according to its own strategies. It continued to exist after the Comintern's dissolution and destruction (in 1938) of the Communist Party of Poland.[32]

2. The Jews were a non-territorial national minority. They did have a certain

degree of territorial concentration, but, more important for the definition here, they did not make territorial claims of any sort at any time. According to the census of 1921, using the criterion of nationality, the number of Jews was put at 2,846,855 or 10.5 percent of the population. Of these, 2,110,000 were classified as Jews by nationality, and the remainder declared themselves of "Mosaic persuasion." In 1931, using the criterion of mother tongue, Yiddish- and Hebrew-speaking, Jews were counted at 2,733,000 or 8.6 percent of the population. Better estimates place the figure at 3,114,000 or 9.8 percent of the population.[33] The estimate for 1939 of about 3,500,000, or greater than 10 percent of the total population, may be considered realistic. As previously mentioned, this minority is the best known and the most studied of all. Several studies, both general and monographic, constitute an established corpus of scholarship.[34]

Except for western Poland, where their presence was negligible, Jews were dispersed throughout the country although higher densities existed in Eastern Galicia, where they were active in commerce and industry, and constituted the Jewish *Shtetl* in the small villages. Totaling over a quarter of the population in the largest cities (those over ten thousand inhabitants), the Jews were almost exclusively urban, visibly part of most of the urban economies, particularly in the southeastern towns. They were represented in every profession and occupation: as traders, artisans, and blue-collar workers. A very large number, however, lived in a situation of pauperism, constituting something akin to an urban *"Lumpenproletariat"*; one-third of Poland's Jews were on charity. They were minimally employed in the public services, (monopolized by the Poles,) and rural activities were limited to under one percent of their number according to some statistics. Although some very rich and powerful Jews existed, the claim of Jews as a dominant elite in the economy of Poland, especially during the interwar time, has been largely exaggerated.[35]

Jewish society covered the spectrum from rich bankers and entrepreneurs to indigent workers. Community life and the communal ethnic identity were highly developed and organized. Autonomous communal bodies (*kehilloth*) supported a complex organizational structure and provided for extensive cultural and social life. The educational system was impressive and extensive. A new high level of culture was reached in religious seminaries and cultural centers, some enjoying an international reputation. This was the case of the progressively oriented YIVO Institute in Wilno and of the conservative Judaic Institute in Warsaw. Religious culture was profound and varied. Its chief expression was through the Orthodox and Chassidic branches of Judaism.[36] Politicization among Jews was extensive. The political arena was broad and dynamic, intellectually, theoretically and politically. Religious orthodoxy, Zionism, and Socialism were the major trends of thought, but assimilationism was also present. The first three trends led to the development of a diversity of political parties.

Many Jews customarily participated in Polish political life, often willing to compromise with, rather than antagonize, the government. The highest expression of this participation was reached in July, 1925, through the signing of a compromise agreement (*ugoda*) between Jewish representatives and the Polish government. In it the Jews reassured the Polish government of their loyalty and dedication and received in turn promises of more autonomy for their communities, rights and benefits for their schools, and protection. The *ugoda* spirit was short-lived, however, the government making use of it in the international arena and failing to maintain its promises internally. Under Piłsudski, the situation improved as the religious Agudat party opted for political compromise with the regime and established an alliance of sorts with it. The Agudat became the vehicle for assuring Jewish participation in the Piłsudski regime, and, in turn, Piłsudski favored the Agudat in its efforts to monopolize the Jewish *kehilloth*.[37] The Bund Party controlled the Jewish non-religious element and the working class. It was an old socialist party founded in Wilno in 1897. It perpetuated socialist traditions amongst the Jewish people and maintained a vigorous opposition to the Polish regime.[38] Revolutionary radicalism was evident in the short-lived Kombund, a separate revolutionary trend of the Bund, as well as in the many Jews in the Communist Party of Poland.[39]

The situation for the Polish Jews worsened dramatically in 1935 after Piłsudski's death, for he had somewhat kept anti-Jewish activities and official anti-semitism at bay. The newly formed regime, consisting of incompetent and anti-semitic Polish colonels, was now escalating in authoritarianism, and with the participation of the Catholic Church hierarchy, favored extensive anti-Jewish activities and anti-semitism. The attitude of compromise on the Jews' part became much less viable. Consequently, in a progressively hostile environment, many Jews turned toward Zionism and started to leave Poland. The Polish regime became increasingly active in favoring mass Jewish emigration: Zionist organizations were actively helped, including assistance with military training. The regime now moved into an "ethnic cleansing" phase of the Polish economy and society,[40] in which anti-semitic sentiments rose to the surface throughout Polish society.

3. The Belorussians, like the Ukrainians, were an ethnically Slavic and territorial minority concentrated in the Polesie and Nowogródek areas of northeastern Poland. Together with the term "Belorussian," the censuses used "*tutejszy*" (local), an artificial definition designed to make Belorussian representation appear lower. The census of 1921 put Belorussians at about 1,110,000 (1,060,000 Belorussians and 50,000 *tutejszy*) or 4.1 percent of the population; the census of 1931 counted about 1,700,000 or 5.3 percent, using the criterion of mother tongue. Almost 1,000,000 were considered Belorussian speakers, and the more than 700,000 remaining were defined as *tutejszy*. Realistic estimates put the number of Belorussians at over 2,000,000 (or over

6 percent) in 1931, and at close to 3,000,000 in 1939.[41]

The Belorussian community was largely undifferentiated in social terms. The vast majority consisted of small landholding peasants and a large number of landless agricultural workers. The limited Belorussian landowning class corresponded in every respect to the Polish one in culture, language, and religion. In general, Poles were significant as landowners in Belorussian areas, owning over one-third of the arable lands. Beginning in the mid-1920s, Polish colonists *(osadnicy)* increased their presence.[42] In the cities and towns, the population was mostly Polish and Jewish, and Belorussian workers were only a tiny presence.[43] A small Belorussian intelligentsia lived in Wilno, where the rebirth of a national consciousness had very recently transpired, although it did not have much visibility. Cultural life was developed, although it never reached the level of relevance and importance that was achieved by other ethnic minorities. Illiteracy was extensive. The educational system operated at the primary and secondary levels and was subject to constant polonisation. Cooperatives, credit unions, and self-help institutions existed in spite of their limited economic resources, although they too were never very visible. Politicization, not so well-established as with the other nationalities, was not rare among Belorussians, though there was a high degree of political fragmentation.

Given a situation of widespread pauperism, oppression emanating from the Polish landed classes, and territorial pressure from Polish colonists, the politicization often took the form of radicalism, agrarian radicalism, and more developed revolutionary ideologies. The most noticeable and active political parties were, therefore, on the left. These parties saw social and agrarian radicalism as the solution to ethnic, social, and local problems. One such party of importance was the revolutionary Belorussian Agrarian-Worker *Hromada* Party.[44] Belorussian political parties usually agreed upon the final goal of national self-determination and free national existence; yet these principles often lacked a consistent theoretical and strategic framework. This was the case with the more Marxist parties, where ambiguity existed on the issues of social liberation versus national liberation, and of whether an independent existence was to be preferred to the goal of joining the neighboring Soviet Socialist Belorussian Republic. Besides these, there were also different agrarian radical and revolutionary parties. The more orthodox Communists formed a separate party which, like the Ukrainian one, operated under the political and organizational umbrella of the Communist Party of Poland.[45]

The vast majority of Belorussians were Eastern Orthodox and, therefore, suffered continuous pressure from the Polish Catholic Church. Along the westernmost parts of the *kresy*, a small minority of Belorussians were Roman Catholic and were thus considered and identified officially as ethnically Polish by the central government and its institutions.

During the 1930s, the repressive policy of the central government intensified on Belorussian lands. Revolutionary forces were subdued and active

and extensive suppression of Belorussian cultural identity took place. Belorussian schools were closed, leaving illiteracy as the only alternative to polonisation for the local population.

4. Germans formed another territorial ethnic minority. They strongly presented both territorial concentrations and political claims. Furthermore, they enjoyed a unique political climate created by the continously growing power of the German *Heimat*, to which almost all of them actively referred. Their visibility was multiplied by the pressure Germany exerted on western Polish borders, on Poland in general, and on the international arena in reference to the German minority in Poland.[46]

Germans resided in significant numbers in areas that had belonged to Germany before Polish independence: Pomorze (Pommern), Wielkopolska (Posen) and Śląsk (Schlesien), had been disputed areas for centuries, and were still sharply disputed. Germans and German communities were also present in central and eastern areas of Poland. In 1921, the census put the number of Germans at about 1,000,000, not counting Upper Silesia. In 1931, applying the criterion of "mother tongue," they numbered about 700,000, this time including Upper Silesia. Germans strongly disputed such numbers, which they considered excessively low.[47] More realistic estimates put the number at no more than 1,000,000 in 1939, considering that emigration to Germany was constant throughout the interwar decades.[48]

The German minority had a strong ethnic and cultural identity, and a specific socioeconomic character. The Germans were landowners, entrepreneurs, middle-class businessmen, skilled workers, and capable farmers. In general, they constituted the most prosperous and compact ethnic minority. Their standard of living was perhaps the highest in Poland, higher than the Poles, excepting for the impoverished German farmers in the eastern provinces.[49] They professed unremitting allegiance to the German *Heimat*, to which many voluntarily emigrated. Those who stayed received financial, political, and diplomatic help from both the Weimar and Nazi regimes. Germany, and particularly Nazi Germany, was in fact very capable of making Poland's German minority a voice in international issues, in keeping it a very hot topic within the international arena, and in constantly placing Poland on the defensive as it dealt with the issue.[50]

The German minority was a compact, well-knit social body whose socioeconomic vitality was supported by powerful bank systems, credit unions, professional organizations, cooperatives, and trade unions. Cultural organizations played an important role in maintaining the solidarity, cohesion, and alertness of this community. The educational system was of high quality, well-developed, well-organized, with the final stage of education usually completed in Germany.[51]

With respect to religion, the German ethnic minority was about eighty-five percent Protestant of various denominations. German Catholics were

found mostly in Upper Silesia. The churches hardly differed on cultural matters and were strongly united in defending the interests of their ethnic minority. Politicization among the Germans was very high, and amongst Germans of various origins and backgrounds no relevant differences existed. Thus in the 1930s, the majority was pro-Nazi, while others were either members of Catholic parties, or Socialists.

Different political groups existed although political life was organized under, and dominated by, umbrella political organizations containing the parties themselves. These were very active and efficient in maintaining contacts with their equivalent or similar organizations in Germany. This caused the political groups in Poland to be *de facto* party branches or organizational extensions of their German-based counterparts, which thereby reduced their ability to create original political agendas more responsive to Polish realities. Consequently, with increasing frequency, the German parties viewed their situation, and thus the Polish western frontier, as temporary phenomena.[52] An exception to this attitude in the German political arena was the German Social Democratic Party, which focused its attention on the ideologically fraternal Polish and Jewish parties within Poland, and therefore marginalized territorial issues.[53]

5. Other ethnic minorities, or more aptly, ethnic segments, existed. Mainly because of their limited dimension, they are not exactly considered ethnic minorities. They were not territorially relevant nor were they able to produce territorial or political claims. Data are unreliable or insufficient, yet estimates may be made following religious criteria or sometimes according to language categories in local statistics, as in the cases of *język inny*, "other tongue," or *język nieznany*, "unknown language."[54]

a) The Lithuanians were a small territorial minority concentrated in the northeastern territories, along the Lithuanian border. They lived in the provinces of Wilno and Białystok with a smaller number in Nowogródek, and some lived in the city of Wilno. Demographic data are unclear and somewhat unreliable, both from the Polish and Lithuanian sides. Some Lithuanian estimates placing the number of Lithuanians at about 800,000 were clearly exaggerations. The Provisional Lithuanian Committee in Wilno put its estimate at about 300,000. Official Polish sources from 1921 and later put the figure at 186,000. The real number was certainly higher than that.[55]

The reawakening of the Lithuanian national conscience had been a fairly recent development. The Lithuanian land owners had been integrated into the equivalent Polish classes. Whereas the memory of the ancient Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth persisted, in the countryside, many ethnic Lithuanian farmers defined themselves linguistically as Polish. While the Lithuanians were predominantly Catholic, they were still in conflict with the Poles over the language to be used in the liturgy. With few exceptions they were farmers by occupation and most of them owned their land. From the very

beginning and throughout the interwar period, a rural cooperative movement existed which grew and acquired increasing importance. A significant factor in this development was the existence of a Lithuanian Cooperative Bank in Wilno.

The territorial issue constituted the major cause of friction between Lithuanians and Poles, the border between the two countries being viewed as temporary by both sides. It was this issue that motivated the political activity of the Lithuanian parties, the main ones being the Christian Democrats and Rural Populists, who were active in Poland and maintained strong links with their counterparts in Lithuania. In the 1930s, groups of extremist nationalists also existed which during the war sided with the Nazis against the Poles. The Polish government tried to repress Lithuanian political and cultural expression, as did the Lithuanian government on the other side of the border with respect to its own Polish minority. The center of political activity and conflict was the city of Wilno where, in fact, few Lithuanians lived. But, historically, it was the cultural center of Lithuania and the symbol of the nation. Here could be found Lithuanian schools, *Gimnazja*, the Lithuanian Scientific Association, and the Central Lithuanian Library.

b) According to the criterion of spoken language, official data of 1931 counted the Russians at 139,000, or 0.4 percent of the population, a number perhaps not far from reality. They resided mostly in the eastern territories which had once been part of the Russian Empire. There, the native peoples, Ukrainians and Belorussians, had undergone a rigid policy of russification. Few Russians in Poland lived outside of the eastern territories of Poland?[56] Following the Russian Revolution, some Russians left this part of Poland for Russia. Most, however, wanting to be in Russia but opposing the Soviet regime, decided to wait. A number of Russian refugees were also awaiting the end of the Soviet regime and considered their stay in Poland temporary.

The Orthodox Christian Churches of the largely Eastern Orthodox Russians functioned only in the eastern territories of Poland. An internal religious conflict smoldered between the Christian Orthodox and the approximately 35,000 who declared themselves Evangelical or Catholics. In addition, a few Russians were of the "Mosaic persuasion," Russian-speaking Jews.

Most Russians did not participate in the political life of the Polish Republic and contributed only sporadically to Polish culture. Politicization and political activity appeared to be limited. From Polish police reports it is known that a certain anti-soviet and anti-socialist political activity had been organized, and attacks against Soviet representatives in Poland are known to have occurred. The territorial issue was not relevant. The more politicized sector of the Russian minority concentrated its attention on the restoration of the monarchy. Some social organizations and cultural associations organized schools in the Russian language; in 1938 four *Gimnazja* whose language of instruction was Russian operated in Poland.

c) The Czech minority numbered a mere 38,000 in 1931, with over 30,000

residing in Wolynia, about 4,000 in the Łódź region, a small settlement in the Cieszyn region of Silesia, and the remainder was dispersed. Czechs had immigrated to Poland as a consequence of religious persecution, and such was the case of the Czech community at Zelów, near Łódź, an old and quite visible community.[57] The Czechs living in Wolynia were capable farmers and relatively prosperous when compared to local standard. Many of them were artisans and textile workers who had come in the second half of the nineteenth century, mostly from the Lódz area. Initially they were not a very large community but they increased in numbers as a result of the emancipation of the peasants in Russia and the availability of cheap land.

Before the interwar period, the majority of Czechs living in Wolynia had become Eastern Orthodox as a consequence of Imperial Russian pressure. According to data of 1931, only about 100 Czech-speaking persons had declared themselves of the "Mosaic persuasion." Czechs enjoyed a relatively developed community life and had rural sporting and fire-fighting associations. Separate Czech primary schools existed, although they were probably limited in number. A Czech periodical was published in Łuck, and one other appeared in Kwasilów, where an honorary consulate of the Czechoslovakian republic resided. This minority was quite resistant to assimilation, tenaciously maintaining its national culture, language, and tradition. The Czechs did not participate in political life, had no territorial claims, and made no political demands. As such they did not constitute a problem for the Polish state.

d) A small Slovak community also lived in interwar Poland, but its strength remains to a certain degree undetermined. Data from 1931 statistics put the number of Slovaks at around 1,000, living almost exclusively in the mountains around Nowy Targ on the Czechoslovakian border. This minority was probably larger than indicated by these data but no other reliable figures are available. The population in that area was not easily identifiable, and there was confusion in identifying the local language.[58] Slovaks had very little national consciousness, often defining themselves as Poles rather than Slovaks. In the interwar period they were generically referred to as mountain people: *Góral.* They adhered to separate Slovak native traditions and customs, and spoke Slovak and local dialects. During the Second World War, the Nazi occupying power tried to create, without success, an artificial classification for them by inventing the term *Goralenvolk.* Most Slovaks were farmers and Roman Catholic. In general there was little religious conflict between them and the Poles; however, prejudice on the Polish side, such as characterizing the Slovaks as heretics and ungodly people, was not uncommon. Slovaks could be viewed objectively as an element of the territorial conflict which existed with Czechoslovakia, although this did not appear to have affected the Slovak community in Poland, which never formulated terrritorial or political claims.

e) Gypsies (the Roma people) never appeared in Polish statistics although

this minority was present and visible during the Second Polish Republic. Some estimates place the population in 1930 at approximately 30,000.[59] Gypsies were not of European origin. They were distinct from all other ethnic groups in language, culture, and in their traditions. Furthermore, the Gypsy population was internally differentiated. Gypsies spoke their own language, articulated in several distinct dialects. Different tribal and family groups existed as did different "kings." Some Gypsies were able to accumulate considerable wealth and, quite unusually, some invested in industry. Though maintaining a nomadic life, the Gypsy population of Poland concentrated in the south and rarely ventured to other parts of the country. Some of the Polish Gypsies settled down or adopted a semi-nomadic life and lived as artisans or day laborers.

Conflicts and friction with the Polish state occurred on the social level as the result of intense discrimination. Much of the antagonism arose from prejudice and age-old popular beliefs about the Gypsy's asocial nature. (It should be remembered that Gypsies, together with the Jews, were the most targeted victims of Nazi barbarity.)[60]

f) Armenians were estimated at about 5,200, living in some provinces of the *województwo* of Stanisławów, to a minor extent in the Tarnopol area, and in Lwów, the city which they referred to as their cultural centre.[61] Since their arrival in Poland extended back to medieval times, by the interwar period Armenians were already at the end of a long process of assimilation into Polish culture. They still maintained a few separate and specific traditions and some contact with other Armenians abroad, but their language had been lost and replaced by Polish. They were members of the Roman Catholic Church, yet had rites of their own. Primarily, they were traders or workers, and generally not farmers. During the interwar period some Armenians gained prominence in Poland in different areas of Polish culture.

g) About 5,500 Tatars were living in Poland in 1935, mostly in the *województwo* of Wilno, Nowogródek and Białystok. Most followed the Islamic religion.[62] Although they continued to observe some separate traditions and customs they were more assimilated than other minorities and were hardly distinguishable within the overall local and regional contexts. They considered themselves members of Polish society and added scholarly contributions to Polish culture during this period. There was no evidence or expression of national consciousness among the Tartars and no open conflict existed with other minorities or Poles.

h) The Karaites (Karaim) were the smallest ethnic segment in Poland and little is known about them. Their number was limited to a few hundred. A source from the Karaite Religious Union estimates about 1,500 members in Poland. Other estimates put the number at 900.[63] Beginning in the fourteenth century, at the invitation of Polish kings, the Karaites had established small communities in the villages of Łuck, Halicz, Troki, and Wilno itself. In the interwar period, they were to be found in the provinces of Wilno, Nowogródek,

and Białystok, with smaller groups further south. They were linguistically and religiously distinct. Their ancient language originated within the Turkic linguistic family. Their faith was based on the Old Testament, but differed from Judaism from which it sprang in that it did not not accept the Talmud and rabbinism. In their religious writings and liturgy they used, at least in part, the Hebrew language and alphabet. At the beginning of the twentieth century, secular writings appeared using the Latin alphabet. Some Karaites became well-known scholars and orientalists in Polish culture. Two Karaite periodicals were published, one in Łuck and one in Wilno, together with books and other materials.

In conclusion, reborn Poland found it difficult to reconstruct itself as a nation, in territorial, economic, social, political, and ethnic terms. From the ethnopolitical perspective, two developmental paths were possible. One was the formulation of an institutional structure of constitutional federalism and ethnic, "mosaic-like" pluralism. The other was the creation of a centralized institutional structure monopolized by a strong central ethnic core. This second path became the one pursued, although in the end it was not realized. Interbellum Poland remained an example of the unsuccessful organization of a modern polyethnic state and society. Still, a degree of cultural intercourse between the Polish and non-Polish elements of the population did exist, and benefitted both sides. On the one hand, an integrated and compact Polish state was necessary to guarantee its survival and continuation in the midst of predatory European neighbors. On the other hand, the Polish state contained a disproportionate number of ethnic minorities, in obvious contradiction of its geographical borders, a problem that was difficult if not impossible to overcome.[64]

The Polish Second Republic failed to give the reborn Poland a stabilized society, nor did it resolve major problems of extreme economic and social complexity. Moreover, at the end of the Interbellum period, an authoritarian regime was *de facto* responsible for exasperating the generally disturbed situation, particularly with regard to the question of ethnic minorities. Larger and tragic historic events profoundly affected the fate of the minorities. After the Second World War, Poland reemerged as a newly reduced geographical entity, as a compact homogeneous ethnic society with virtually no ethnic minorities. They had largely been exterminated, had emigrated or now resided outside the redrawn Polish borders. Postbellum Poland has been free of its minorities. But, as other essays in this volume reveal, a specter is haunting Poland.

NOTES

1. For coeval accounts see J. Urbański, *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce*, Warszawa, 1932; P. Włodarski, *Zagadnienia narodowościowe w Polsce odrodzonej*, Warszawa, 1936; K. Kierski, *Ochrona praw mniejszości*

w Polsce, Warszawa, 1933. And the Journal *Sprawy narodowościowe*, published during the interwar time after 1926.

2. For a recent valuable overview of minorities, see E. Wynot, "The National Minorities of Interwar Poland: An Overview," *Poland between the Wars: 1918-1939.* A Collection of Papers and Discussions from the Conference "Poland between the Wars: 1918-1939" held in Bloomington, Indiana, February 21-23, 1985, T. Wiles (ed.), Bloomington, 1989.
3. See note 34.
4. Although not written in this perspective, see A. Chojnowski's useful *Koncepcje politiky narodowościowej rządów poskich w latach 1921-1939*, Ossolineum, Wroclaw, 1979.
5. J. Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, Warszawa,1974. Although not concerned with the issue of minorities this work is a useful outline containing a review of major political parties of the minorities.
6. J. Tomaszewski, *Rzeczpospolita wielu narodów*, Warszawa, 1985. Also J. Tomaszewski, *Ojczyzna nie tylko Polakók. Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce w latach 1918-1939*, Warszawa, 1985. These two studies form part of the basis of this article.
7. J. Rothschild, "Ethnic Peripheries Versus Ethnic Cores: Jewish Political Strategies in Interwar Poland," *Political Science Quarterly*, Winter 1981-82, p. 591. Although the focus of this article is on Jewish matters, I found it stimulating where broader inquiries and definitions are concerned.
8. See G. Simoncini, *The Communist Party of Poland 1918-1929*, Lewiston NY, 1993, and M. K. Dziewanowski's well-known outline *The Communist Party of Poland. An Outline of History*, Cambridge MA, 1959.
9. See note 38.
10. For an introduction to the topic, see G. Simoncini, *Revolutionary Organizations and Revolutionaries in Interbellum Poland. A Bibliographical Biographical Study*, Lewiston NY, 1992.
11. A representative example of coeval literature is R. Korsh, *Żydowskie ugrupowania wywrotowe w Polsce*, Warszawa, 1925.
12. See J. Łobodowski, "Koncepcje wschodnie Piłsudskiego," *Wiadomości* No.23, 1964; T. Piotrkiewicz, *Kwestia Ukrainska w Polsce w koncepcjach Piłsudczyń 1926-1930*, Warszawa, 1981; J. Wiatr, "Koncepcje polityczne Piłsudskiego," *Argumenty* No. 45, 1968; M. Król, *Józef Piłsudski. Ewolucja myśli politycznej*, Warszawa, 1981. In English see M. K. Dziewanowski, *Joseph Piłsudski. A European Federalist, 1918-1922*, Stanford, 1969. See also the several well-known works on Piłsudski by the Polish historian Andrzej Garlicki.
13. A. Burda (ed.), *Konstitycja Marcowa 1921*, Lublin, 1983.

14. Lex Grabski defined a body of laws passed in 1924 dealing with minority rights such as those having to do with the school system, language, administration and legal procedure. For the text of the law refer to *Dzennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* for 1924.
15. The proposal for a political Minorities Bloc was made by Yitzhak Gruenbaum, a leader of the Zionist movement. See J. Rothshild, "Ethnic Peripheries Versus Ethnic Cores," *Political Science Quarterly*, Winter 1981-1982.
16. See A. Chojnowski, *Koncepcje..*
17. See *Mniejszości narodowe w wyborach do Sejmu i Senatu w 1928 r*, Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrzych, Warszawa, 1928, and K. an T. Rzepeccy, *Sejm i Senat 1928-1933*, Poznań, 1938.
18. J. Tomaszewski, *Rzeczpospolyta..*, p. 35.
19. E. Wynot E, "A 'Necessary Cruelty': The Emergence of Official Anti-Semitism in Poland, 1936-39," *American Historical Review*, No. 77, 1971.
20. J. Tomaszewski, *Rzeczpospolyta..*, p. 35.
21. *Ibidem.*
22. Throughout this article I refer to the official data and to the elaborations on them done by different scholars. Official data are derived from *Rocznik Statystyky* and *Mały Rocznik Statystyczny*, the Polish government annual statistical reports for the 1920s and 1930s, particularly for the years 1921 and 1930. Also of value is the government publication *Mniejszości narodowe w wyborach do Sejmu i Senatu w 1928 r.* Minsterstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych. Warszawa, 1928. The data from the Polish government annual reports are reported and discussed in the chapter on Poland in J. Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars*, Seattle, 1974, p. 36 ff. Official data are also extensively reported and discussed in J. Tomaszewski, *Rzeczpospolita wielu narodów*, Warszawa, 1985, p. 35 ff. E. Wynot also refers to the same data in his "The National Minorities of Interwar Poland: An Overview," in T. Wiles (ed.), *Poland between the Wars: 1918-1939*, pp. 149-160. For more data study and interpretations, at times controversial, see W. Medręcki, "Liczebność i rozmieszczenie grup narodowościowych w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej w świetle wyników II spisu powszechnego (1931 r.)," *Dzieje Najnowsze*, No. 1/2, 1983; K. Srokowski, *Sprawa narodowościowa na kresach wschodnich*, Kraków, 1924; M. Drozdowski, *Społeczeństwo, państwo, politycy II Rzeczypospolitej. Szkice i polemiki*, Kraków, 1972. Also of interest is J. Żarnowski, *Społeczenstwo Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1918-1939*, Warszawa, 1973.
23. *Ibidem.* More detailed data and estimates are to be found in J. Tomaszewski, *Rzeczpospolita...* p. 78.

24. For general reference see W. Serczyk, *Historia Ukrainy.* Wrocław, 1979 and M. Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa Ukrainska w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitey 1922-1926*, Kraków, 1979.
25. See J. Tomaszewski, "Dokumenty w sprawie polityki agrarnej rządu połskiego w województwach południowo-wschodnich w przeddień wybuchu II wojny światowej," *Dzieje Najnowsze*, No. 3, 1972.
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NATIONAL SELF-DENIAL AND MARXIST IDEOLOGY: THE ORIGIN OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN POLAND AND THE JEWISH QUESTION: 1918-1923*

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At the formation of the second Polish republic in 1918 the Communist Workers Party of Poland (KPRP) displayed total disregard for the Polish national feelings. Polish communists actively opposed the creation of the new Polish state which they thought would impede the march of revolution from Russia to the West. They saw Polish national liberation as an expression of a bourgeois ideology hostile to the interests of the Polish workers. True national liberation, they maintained, could only be achieved by the way of the international proletarian revolution.[1]

Neglecting the national question, Polish communists found themselves in complete isolation from the majority of the Polish population. After more than a century of foreign rule, Polish patriots viewed the communists not as heroic emissaries of the world revolution but as *de facto* "agents of Moscow." Moreover, the communists' display of national nihilism was often portrayed by nationalists as evidence of a dangerous anti-Polish Jewish communist conspiracy.[2]

The average presence of Jews in the KPP was estimated at 22% to 26% as compared to 33% for ethnic Poles. In particular, the Party's leadership was believed to contain a considerable number of Jews. However, at the II Congress of the KPRP (September 19 - October 2, 1923), of the sixty-nine delegates only six declared their nationality as Jewish. Forty-five delegates described themselves as Poles and fourteen identified themselves as "Poles of Jewish descent."[3]

In fact, most high ranking Polish communists of Jewish descent were devoid of Jewish national identity. They belonged to the marginal category of so-called "non-Jewish Jews."[4] Due to their frequent violation of Jewish law, such "Jews" were often described as "worse than gentiles" by the majority of the traditional Jewish population in Poland.[5] Thus the complex problem of the Polish communists' national identity had a significant impact on the KPRP's attitude toward the Jewish question.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the early development of the communist movement in Poland in the context of its relation to the Jewish question. In particular, I would like to compare various Marxist interpretations of the Jewish question with communist practice. My main interest concerns the origins of Polish Jewish intellectuals' lasting attraction to the communist ideology. It is my belief that, in case of some Polish communists of Jewish descent, their national self-denial played a far more important role in their devotion to the communist movement than did their hatred of social

injustice.

The popular stereotype of the "Jew-communist" *(Żydokomuna)* was enhanced by the Polish communists' high visibility in the provincial government set up by the Bolsheviks in territories occupied by the Red Army in 1920.[6] Polish Jews, in general were suspected of collaboration. During the 1920 war, many soldiers and officers of Jewish descent were detained in the Polish military camp in Jablonna as potential traitors.[7] At the same time Polish authorities arrested several leaders of the Jewish Labor Party (Bund), accusing them of sympathizing with the communists in spite of the Bund's hostile relationship with both the Comintern and the KPRP.[8]

According to many accounts,[9] the frequent identification of Jews with communists greatly enhanced anti-Semitism in Poland during the Soviet-Polish war. For example, anti-communist Ukrainian fighters, who associated the Bolsheviks with the leadership of "the Jew Trotsky," initially turned their hostility against Jews living in Poland's eastern territories.[10] The same Jews, as a "bourgeois element", subsequently fell victim to the Red Army. Finally, they were attacked by the victorious Polish Army punishing the Jews for their alleged collaboration with the Bolsheviks.[11] Thus, in the ironic words of the chief rabbi of Moscow, "the Trotskys made the revolutions and the Bronsteins (Trotsky's original Jewish name) paid the price."[12]

Ironically, Poland's first president, Gabriel Narutowicz, also became the victim of the Jewish-communist stereotype. As a candidate strongly supported by the minorities bloc and the Polish political left, President Narutowicz was immediately branded "the president of the Jews" and murdered on the day following his inauguration.[13]

Use of the slogan *Żydokomuna* particularly intensified in the Polish press in the late 1930s. For example, on June 12, 1936, the Polish Telegraphic Agency ran false reports of an incident involving three Jewish communists committing sacrilegious acts near a church. The news provoked several anti-Semitic outbursts during the week of Catholic religious holidays.[14]

The image of a Jewish-communist threat was furthered by use of a Yiddish word "folksfront" to describe the anti-fascist Popular Front *(Front Ludowy)* initiated by the Polish communists in 1935. In the prestigious Catholic quarterly *Przegląd Powszechny*, J. Skalinski eloquently portrayed the united front of all Polish liberal, democratic and leftist parties as a Jewish communist conspiracy threatening Polish independence.[15] Skalinski passionately warned all Polish patriots against "Judeo-Muscovite communism," which might infiltrate Poland through "the gates of both democratic and liberal ideologies."[16] In Skalinski's view, the anti-fascist political coalition could unwittingly "open the door" to the Jewish communist disaster and destroy the Polish nation.

In his article, "The Goal and the Meaning of the Anti-Semitic Campaign," Julian Brun-Bronowicz, a leading communist journalist, argued that the term *folksfront* was purposely created by the Polish bourgeoisie in order to discredit

all communists as Jews and to use anti-Semitism against the underprivileged classes.[17] The anti-Semitic campaign, in Brun's view, aimed at manipulating social unrest by blaming the Jews for the economic crisis in Poland. Therefore, since anti-Semitism was used as a weapon against all of Poland's liberal and democratic forces, Polish patriots should join the communists in their struggle against anti-Semitism.[18]

In practice though, the communists' attitude to the Jewish question was often ambiguous and contradictory. On the one hand the Polish Communist Party fought consistently against anti-Semitism throughout its twenty years of existence.[19] At the same time, however, the KPP spoke often against Jewish "social-fascism" and attacked the "Jewish nationalism" of the religious organizations, the Zionist movement and the Jewish Labor Party (*Bund*).[20] Polish communists led many campaigns against the observance of the Jewish Sabbath and criticized nearly all manifestations of traditional Jewish culture. In particular, the communists singled out members of the Jewish "bourgeoisie" as objects of hate and contempt. According to Marx's notorious expression, those were the Jewish parasites who lived "in the pores of Polish society."[21] In view of such apparent bias against Jewish national and religious culture, one may question the motives behind the communists' outspoken campaign against anti-Semitism.

Some of the ambiguity in the KPP's Jewish policy may be traced to certain ambiguities in Marxist theory toward the Jewish Question. The *Communist Manifesto*'s beginning statement that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle"[22] challenged nationalism as a divisive force. According to the authors of the *Manifesto*, the nineteenth century's national movements, erupting in the 1848 Spring of Nations (the year the *Communist Manifesto* was first published) had their origins in class struggle, national "in form" but "not in substance."[23] The history of mankind was determined by material productive forces and socioeconomic classes and not by abstract national ideas which were byproducts of capitalism, destined to "wither away" in the post-capitalistic era.

The awakening of proletarian class consciousness was first manifested by the workers' rejection of bourgeois ideology of nationalism as alien to their own class interests.[24] According to Marx, the workers had no country[25] since their humiliating subjection to global capital had stripped them of "every trace of national character."[26] Only a world revolution, led by communists, could liberate the masses and build a classless society. In a new world devoid of exploitation workers would recover their human dignity and create new international culture.

Marx's emphasis on a socioeconomic interpretation of history could be viewed as an expression of his total rejection of the ideology of nationalism. His lack of insight into the national phenomenon and careless and often contradictory pronouncements on national questions reflected a conscious effort to underestimate the importance of ethnic factors and national culture

in human development. Therefore, classical Marxism and nationalism were two ideologies politically antithetical to each other and theoretically incompatible. [27]

In practice, however, both Marx and Engels were forced to confront several explosive national issues. As leaders of the international proletariat, they were expected to provide current political evaluations and practical policies for the revolutionary workers' movement. In response to this challenge, they developed a "dialectic" approach. Thus "strategic" Marxism supported national movements in the early stages of capitalism, as long as they facilitated the advancement of capitalistic modes of production and economic progress. Furthermore, Marx and Engels tactically supported various nations' struggles for liberation (Polish, Irish), which weakened the foundations of old feudal imperial orders and indirectly aided the future proletarian revolution. Simultaneously, however, they passionately fought the so-called "reactionary nationalism" of the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries as an obstacle to the international class struggle.

Throughout their lives Marx and Engels "played God" in their arbitrary support or rejection of various peoples' national aspirations. Frequently, however, their pronouncements reflected a national bias. For example, in spite of their positive attitude to both Polish and Irish independence movements, they contemptuously described Irishmen as "wild, fanatical, corruptible, potato-eating children of nature."[28] In another example, Engels cynically condemned Poles as "a doomed nation to be used as a means" to undermine Tsarist Russia. In a private letter to Marx, he wrote that Poles "have never done anything in history except play heroic quarrelsome acts of stupidity." [29] Thus, paradoxically, the founding fathers of socioeconomic historical determinism thought in terms of "bourgeois" national generalizations based on permanent national features and not on class distinctions.

The political use of national categories as well as personal national bias expressed in Marx' and Engels' private correspondence, sharply contradicted their socioeconomic thinking and the very essence of classical Marxism.[30] It is doubtful that such an "error" was purely incidental.[31] The language of national ideology properly "slipped" in to Marx' and Engels' vocabulary in the context of their formulation of revolutionary strategy toward the national question. The unsolved theoretical problem, inherited from Marx and Engels, of how to reconcile Marxist theory of class struggle with the manipulation of national movements, had profound impact on communists' future attitudes toward the Jewish question.

Marx's early work, *On the Jewish Question*, written in 1844, presented his most comprehensive discussion of the Jewish problem.[32] Due to his strong condemnation and rejection of the Jewish religion and nationality, Marx's essay was traditionally interpreted as an embarrassing display of his extreme anti-Semitism.[33] Yet Marx's controversial pronouncements concerning Jews were theoretically deduced from his economic analysis of their social role in

the history of western civilization.

The historical phenomenon in question was the "miracle of the Jew," the historical survival of the Jewish national identity. Throughout the ages the miraculous preservation of the Jews was attributed to their devotion to the Jewish faith and attachment to their national idea. The unending existence of the ancient Israelite tribe presented a direct challenge to Marx's class theory of the historical development. "We will not look for the secret of the Jew in his religion," he wrote, "but we will look for the secret of the religion in the real Jew," *i.e.*, in the concrete, "real" economic and social role of the Jews in history.[34]

According to Marx, Jews continuously functioned as agents of market economy in non-capitalistic societies. As merchants and money-lenders, they specialized in commerce and usury, forbidden and contemptuous occupations in a Christian world. Rejected but needed, the Jews in fact constituted a separate people-class sharply different from all other nationalities.[35] As Marx wrote: "Judaism has survived not in spite of history, but by virtue of history,"[36] *i.e.*, Jews were not preserved by their miraculous Covenant with God but because of the continuous need for their occupational services. Consequently, Jews' nationality was solely defined on the basis of their social and economic functions. Moreover, in Marx's view, the Jews' religion only facilitated and enhanced their commercial role in society, which, in turn, explained Jewish stubborn loyalty to the "useful" faith.[37] "What is the secular cult of the Jew? Haggling," he wrote, "What is his secular god? Money...money is the jealous God of Israel, beside which no other God may stand."[38]

As a result of Marx's analysis, the essence of Judaism, stripped of the superstructure of both nationality and religion, was reduced to a purely capitalistic function. In fact, Jews living in a pre-capitalistic society in a sense represented the essence of capitalism. Thus in Marx's interpretation, capitalism was synonymous with Judaism and, therefore, the whole of capitalist Europe became in a sense Judaized. Consequently, with the advent of capitalism, Jews joined the melting-pot of the multinational capitalist class, and, theoretically, lost their former "national" distinctiveness. Marx's fervent dream about the emancipation of humanity from capitalism also meant the emancipation of humanity from Judaism and emancipation of Jews from their Jewish national-bourgeois identity.

Thus, in theoretical terms, Marx's hatred of the Jews was an expression of his general hatred of capitalism and the bourgeoisie. From the point of view of his theory of class struggle, the hostility toward Jewish merchants was an historically justified source of modern anti-Semitism. In other words, only the victory of the proletarian revolution would secure the destruction of capitalism and the annihilation of the Jewish capitalist nation-class, which would automatically solve the Jewish question.

However, rich capitalists were not the only Jews provoking Marx's hostility. Marx also described penniless Jewish refugees from Poland as the

"filthiest of all races, [who] only perhaps by its passion for greedy gain could be related to [the Jewish capitalists] of Frankfurt."[39] Thus Marx undermined his socioeconomic theory of anti-Semitism by using national epithets and even racial slur. Given Marx's distinct Jewish ancestry,[40] his passionate rejection of Jewry could be viewed in terms of national self-denial. In a sense, Marx's theory of class struggle, which profoundly influenced generations of revolutionaries, served as a grand design to escape the ambivalence of his own national identity into the abstract world of internationalist utopia.

The greatest challenge to Marx's concept of the Jewish bourgeois national identity was presented by the Austrian Marxist school of thought. Karl Kautsky, in his essay published in *Die Neue Zeit* in 1890, repeated Marx's main idea that the social and economic function of the Jews contributed to their historical preservation.[41] However, Kautsky maintained that the development of capitalism transformed part of the Jewish population into the working class opposed to the Jewish bourgeoisie. Thus, contrary to the Marx's theory, the Jews did not, as a purely functional nationality, disappear in the advanced stage of capitalism. Kautsky's acknowledgment of class divisions among Jews contradicted Marx's narrow approach and treated Jews similarly to other European nationalities.

However, as Lenin pointedly noticed, neither Kautsky nor Otto Bauer, the author of the book, *The National Question and Social-Democracy*, recognized Jews' right to national cultural autonomy.[42] Kautsky called Eastern European Jewry a 'caste' and not a nation. And Bauer who wrote that future nations would "enjoy freely their national culture,"[43] excluded Jews due to their extra-territoriality.[44] Both Kautsky and Bauer interpreted anti-Semitism as an expression of class hatred and not national hatred. Therefore, the only solution to the Jewish problem would be to end class antagonism and to liberate the Jews from their caste existence. This would also mean that the emancipated Jews would simply cease to exist as a nation. Thus both Kautsky and Bauer, who emphasized the importance of the national factors in Marxist theory, denied national identity to one of the oldest peoples in Europe.

Vladimir I. Lenin, the leader of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, did not share Marx's obsession with the Jewish bourgeoisie. "It is not the Jews who are the enemies of the working people," he wrote, "The enemies of the workers are the capitalists of all countries... They (the Jews) are our brothers, who, like us, are oppressed by capital."[45] Lenin clearly recognized both the social and national distinctiveness of the Jewish people. "No nationality in Russia," he wrote, "is as oppressed and persecuted as the Jewish... The Jewish workers are suffering under a double yoke, both as workers and as Jews." [46]

In practice, however, Lenin' primary political concern was the separatist tendency of the Jewish Labor Party (*Bund*), which, in his view, threatened the unity of the Russian workers' movement. In the course of its turbulent relations with the RSDLP, the *Bund* left the Party in 1903, rejoined in 1906 and

later supported the Mensheviks. Most likely, Lenin viewed the *Bund* as a potential political competitor to his own Party. In his pursuit for the revolutionary power, the future Bolshevik leader developed Marxism into an impressive sophisticated "dialectical" theory of political manipulation.

For example, to undermine the *Bund*'s demand for Jewish national-cultural autonomy, Lenin made a theoretical distinction between "the national culture{ and "the international culture," which should only include the "socialist content of each national culture."[47] "Jewish national culture is the slogan of the rabbis and the bourgeoisie," he wrote, "the slogan of our enemies." The only "world-progressive" part of the Jewish culture was "its internationalism, its identification with the advanced movements of the epoch,"[48] *i.e.*, the "national features" which Lenin found most useful for his own political agenda.

Lenin's negative attitude toward Jewish national culture did not prevent him, however, from the use of the issue of anti-Semitism as his propaganda weapon against the tsarist authorities. Moreover, in spite of his hostility to Jewish national separatism, Lenin supported use of the Yiddish language in the activities of the Russian Social Democratic Party, solely for the sake of gaining influence among the Jewish workers.[49] Like Kautsky and Bauer, Lenin anticipated complete national assimilation of the Jews in the future socialist society as the ultimate solution to the Jewish question.

Paradoxically, in spite of his opposition to the *Bund*'s demand for Jewish cultural autonomy, Lenin strongly supported the Polish nation's right to national self-determination and even secession from the Russian state. In several of his articles on the national question (1903-1916), he repeatedly argued that it was in the interests of the Russian Social Democratic Party not to antagonize oppressed peoples in the Russian Empire and to use their national struggle as a driving force for the socialist revolution. As for the Social Democratic parties of non-Russian nationalities, their obligation was to insist on "international unity," in practical terms, meaning the leadership of the RSDLP.

Lenin's manipulation of the national question was strongly criticized by Rosa Luxemburg, the chief ideologist of the Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL, founded in 1893). Luxemburg's opposition to Poland's independence was based on her Marxist theory of growing economic integration between the partitioned Polish territories and the developing capitalistic economy in Russia. In her view, national ideology would divert Polish workers from their solidarity with the Russian proletariat.

Luxemburg's arguments against Polish national aspirations resembled Lenin's criticism of the *Bund*'s national separatism. In point of fact, Lenin did not regard his dispute with Rosa Luxemburg as a substantial theoretical disagreement but just a difference in tactics. "They (the SDKPiL) have a perfect right to oppose Polish secession," he wrote, "but they fail to understand that in order to propagate internationalism we need not all repeat each

others' exact words. In Russia we must stress the right to self-determination for subject peoples while in Poland we must stress the right of such nations to unity." [50]

While Lenin's position on the national question was largely a matter of tactics,[51] Luxemburg categorically rejected the 9th point of the Russian Social Democratic Party's program (declaring the right to national self-determination) as a matter of principle. The withdrawal of the 9th point was her primary condition for the Polish Social Democratic Party's pending affiliation with the RSDLP. Both Lenin and Luxemburg were faithful students of Marx's theory on the national question. Yet, in practice, their Marxist strategies clashed when they tried to pursue the political interests of their respective Social Democratic parties.

Luxemburg's uncompromising position was possibly motivated by her realistic perception of the general weakness of the original Polish socialist movement.[52] Hence, she held great expectations for and gave priority to the Russian revolution. In addition, Lenin's concessions to Polish national self-determination undermined her fierce political struggle against the so-called "social-patriots" of the rival Polish Socialist Party (PPS). In fact, Luxemburg consciously followed Marx's theory about historically progressive and reactionary nations. In her view, Poland's independence would create artificial national barriers to capitalistic development and thus would impede historical progress.

Luxemburg's passionate rejection of Poland's independence had its deeper roots in her total denial of the very idea of a nation. "In a society based on classes," she wrote, "the nation as a uniform social-political whole simply does not exist. Instead there exist within each nation classes with antagonistic interests and 'rights.'"[53] Therefore, from Luxemburg's point of view, such terminology as "the will of a nation" or "the right of a nation" were just abstract metaphysical ideas.[54] According to Andrzej Walicki, Luxemburg erroneously believed that class consciousness could exist in a pure form outside its national environment.[55] "There is literally no social area," she wrote, "in which the possessing classes and a self-conscious proletariat could take one and the same position...as one undifferentiated national whole." [56]

While Luxemburg regarded nations as *de facto* fictions, she nevertheless recognized the importance of various minorities' rights to their national cultural autonomy.[57] Yet she rejected with contempt any national aspiration of the Jews as incomprehensible and ridiculous.[58] Luxemburg fought the "bourgeois nationalism" of the Jewish *Bund* as forcefully as the "social patriotism" of the Polish Socialist Party. In her view, national assimilation was the only realistic solution to the Jewish problem.

As Walicki pointed out, the accusation of cosmopolitanism would be unfair to Luxemburg, who visibly struggled with her own national ambivalence in the name of internationalist ideology.[59] On the other hand, J. P. Nettl in his book on Rosa Luxemburg questioned her "patriotic consciousness." He

argued that in Luxemburg's case, "the notion of a national fatherland, even of a special cultural home, was entirely alien."[60] However, painful unpublished letters from Rosa Luxemburg's relatives, following the death of her mother, referred to traditional Jewish mourning and mentioned daily recitations of *Kaddish* and *El moley rachamim.*[61] Thus Luxemburg came from a religious, only partially assimilated, Jewish home, certainly much more traditional than Marx's converted family.

If Luxemburg's "cultural home" was "alien" it was so by virtue of her conscious rejection of her Jewish identity. "Why do you come with your special Jewish sorrows?" she wrote to Mathilde Wurm in 1917, "I feel just as sorry for the wretched Indian victims in Putamayo, the negroes in Africa...I cannot find a special corner in my heart for the ghetto. I feel at home in the entire world wherever there are clouds and birds and human tears."[62] There was a special place, however, where Luxemburg felt "at home" more than in any other place in the world. This place was Poland. In her private letters to Leon Jogiches-Jan Tyszka, she expressed her genuine love for Polish landscape, culture and people. "I was extremely impressed by the countryside," she wrote, "wheat fields, meadows, woods, enormous plains and Polish speech, Polish peasants around. You have no idea how all this made me happy. I felt reborn as I would have found ground under my feet.... In Kandrzyn I saw three families: two peasant and one Jewish going to America. What poverty! I was suffocated by tears but at the same time I was so happy to see them that I couldn't take my eyes off them."[63]

Luxemburg's Polish patriotic feelings, revealed passionately in her private correspondence, sharply contrasted with her provocative internationalist ideas. As Nettl noticed, Luxemburg's denial of Poland's right to self-determination was not equivalent to a denial of Polish nationality.[64] Therefore, what were the real reasons for Luxemburg's demonstrative display of internationalism? "Such internationalism," Nettl wrote, "...is usually a negative not a positive quality, a revolt against national disappointment."[65] Nettl's insightful remarks were supposed to argue against the common perception of Luxemburg's internationalism as a substitute for her lack of national identity. Yet Nettl's own words suggested that Luxemburg's "revolt" was "against national disappointment." The national disappointment in question was most likely caused by the painful feelings of rejection or lack of acceptance of the only national identity of her choice - Polish nationality. In fact, Luxemburg was one of the first Polish Marxists of Jewish descent to experience the drama of the future communist Jewish assimilationists. Their rejected national status, as assimilated Jews, played an important role in their choice of internationalist communist ideology.

Rosa Luxemburg's controversy with Lenin over the national question had a profound impact on the Polish Communist movement. The Communist Workers Party of Poland (KPRP) came into being in 1918 from the union of two parties, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania

(SDKPiL) and the Polish Socialist Party's left wing (PPS-Left). In this rather schematic political merger, the leaders of the former SDKPiL, as internationalists, faithfully followed the Luxemburg tradition. They sincerely believed that the socialist revolution would transcend the narrow national interests of single nations. On the other hand, the leaders of the former PPS-Left tried to combine the idea of a social revolution with national liberation. This original difference in theoretical approach was also reflected in different attitudes toward the Jewish question within the Polish Communist Party.

The most thoughtful study on the Jewish question was authored by Maksimilian Horwitz-Henryk Walecki, one of the leaders of the PPS-Left and, after 1918, a distinguished member of the KPRP's Central Committee. In his article, "On the Jewish Question," written in prison in 1905, Walecki argued against a religious and racial approach to Jewish nationality. Instead, he presented a Marxist interpretation of the Jewish history as a primarily socio-economic phenomenon. "The Jewish question," he wrote, "is entirely a social question."[66] Thus the Jews, due to their specific social functions, should be treated as the integral part of the modern capitalistic society. Like Marx, Walecki noticed that capitalism liberated Jews from their seclusion and opened the door to their political emancipation and national assimilation.

Contrary to Marx, however, Walecki did not greet this liberal assimilationist movement of the Jewish middle class as a positive resolution to the Jewish question. In his view, due to the process of Polonization, the most enlightened members of the Jewish community lost their national identity and selfishly left behind the unassimilated Jewish masses. Thus Walecki not only criticized the behavior of the first Jewish assimilationists as highly anti-social, but also blamed them for national "betrayal" of their Jewish origin.

In his search for the Marxist solution to the Jewish question, Walecki distinguished a special category of "cultural nationality," which would fit the description of the Jewish minority, as opposed to "political nationality," more appropriate in the description of the Polish independence movement. Thanks to such differentiation, Walecki could dismiss the Zionist unrealistic yearning for "political nationality." In his view, Zionism as a Jewish bourgeois nationalism was a harmful escapist ideology, which only obscured the real social roots of the Jewish problems. Moreover, it promoted false national solidarity between the Jewish bourgeoisie and the Jewish proletariat.

According to Walecki, only social democrats could defend "Jews as Jews," *i.e.*, effectively secure free development of their Jewish "cultural nationality." Only the revolutionary class struggle was able to transform humiliated Jewish victims into proud Jewish warriors. Through their participation in the social democratic movement, Jews regained their human and national dignity. And *vice versa*, national emancipation enabled the Jewish workers to join the Polish workers' social struggle, without losing their Jewish cultural identity. "The social democracy," Walecki wrote, "is international but not...anti-national."[67]

Walecki's Marxist theory on the Jewish question was indeed unique and very original. Contrary to Marx's and Luxemburg's rejection of a Jewish national identity in favor of assimilation, Walecki emphasized the positive values of Jewish national self-affirmation. Thus, in his view, Jewish cultural emancipation was an important part of the international socialist revolution. Walecki's version of the Marxist solution to the Jewish question could be viewed as a theoretical explanation for the attraction to communist ideology of so many Jewish intellectuals and even the Yiddish-speaking Jewish proletariat.

Another outstanding communist theoretician on the national question was Julian Brun-Bronowicz, a former member of the SDKPiL and one of the leading activists and editors of the Polish Communist Party's central publications. Brun was a typical example of a Polish communist of Jewish descent whose family had been fully assimilated for two generations. He shared neither Luxemburg's passionate rejection of Jewish identity nor Walecki's positive recognition of Jewish cultural nationality. Brun's primary interest in Marxism was the search for a theoretical and practical solution to the Polish national question. In his theory, he tried to combine the process of national development with revolutionary social transformation. To this end, he explored Marx's claim for a proletariat primary need to establish as a nation.[68] Brun's idea of a modern nation-state was, in fact, equivalent to Walecki's category of "political nationality."[69]

While Marx defined the entire Jewish nation as a bourgeoisie growing in the "pores of Polish society," Brun saw the formation of the Polish nation as a future product of the Polish proletariat. Thus the Polish working class was the major carrier of national values and the key to national renewal. In Brun's vision of Polish national development the Jewish minority could not play a positive role. According to Brun's dialectical theory, even the formation of a Polish nation was just a stage in the proletariat's victory over the bourgeoisie. At the same time, however, the new classless Polish society was to transform itself into a multinational socialist state not unlike the idealized Soviet Union.[70] Thus in Brun's utopian vision, the ultimate solution to both the Jewish and Polish questions was the disappearance of all national distinction.

The national question was the main topic of discussion at the KPRP's II Congress in 1923. In view of the Comintern's growing control over the Polish communist movement, this historic congress probably provided the last opportunity for a genuine exchange of ideas. The II Congress created a suitable forum for ideological confrontation between the "reformed" supporters of Lenin's tactical approach to the national question and the faithful followers of Luxemburg's "canonic" theory of Marxist internationalism.

From the beginning, Grigorii Zinoviev, the official representative of the Comintern, attacked the "national nihilism"[71] of the Polish Communist Party, which failed to manipulate the national hatreds of Ukrainian, Belorussian,

Lithuanian, German and Jewish minorities against the Polish bourgeoisie. In his view, in spite of the internationalist principles of the Communist Party, the national movements should be used as a political weapon. "Our main criterion," Zinoviev argued, "should be the best way to attack the bourgeoisie, to grip the enemy by the throat."[72] Zinoviev's blunt statements influenced the central theme debated by congress, namely, the question of KPRP's national strategy.

In their response to Zinoviev, the Polish communists followed two distinctly different Marxist traditions of revolutionary tactics. This initial theoretical difference was later manipulated by Stalin, who provoked a lengthy internal Party struggle between the so-called "majority" and "minority" factions. Thus the future "majority" leader, Adolf Warszawski-Warski was first to question SDKPil's tradition, which influenced KPRP's display of total national nihilism while the Polish state was being formed. "We told ourselves that we don't care about the borders," he admitted. "We didn't understand the importance of the state."[73] Stefan Krolikowski criticized Luxemburg's negative attitude to Polish national self-determination: "Theoretically we felt that we were bringing liberation to the whole of mankind...but we didn't feel that that we represented the Polish nation."[74] And Franciszek Grzelszczak-Grzegorzewski bitterly complained about the communists' anti-Polish sentiments: "Such words as Poland or Polish interests were impossible for us to swallow."[75]

While some Polish communists expressed genuine feelings of patriotism, others tried to justify the defence of Poland as strategically useful for the future world revolution. "Is the defence of Poland's independence just a maneuver to appeal to the (Polish) peasants and working masses?" asked Tadeusz Zarski. "No! In today's historical conditions, the defence of her independence against fascist Germany is in the interests of the international revolution."[76] The future "minority" leader, Julian Leszczynski-Lenski, strongly questioned such "unorthodox" reasoning in support of the Polish state. Instead, in Lenski's view, the KPRP should primarily defend the interests of the working masses against the counter-revolutionary Polish bourgeoisie. "Pure abstract independence is out of the question," he concluded.[77]

Julian Brun, the future member of the "minority" faction, addressed the inconsistencies in communist strategy toward national issues. As he ironically noted: "We have to support the separatist movements (of the national minorities). At the same time we have to play the role of 'the saviors of the (Polish) fatherland.'"[78] According to Brun, given the communists' reputation, their new "mission to defend the Polish nation's right to independent national and political status would be incomprehensible to the Polish intelligentsia and petty bourgeoisie."[79]

In his polemics with Warski, Brun strongly defended Luxemburg's opposition to national ideology. He explained that her strategy was a

necessary condition for the establishment of a true workers' movement. "The SDKPiL worked hard against the whole of the Polish society," Brun declared, "to create a new type of a Polish worker-internationalist.'[80] Thus, faithful to the international legacy of the SDKPiL, Brun envisioned an independent Poland as the Poland of workers and peasants, functioning within the "federation of the socialist republics." Such a Poland could be only created as the result of socialist revolution, which would abolish the Versailles Treaty. According to Brun's strategic theory, the KPRP should "alarm [the Polish patriotic intelligentsia] that Poland is in danger and that...only [communists] are capable of guaranteeing her real [socialist] independence."[81] Another future "minority" member, Wladyslaw Stein-Krajewski, also advocated manipulation of the national issues. "There is no class struggle without maneuvering," he openly declared. "Maneuvering is the skill of mass mobilization...of attacking the weakest spots of the enemy, the ability to find revolutionary allies, and to bring agitation into the enemy's camp."[82] The Polish Communist Party's entire attitude toward the Jewish question could serve as a perfect example of communist skills in political maneuvering.

The manipulation of the Jewish question was strongly recommended by the Comintern's representative Grigorii Zinoviev (who was himself of Jewish origin) in his opening address: "We have learned that the Jews did not vote for the communists in Poland.... It must be some basic mistake.... I am using the example of the [Jewish] nationality on purpose, since I know that Jews are not very popular in Poland - even among the communists. But we are dealing with the political struggle and not with personal likes and dislikes... With the use of a proper tactics,...they [the Jewish workers] will be with us, when they become convinced that we have entirely broken with anti-Semitism."[83] However, Zinoviev's "practical" advice was questioned on Marxist grounds. Wiktor Bialy, for example, warned that playing with Jewish nationalism can backfire, since communists should differentiate between various social classes and not nationalities.[84]

This purely Marxist critical approach was in turn questioned by Jerzy Czeszejko-Sochacki, who pointed out that the large volume of Jewish literature and journalism in Yiddish was a clear indication of a growing Jewish national culture. In his view, this new development should not be ignored by Polish communists.[85] And Izaak Gordin-Aleksander Lenowicz accused the KPRP that, in spite of great popularity of communist ideas among the Jewish population, the Party neglects its activities on "the Jewish street." His remarks implied the existence of subtle anti-Semitism among the Polish Communist Party's activists: "Comrades show disdain toward work among the Jews," he bitterly complained. "We have to convince our own comrades that Jewish work is part of our general work. It should not be treated lightly."[86] Sochacki also confirmed some anti-Semitic sentiments shared by the "periphery" of the Polish Communist Party.[87]

In his presentation entitled, "On the National Question," Karol Radek

(another representative of the Comintern) argued that anti-Semitism is a logical outcome of the economic competition between the Polish and Jewish bourgeoisie. "The anti-Semitism of the Polish bourgeoisie," he stated, "is economically the most justified anti-Semitism in the world."[88] However, his theory was contradicted by several reports about fierce anti-Semitism among Polish workers. For example, Jakub Dutlinger described his fruitless efforts to combine Poles and Jews in one trade union. After the merger with the Jews, the number of Polish workers dropped from six thousand to three thousand. "In reality," he concluded, due to both Polish and Jewish nationalism "the Jewish and Polish elements could not bring themselves to act together."[89]

Lenowicz pointed out that the true source of anti-Semitism was simple hatred of Jews. "Quite often," he observed, "even the most conscientious and progressive workers find Yiddish repugnant and irritating. They treat Jewish culture with scorn and contempt, though they know nothing about it."[90] Despite such a deeply hidden aversion to the Jews shared by some communist activists and Polish workers, the II Congress recommended the use of Yiddish for the practical purpose of communist propaganda.[91] Moreover, in accordance with the KPRP's new appreciation of the national question, the official resolution of the II Congress declared: "The Polish proletariat should demand the lifting of all restrictions on Jews in the fields of administration, jurisdiction and education. They should demand complete freedom of cultural development for the Jewish masses,...secular schools with Yiddish as the language of instruction."[92]

The II Congress resolution diverged sharply from the KPRP's previous negative attitude toward the Jewish national culture. For example, in their struggle against the *Bund*'s national separatism, the communists condemned the Jewish Cultural League created by the *Bund*, Poalej-Syjon (Zionist left wing) and Ferajnigte (Jewish workers' organization). In the resolution of February 25, 1922, both the KPRP and *Kombund* (*Bund* communist faction which later joined KPRP) declared: "The opportunistic and social-nationalistic Jewish parties want to use cultural organizations to spread the poison of nationalism among the working masses."[93]

Even during the KPRP's II Congress, the Jews were treated like an unloved step-child. The Party was far more preoccupied with "the Polish question" and the manipulation of Ukrainian, Belorussian and Lithuanian territorial minorities against the Polish state. In the final resolution entitled "The Political Situation and the Party's Tactics," there was no single reference to the specific Jewish problem.[94] Saul Amsterdam-Henrykowski had to make a separate motion to include a special statement about the struggle against anti-Semitism in the paragraph concerning the general issue of national oppression in Poland.[95]

The KPRP's policy on Jewish issues was delegated to the special Jewish Department (later the Central Jewish Bureau) directly responsible to the Party's Central Committee. According to the Statutory Rules and Regulations

(1921), the main objectives of the KC KPRP's Jewish Department were:

a. Supervision of all the oral and written propaganda and agitation in Yiddish.

b. Struggle against Jewish nationalism and the Jewish nationalist parties.

c. Proper evaluation and reports to KPRP's leadership about all issues concerning communist activities among Jewish workers.[96]

The Central Jewish Bureau's activities were purely functional and completely controlled by the Party's Central Committee. The Central Jewish Bureau primarily served the interests of the Polish communist movement and concentrated on its current political struggle. For example, in accordance with the communists' early stand against Poland's independence, the Yiddish proclamation to Jewish workers ("Under the Revolutionary Banner," February, 1919) tried to agitate them against the new Polish state: "They say that there is no need for further struggle because we have already attained an independent Poland. They try to turn your attention from your real concerns.... They...sponsor wild cruel pogroms of Jews.... This is how your real enemies and exploiters act - the [Polish] magnates and bourgeoisie."[97]

On the other hand, the Yiddish letter of the KPP's (former KPRP) Central Committee tried to dismiss the *Bund*'s (probably justified) protest against communist tactics of provocation, infiltration and breaking up of Jewish labor unions. In response, the KPP accused the *Bund* of its alleged attempt to destroy the Polish Communist Party. The Polish communists denounced the *Bund* for its ties with the nationalist Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and cultural cooperation with Zionists by supporting the Central Organization of Jewish Schools (COSzZ). In KPP's view, such action was proof of the *Bund*'s ideological betrayal of the Jewish working class.[98]

One must admit that the KPRP also made some genuine effort to fight anti-Semitism among Polish workers. In his well-intended but somewhat ambiguous essay, "Is the Attitude Toward the Jewish Question a Sensitive Issue for a Polish Communist?" Henryk Lauer-Brand discussed anti-Semitism from the point of view of the practical benefits and the political interests of the Polish communist movement.[99] The article, clearly written for the benefit of ethnic Poles, maintained that national conflicts between workers help the bourgeoisie manipulate the lower classes against each other. Anti-Semitism, the article explained, consists, in fact, of dirty competition between Polish and Jewish shopkeepers. Such shameless chasing after profits is falsely portrayed by both the Jewish and Polish bourgeoisie as the "national question." So the Jewish bourgeois tells the Jewish worker that there is no common interest between a Jew and a "goy." The Polish worker, in turn, is infected with hatred of Jews. Thus the Polish bourgeoisie steers the Polish workers' struggle into anti-Semitic pogroms.

"The revolutionary struggle would be much easier if all the workers spoke the same language." Lauer-Brand mused.[100] However, "the existence of different nationalities is a historical fact" and "we the communists must

acknowledge such historical realities.... The Jewish workers' demand to use their own language is not a nationalistic demand," he concluded.[101]

"Suppose you don't like the sound of Yiddish," asked the author. "You will do no better then the white American who throws a negro from a streetcar because he stinks. If you want to be a communist internationalist, you must have the civil courage to oppose Polish nationalism. We communists do not merely defend the narrow class interests of a worker. The struggle of the communist proletariat represents the liberation of the whole of mankind from all kinds of exploitation and persecution. Therefore, we must defend the national rights not only of the Ukrainian and Jewish workers but also the Ukrainians, Jews, Germans and Belorussians as national minorities, for all of them suffer human indignities caused by Polish suppression of their language and culture.[102]

The Jewish Sabbath, however, was a different issue. "This demand goes against the interests of the Jewish worker," Lauer-Brand wrote. "Religious belief separates him from the Polish proletariat. Thus we should fight against such nationalistic Jewish demands."[103] In spite of Laueer-Brand's positive recognition of Jewish cultural needs, he expressed little tolerance for Jewish religious distinctiveness, which prevented unity with the Christian population. Moreover, from the point of view of the communists' practical interests, Jews should not differ from other national minorities.

Due to direct Comintern interference after the II Congress, the KPRP changed course to a more dogmatic approach toward the national question. The arbitrary dismissal of KPRP leaders (called the "4W" - Wera Kostrzewa-Maria Koszutska, Maksimiliam Horwitz-Henryk Walecki, Edward Prochniak-Weber, Adolf Warski-Warszawski) was executed by Stalin at the V Congress of the Comintern (June 17-July 8, 1924). In reference to the Jewish question, the Resolution of the Polish Committee of the V Congress of Comintern declared: "In particular, it is necessary to eradicate all the remnants of social-nationalism and Bundism among Jewish communists."[104] As a result of this new policy and an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, some communists condemned even the Jewish language and culture as "Jewish nationalism." For example, Karolski-A. Wajsblum, himself of Jewish origin, in his article, "The Weak Points of the KPRP's Jewish Work and How to Eliminate Them," wrote that the Party should "categorically stop courting the (Jewish) petty bourgeoisie by playing national farce."[105]

Due to the communists' manipulative use of the Jewish question and their growing disregard for Jewish national concerns, several young Jews became deeply disappointed in the communist ideology. "Socialism in theory had no value to me," wrote a former Jewish member of the communist youth organization. "I always look at practice. And the practice was in contradiction to the theory...I stopped believing in Marxist socialism. I became convinced that socialism would not solve the Jewish problem."[106] Another nineteen-year old youth bitterly confessed: "Somebody said to me rightly when I was

an internationalist that I worried about all humanity, about all nations but forgot my own nation's misfortunes."[107]

The Jewish disenchantment with the communist ideology was a logical outcome of the KPRP's self-contradictory "Leninist" strategy toward the Jewish minority. On the one hand, in order to recruit large numbers of Jewish workers, the Party emphasized its unquestionable commitment to the defence of Jews against anti-Semitism. On the other hand, the large number of Jews in the Polish Communist Party justified the *Zydokomuna* (Jew-communist) stereotype and, in a sense, caused embarrassment and presented a political liability to the communists. Thus the KPRP tried to "hide" its Jewish Jews in a "closet" (Central Jewish Bureau) and to keep a low profile about the activities "on the Jewish street." In all its resolutions and proclamations, even those written in Yiddish, the KPRP was careful not to emphasize the uniqueness of Jewish problems. Ironically, Jews were often compared to another extraterritorial people in Poland - the German minority. With the same "sensitivity," the communists asked the impoverished Yiddish-speaking Jewish masses to sympathize and defend the Ukrainian peasants from Polish national oppression.[108]

The most "insensitive" (to the Jewish question) Jewish members of the KPRP were the assimilationists - "non-Jewish Jews."[109] In her article, "KPP and the Cultural-Educational Problems of the Jewish Population Between the KPRP's I Congress and the IV Conference," Larysa Gamska observed that some Jewish communists' indifference to the Jews' desperate situation was the result of their Polonized family background.[110] The Jewish assimilationists were first criticized in Maksimilian Horwitz-Henryk Walecki's article, "On the Jewish Question," written in 1907. "Let's look at the type of people these so-called 'Poles of Mosaic faith' were," he sarcastically asked![111] In Walecki's view, they were Polish neophytes, ashamed of their Jewish background. "Nobody can deny," he wrote, "that all their lives they were haunted by the nightmare of ambiguous status, insincerity and imitation."[112] As Cellia S. Heller wrote in her book *On the Edge of Destruction*, "The fully Polonized Jewish bourgeoisie...lived in a make-believe world of their own construction.... Within their own community,...the assimilationists...sought escape from social deprivation, psychological derogation, and humiliation resulting from their ascribed status in a larger society."[113]

In his essay, "Anti-Semite and Jew," Jean-Paul Sartre analyzed the existential tragedy of the Jewish assimilationists. "What characterizes the unauthentic Jews," he wrote, "is that they deal with their situation by running away from it; they have chosen to deny it, or to deny their responsibilities, or to deny their isolation, which appears intolerable to them."[114] By their own choice, according to Sartre, the Jewish assimilationists created their own Jewish inferiority complex, "a fear of acting or feeling like a Jew."[115] The Jewish assimilationists' self-denial and self-hatred was also emphasized by Heller. She described this phenomenon of "Jewish anti-Semitism" as a result

of their "negative (Jewish) identity" which "they submerged in themselves as undesirable or irreconcilable with their 'positive' Polish identity."[116] This in-depth psychological analysis of the Jewish self-denial could also explain (but not justify) some Jewish assimilationist-communists' negative attitudes toward traditional Polish Jewry.[117] These communists' anti-Semitism, in some instances, reflected deeply hidden hostility toward their own Jewishness.

According to Heller, the process of assimilation in interwar Poland was strengthened by the rebellion of a whole Jewish generation against their traditional parents in the name of modern secular culture, based on rational empirical research and not the sanctity of religion.[118] In Sartre's view, it was assimilation that drove the Jews to "a rationalism of despair."[119] "The unauthentic Jew," he wrote, "has been reduced to pursuing the impossible dream of universal brotherhood in a world that rejects him."[120] In the historical atmosphere of political activism and radical ideologies of pre-war Poland, some assimilated Jews found their "universal brotherhood" in the communist movement. In his book, *The Generation: The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Communists of Poland*, Jaff Schatz argued that the choice of communism "was the most radical of all possible rebellions. It meant rebellion against the traditional Jewish world, the values of one's parents, and the values of the general society."[121] In fact, "assimilation through communism," (the expression of Abel Kainer-Stanislaw Krajewski, the great-grandson of Adolf Warszawski-Warski)[122] provided a substitute for broken family ties, social and religious bonds[123] and, most importantly, for a positive national identity.

As Kainer pointed out in his *samizdat* article, "Jews and Communism," another "road to communism," especially popular among assimilated Jewish intellectuals, led through total nihilism.[124] Aleksander Wat, the Polish poet and literary critic of Jewish descent, in his biographical book,*My Century*, described his involvement in the early twentieth century literary movement as "anti-literature." His futuristic almanac *GGA* proclaimed: "Civilization, culture with its justice, should be thrown in the garbage. Our choices are simplicity, boorishness, cheerfulness, health, coarseness, laughter."[125] The young rebels tried to irritate everyone with their somewhat naïve scandals and protests against society. According to Wat's memoirs, his later "conversion" to communism was an extreme reaction to his previous "intellectual hooliganism." It was a panic escape from nihilism and atheism dictated by the "hunger for a global (ideology)."[126]

In his search for the Jewish content of communist ideology, Schatz emphasized the universalist dimension of Jewish messianism, especially the promise of future peace, harmony and justice for the whole of mankind.[127] The other alleged Jewish features of the communist movement were semireligious zeal, intensity, abstract analytical thinking, a holistic perspective, intellectualism, historically developed senses of social and religious obligations, self-denying subordination to political causes, international solidarity and a sense of a meaningful history.[128] One could equally argue, however,

that the communist ideology also inherited the ideas of Christian chiliasm, Renaissance utopia and eighteenth-century Enlightenment.

In fact, all comparisons between Jewish messianism and communism could unintentionally feed the dangerous anti-Semitic stereotype of *Żydokomuna.* The Jewish Messianic idea, which prophesied the redemption of the Jews through moral redemption of the world, was contingent on divine, not human, will. The Messianic era in Judaism promised peace and universal brotherhood but never implied a "withering away" of nations as Marxism did. Jewish "internationalism" did not mean national nihilism but the end of national hostilities through sharing similar moral values.

The KPRP often demonstrated its readiness to sacrifice Jews for the sake of its political interests. In their book *Why the Jews?*, Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin argued that "the unique Jewish fusion of religion and nationality is anathema to the secularism and universalism of the Left."[129] But the Marxist ideology did not only attempt to destroy the Jewish national identity. According to Wat, the primary objective of the communist practice was to destroy Jews and other nationals as moral human beings. "Communism is hostile to the inner man," wrote Wat. "The reason for our leftist sentiments, fascinations and enchantment with communism was our awareness of the danger and deceit of (our) inner nature. But today we realize what the exterior (implementation of ideas) can lead to.... The essence of Stalinism was to poison the inner spiritual man in a human being."[130]

A similar idea of a moral self-destruction of the Jews, due to their infatuation with communist idolatry, was beautifully expressed in the literary biography of Isaac Bashevis Singer: "In all the centuries that the Gentiles had waged wars against each other, the Ghetto Jew had waged a war with his inner enemy, with that power of evil that roots in every brain and constantly strives to lead it astray.... The Enlightened Jew had himself become a bit of the Evil Spirit.... He had become a master of specious theories, of perverse truths, of seductive utopias, of false remedies. Since the Gentile world needed its idols, the modern Jew had emerged to provide new ones. He grew so absorbed in this business of idolatry that he became to believe it himself and even sacrificed himself to it."[131]

NOTES

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1. Compare Antoni Czubiński, *Komunistyczna Partia Polski (1918-1938)*, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1985), pp.3-29.
2. Compare the most notable studies and documents about the early

communist movement in Poland and the Jewish question: Abel Kainer (Stanislaw Krajewski), "Żydzi a komunizm," *Krytyka*, no.15 (1983), pp.214-247.; Celia S. Heller, "The Appeal of Polish Leftist Parties," in Celia S. Heller, *On the Edge of Destruction, Jews of Poland Between the Two World Wars*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp.253-260; Jaff Schatz, *The Generation, The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Communists of Poland* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1991); See also the review of Schatz's book by Daniel Grinberg in *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego w Polsce*, no.155-156 (1990), pp. 191-193; Jerzy Holzer, "Relations between Polish and Jewish left wing groups in interwar Poland," in Chimen Abramsky, Maciej Jachimczyk, Antony Polonsky, ed. *The Jews in Poland* (New York: Basil Backwell Ltd., 1986), pp.140-146; Leon Baumgarten, "Rewolucjoniści Żydzi w pierwszych polskich kołkach socjalistycznych i w Wielkim Proletariacie," *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego w Polsce*, no. 47-48 (1963), pp.3-28; Henryk Piasecki, "Żydowscy robotnicy i polscy inteligenci pochodzenia żydowskiego w PPS-Lewicy na tle rozłamów i secesji w latach 1907-1918," *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, no.129-130 (1984), pp.15-23; Maurycy Tyrman, "O żydowskich kołkach robotniczych PPS Lewicy i SDKPiL w Warszawie," *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, no. 38 (1961), pp.128-145; Larysa Gamska, "Lewica zydowskich partii socjalistycznych wobec III Miedzynarodowki i KPRP (1918-1923)," *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, no. 97 (1976), pp.61-75; Gereon Iwański, "Powstanie i działalność komunistycznej organizacji młodzieży 'CUKUNFT' w Polsce (styczeń 1922-kwiecień 1923 r.)," *Pokolenia*, no.3/47 (1974), pp.41-62; Gereon Iwański, "Żydowski komunistyczny związek robotniczy KOMBUND w Polsce 1921-1923," *Z pola walki*, no. 4/68 (1974), pp.43-78; Zbigniew Szczygielski, "Warszawska organizacja Komunistycznej Partii Polski, problemy organizacyjne," in *Warszawa II Rzeczypospolitej 1818-1938*, (Warszawa: PWN, 1968), vol. I, pp.179-205; Larysa Gamska, "KPP wobec problemów kulturalno-oświatowych ludności żydowskiej w okresie od I Zjazdu do IV Konferencji," *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, no. 3/103 (1977), pp.35-47; Julian Auerbach, "Niektóre zagadnienia działalności KPP w środowisku żydowskim w latach kryzysu (1929-1933)," *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, no.55 (1965), pp.33-56; Władysław Mroczkowski, Aleksandra Tymieniecka, "Listy Komitetu Warszawskiego KPP do kierownictwa warszawskich organizacji PPS i Bundu 1934-1936 w sprawie jednolitego frontu," *Warszawa II Rzeczypospolitej 1818-1938*, (Warszawa: PWN, 1971), vol.3, pp.133-154; T. Berenstein, "KPP w walce z pogromami antyżydowskimi w

latach 1935-1937," *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, no. 57 (March, 1966), pp. 3-74; P. Rybak, "Wspomnienia o walce KPP z antysemityzmem i pogromami," *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, no.13-14 (January-February, 1955), pp.268-273; "Szymon Zachariasz: Dokumenty do historii ruchu komunistycznego wsród żydowskich robotników w Polsce (in Yiddish)," *Bleter Far Geszichte*, no. 2/3 (1953), vol.7, pp.58-169; Henryk Lauer-Brand, *Głos w kwestji żydowskiej*, (Warszawa: 1924), also under the title,"Czy stosunek do kwestji żydowskiej jest dla komunistów sprawa drażliwa? (Z notatek więznia)," 158/V-4/12, pp.11-25, Archiwum Lewicy Polskiej (The Archive of the Polish Left), Archiwum Akt Nowych, former Archiwum Centralne KC PZPR (hereafter cited as *ALP*); Centralne Biuro Żydowskie, 158/X-2/ vol. 1-41,*ALP*; Korespondencja Sekretariatu Krajowego, 158/V-3, *ALP*.

3. *II Zjazd Komunistycznej Partii Robotniczej Polski (19. IX-2. X. 1923) Protokoły obrad i uchwały*, (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1968), p.310. (Herafter cited as *II Zjazd KPRP*).
4. Compare Isaac Deutscher, *The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.25-41.
5. Compare Heller, p.255.
6. Compare Tadeusz Zenczykowski,*Dwa Komitety 1920 1944*, (Warszawa: Editions Spotkania, 1990), pp. 9-50.
7. Adam Ciolkosz, "Dzielnica Żydowska Obozu w Jabłonnie," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, no. 20 (1971), pp.178-199.
8. 267/III/t.3, p.22, *ALP*.
9. Dennis Prager, Joseph Telushkin, *Why the Jews?* (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1983), pp. 62-63.
10. *Ibid.*, p.62.
11. Heller, p.52.
12. Prager, p.63.
13. Heller, p.88.
14. T. Berenstein, p.22.
15. J. Skalinski, "Demokratyczne drzwi...,"*Przegląd Powszechny*, vol.217 (January-February-March, 1938), pp. 3-14.
16. *Ibid.*, p.14 (trans. Julia Brun-Zejmis).
17. Julian Brun, "Cel i znaczenie hecy antyżydowskiej," in Julian Brun, *Pisma Wybrane*, (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1956), vol II, part 2, pp.102-110.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.
19. Compare "Uchwała protestacyjna przeciw pogromom antyżydowskim," I Congress KPRP, February, 1918, in *KPP Uchwały i Rezolucje*, (Warszawa: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1954), vol.1, p. 54; "Żydzi," III Congress KPP, March, 1925, in *KPP Uchwały i Rezolucje*, vol. 2, pp.179-184; J. Spis (Julian Brun-Bronowicz), "Pogromy," *Nowy*

Przegląd, 1931, pp. 5-18; J. Brun, "Endecja," *Nowy Przegląd*, 1934, pp.31-41; "Pogromy żydowskie w Niemczech i w Polsce," *Nowy Przegląd*, 1935, pp. 649-650; "Włókniarze łódzcy przeciw pogromom," *Przegląd*, 1937, no.3, p.9; P. Rybak, "Wspomnienia o walce KPP z antysemityzmem i pogromami"; T. Berenstein, "KPP w walce z pogromami antyżydowskimi w latach 1935-1937."

20. Compare "Stosunek do Bundu," KPRP I Conference, April, 1920, in *KPP Uchwały i Rezolucje*, vol.I, p. 103; Karolski-A. Waisblum, "Bolaczki roboty żydowskiej KPRP i jak je usuwać," *Nowy Przegląd*, 1924-1925 (reedycja: Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1959), pp.195-230.; "Rewolucyjne perspektywy w Palestynie," *Nowy Przegląd*, 1929 (reedycja: Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1966), pp.588-600; "Praca wsrod żydowskich i niemieckich mas pracujących," V Congress KPP, September, 1930, in *KPP Uchwały i Rezolucje*, vol.III, p.234-235; A. Szymonowicz, "Z walk proletariatu żydowskiego," *Nowy Przegląd*, 1931, pp.56-63; "Rezolucja KC KPP w sprawie pracy partji śród żydowskich mas pracujących," *Nowy Przegląd*, 1931, pp.68-71; "Przeciw pozostałosciom ideologicznym bundyzmu i poalejsjonizmu," *Nowy Przegląd*, 1932, pp.30-39; "Dlaczego KC Bundu zerwał rokowania o jednolity front? Rokowania powinny być natychmiast wznowione!," *Nowy Przegląd*, 1934, pp.14-15; "PPS a antysemityzm," *Nowy Przegląd*, 1934, pp.100-101.
21. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Kerr Edition, vol.III, p.716. Quoted after Abram Leon, *The Jewish Question, A Marxist Interpretation*, (New York, London, Sydney: Pathfinder Press, 1970), p.77.
22. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, (New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1987), p.79.
23. *Ibid.*, p.92. Compare James M. Blaut, *The National Question*, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1987), p.23.
24. At the 1880 meeting in Geneva, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Polish national uprising of 1830, Ludwik Warynski, the leader of the first workers party Proletariat proclaimed: "Our motherland is the entire world.... We are compatriots, members of one great nationality, more unfortunate than Poland, the nation of proletarians." (Trans. Julia Brun-Zejmis), Alina Molska, ed. *Pierwsze pokolenie marksistów polskich*, (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1962), Vol.I, p. 423.
25. Marx. Engels, p.102.
26. *Ibid.*, p.92.
27. Compare Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninst Theory and Strategy*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 1-20.
28. Cited in Connor, p.15.
29. Cited in Connor, p.13.

30. Compare Connor, pp. 19-20.
31. According to Connor, "The founders of Marxism...came themselves to be influenced more substantively by national concepts than they were probably aware." Connor, p. 19.
32. "On the Jewish Question," in *Selected Essays by Karl Marx* (New York, 1926). Quoted after Leon, p.66.
33. Compare Prager, pp. 137-140.
34. "On the Jewish Question," p. 88.
35. According to Leon, "The social position of the Jews has had a profound, determining influence on their national character." Leon, p.75.
36. "On the Jewish Question," p. 92.
37. According to Leon's interpretation of Marx's thought, "It is not the loyalty of the Jews to their faith which explains their preservation as a distinct social group; on the contrary, it is their preservation as a distinct social group which explains their attachment to their faith." Leon, p. 73.
38. Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in *Early writings* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1975), p. 236, p. 239.
39. Cited in Prager, p. 139.
40. Compare David McLellan, *Karl Marx: His Life and Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 3.
41. S. "Das Judentum,"" *Die Neue Zeit*, 1890, p. 28.
42. Hyman Lumer, ed. *Lenin on the Jewish Question*, (New York: International Publishers, 1974), p. 71.
43. Otto Bauer, "The National Question and Social Democracy," in Tom Bottomore, Patrick Goode, Austro-Marxism, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), pp.102-117.
44. Compare Lenin's remarks on Austro-Marxism in *Lenin on the Jewish Question*, pp. 70-71.
45. *Lenin on the Jewish Question*, p. 135.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
50. Quoted after J. P. Nettl, "Appendix: The National Question," in J. P. Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburg*, (New York: Schockem Books, 1969), p.513.
51. Compare Feliks Tych, "The Historical Controversy on the Polish Question in the Revolutionary Movement from Marx to Lenin," a paper presented at the IV World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, England, July 1990, p. 18.
52. Tych, p. 13.
53. Roza Luksemburg, *Wybór pism*, (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1959), vol.II, pp. 147-148. Trans. Julia brun-Zejmis.

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.
55. Andrzej Walicki, *Rosja, Polska, Marxism, Studia z dziejów marksizmu i jego recepcji* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1983), p. 217.
56. Roza Luksemburg, *Wybór pism*, p. 148.
57. Compare Walicki, p. 222.
58. Roza Luksemburg, *Wybór pism*, vol I, p. 399.
59. Walicki, p. 221.
60. J. P. Nettl, p. 517.
61. There are many religious references in the unpublished letters from Rosa Luxemburg's family. For example, in the postcard of Sept. 24, 1897, Rosa's sister Anna greeted her with the approaching Rosh Hashanah (Jewish New Year). In his mournful letter of October 30, 1897, Rosa's brother Jozef (who was a doctor) expressed his despair after their mother's death: "I can do nothing now," he wrote, "every day I recite Kaddish for her at the temple, the way she would have done it if I were the one who left her. Mama was religius and she often asked to pray for the recovery during her illness." (Trans. Julia Brun-Zejmis). In Anna's letter to Rosa of November 11, 1897, she remembered that their mother liked to read the Bible and to translate some passages into German for the sake of her daugther. Another letter from Anna, dated September 26, 1901, described the family's recitation of *Ayl mo-lay ra-cha-mim* in Rosa's name on the anniversary of their mother's death. (Rosa Luxemburg Collection, Hoover Institution Archive, Stanford, CA).
62. Quoted after J. P. Nettl, p. 517.
63. Feliks Tych, ed. *Rosa Luksemburg, Listy do Leona Jogichesa-Tyszki*, (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1968-1971), vol. I, pp. 196-197. Trans. Julia Brun-Zejmis.
64. J. P. Nettl, pp. 516-517.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 517.
66. Henryk Walecki, "W kwestii żydowskiej," in Henryk Walecki, *Wybór pism*, (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1967), Vol I, p. 138. Trans. Julia Brun-Zejmis.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
68. Julian Brun, *Pisma Wybrane*, (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1955), Vol I, p. 59.
69. During the internal party conflict between the "minority" and "majority" factions, following Jozef Pilsudski's 1926 coup, both Brun and Walecki were engaged in a crude political fighting. Ironically, two most distinguished party theoreticians on the national question were accusing each other of national Bolshevism. Compare "O polskim nacjonalizmie," *Nowy Przegląd*, 1926, (reedycja),pp. 378-388; "Oswiadczenie tow. Julianskiego. Do KC KPP," *Nowy Przegląd*, 1926, (reedycja), pp. 535-538; J.Spis, "Moj Błąd," *Zbiór artykulów*

i materiałów dyskusyjnych, (Warszawa, 1927), pp. 76-91.
70. In his unpublished letter to Franciszek Fiedler, Brun admitted that his theory was first inspired by the socialist system of the Soviet Union. 186/II-I, *ALP*.
71. II Zjazd KPRP, p. 25.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 27. Trans. Julia Brun-Zejmis (all quotations from the II Zjazd KPRP).
73. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 223.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 209.
79. *Ibid.*
80. *Ibid.*, p. 339.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 210. In 1925, Brun actually used his strategic "exercise in disguise," in his famous brochure *Stefana Żeromskiego tragedia pomyłek* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1958). In his brochure he artfully manipulated the moral dilemma of the liberal intelligentsia in order to convince it about communists' genuine Polish patriotism.
82. II Zjazd KPRP, p. 226.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 342.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 333.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 337.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 391.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 528.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 574.
93. Centralne Biuro Żydowskie, 158/X-2/ t. 9, p. 3, *ALP*. Trans. Julia Brun-Zejmis.
94. *II Zjazd* KPRP, pp. 507-521.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 522.
96. Centralne Biuro Żydowskie, 158/X-2/ t. 5, p. 1, *ALP*. Trans. Julia Brun-Zejmis.
97. *Bleter Far Geszichte*, vol 7 (1954) no. 2/3. p. 67. Trans. Helena Wajcman.
98. "The Answer of the KPP's Central Committee to the Bund's Central Committee," November, 1924, *Bleter Far Geszichte*, Vol. 7 (1954) no. 2/3, pp. 71-74.
99. Henryk Lauer-Brand, *Głos w kwestji żydowskiej*, (Warszawa: 1924).
100. "Czy stosunek do kwestji żydowskiej jest dla komunistów sprawa

drazliwa? (Z notatek więznia)," 158/V-4/12, p. 15, *ALP*. Trans. Julia Brun-Zejmis.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
104. *KPP. Uchwały i rezolucje* , Vol. II, p. 68. Trans. Julia Brun-Zejmis.
105. Karolski-A.Wajsblum, p. 226. Trans. Julia brun-Zejmis.
106. Cited in Heller, p. 268.
107. Cited in Heller, p. 257.
108. "Z manifestu Centralnego Komitetu Wybórczego Związku Proletariatu Miast i Wsi. W sprawie Wyborów do sejmu w 1922r., Sprawa mniejszości narodowych," (in Yiddish) *Bleter Far Geszichte*, 1954, t. 7, no. 2/3 , pp. 68-69.
109. I am following Heller's distinction between the term "assimilationist," as an active conscious existential choice, rather than the term "assimilated," which implies passivity. Compare Heller, p. 183.
110. Gamska, "KPP wobec problemów kulturalno-oswiatowych...," p. 44.
111. Walecki, p. 146.
112. Walecki, p. 146.
113. Heller, p. 202.
114. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1976), p. 92.
115. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.
116. Heller, p. 205.
117. In his book, Schatz described communist Jews who ostentatiously violated Jewish religious norms and habits, while not daring to challenge "the opium of the masses" of the Polish Catolic Church, Schatz, p. 125.
118. Heller, p. 212.
119. Sartre, p. 135.
120. *Ibid.*
121. Schatz, p. 53.
122. Abel Kainer, p. 228.
123. Aleksander Wat, *Mój wiek*, (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1990), Vol I, p. 66.
124. Kainer, p. 229.
125. Wat, p. 41. Trans. Julia Brun-Zejmis.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
127. Schatz, pp. 40-41.
128. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
129. Frager, p. 150.
130. Wat, p. 241.
131. Isaac Bashevis Singer, *Love and Exile*, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1984), pp. 168-169.

ETHNIC AND SOCIAL DIVERSITY IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND: 1918 - 1938*

Gabriele Simoncini

The Communist movement in interbellum Poland was a small political entity that did not constitute a threat to the power of the state, nor did it become a visible presence since it failed to attract a majority of the working class. The movement, overall, consisted of a number of parties, organizations and groups, usually illegal, but some at times provisionally legal. The Communist Party of Poland - CPP (*Komunistyczna Partia Polski - KPP*) was the main party, entrusted with the guiding role by the Comintern, and also the umbrella organization and ideological reference point for the Communists throughout the twenty-year existence of the Second Polish Republic.[1] The CPP was originally formed under the name "Communist Workers' Party of Poland" - CWPP, (*Komunistyczna Partia Robotnicza Polski - KPRP*). In 1920, it briefly took on the designation "Section of the Communist International" of which it was a founding member. By virtue of its name, the Party proclaimed a total proletarian orientation, ignoring the reality of an almost completely agricultural Poland at the time.[2]

In 1925, at its Third Congress, the Party took on the name "Communist Party of Poland" - CPP, a consequence of its greater sensitivity to the problems of peasants and workers, keeping this name until the party's break-up in 1938.[3] Its demise was decreed by the Comintern on a personal order from Stalin, and all future use of the term "Communist" was thereby prohibited. After 1938, no party in Poland defined itself with the qualification "Communist." The commonly used term "Polish Communist Party" is actually incorrect, whether one is referring to the Communists of Poland after 1938, or to those of the years 1918-1938. During the twenty-year interbellum period, the CPP refused any national appellation and was, like all the other communist parties of the time, a section of the Comintern, which had, in turn, decreed the internationalist character of all communist parties and the universal identity of the communist movement, a movement hostile to the notion of borders because it favored the principle of class divisions. In Poland, proletarian internationalism turned out to be an absurd and incomprehensible slogan for a nation that, having only just regained its independence after more than a century of foreign domination, continued to teeter on the edge of extinction, threatened by the German and Russian powers.

The CPP, during the twenty years of its illegal existence, was a communist party based on principles established by the Comintern and on the communist ideology articulated by Leninist Bolshevism. The Party, at least in theory, was strictly revolutionary and proletarian, an avant-garde organization of professional revolutionaries, in accordance with Leninist canons that maintained social revolution as its prime strategic goal. In practice, however, the Party

did not succeed in working along strict ideological lines. For example, the very principle of democratic centralism, at the base of Leninist Bolshevism, never functioned properly in the quotidian affairs of the Polish party, whose inner workings were complicated by a heavy Luxemburgian tradition and were marked by continual friction between opposing factions of differing ideological stamps. Moreover, the principle of iron-clad discipline preached by Lenin never gained precedence over the basic tendencies within the party towards autonomy and democracy.

In many ways the CPP was a unique revolutionary organization: its founding unified two other revolutionary parties, The Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania - SDKPL *(Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy - SDKPiL)* and the Polish Socialist Party-Left - PSP-Left *(Polska Partia Socjalistyczna-Lewica - PPS-Lewica)*. All other communist parties were formed as a consequence of schisms within a socialist party. The CPP sought to promote a strict proletarian revolutionary strategy in a nation that was largely agricultural and Catholic.[4] The Party had to confront the peculiar requirements of a working class which was small and highly fragmented, concentrated in pockets of "proletarian" workers. Moreover, this class was strongly nationalistic, tending towards reformism, and imbued with anti-Semitism. Finally, it was quite unattracted to Soviet revolutionary perspectives since Russia, and then even more so, Soviet Russia, remained a historic enemy and a constant threat to the existence and identity of Poland as a nation.[5]

The communist movement reflected within itself the complicated and chaotic social, ethnic and political patchwork comprising interbellum Poland. The CPP had the function of an umbrella organization for various parties, groups, and political organizations encompassing different social strata: workers, intelligentsia, peasants, and various ethnic groups - Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, Byelorussians; and groups that leaned toward revolutionary, populist, or communist theories and strategies.[6] The CPP was also the political umbrella for various social, intellectual, electoral, and trade-union groups that tended to come into and go out of existence, either legally or illegally. The CPP itself sometimes brought forth legal adjunct organizations, and supported and nurtured spontaneous groups of radicals and revolutionaries at large. At times contrasts flared up, but in general the dominating role of the CPP was guaranteed by the dictum of the Comintern: in each country there was to be a sole revolutionary center - a sole communist party.

In the Polish communist movement, the central position was occupied by the CPP, containing within itself workers, intellectuals and, in a very small way, peasants. The movement had two ethnic components: the Poles and the Jews. Other elements were negligible, being limited in number and confined to specific areas, like the Germans in Silesia, where membership in two revolutionary parties (the Polish and the German) was no rarity. The CPP was thereby sectioned into three distinct social groups and at least two ethnic ones.

Also under the umbrella of the CPP were two other major communist political components: The Communist Party of Western Ukraine - KPWU *(Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Ukrainy - KPZU)* and the Communist Party of Western Byelorussia *(Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Białorusi - KPZB).*[7] Their internal composition was similar, defined clearly by a strong peasant presence and with only one predominant ethnic element, Ukrainian or Byelorussian, respectively. There were, however, exceptions, due to the principle that within national territories, communists were to join the parties of the area in which they lived. Thus, there were individual cases or even small groups of Polish communists within the Ukrainian or Byelorussian parties and vice versa. This same variation occurred, though in a more limited way, with Jewish communists from these Slavic regions. The diverse ethnic components of the Communist Party surely did not ease the Party's internal workings, its revolutionary tactics and strategies, despite the communists proclaimed absolute internationalism and their refusal to abide by principles of territory or borders. As far as the Ukrainian and Byelorussian questions were concerned, the prime slogan for Polish communists always supported the principle sustained by Lenin, that of self-determination for all peoples including the right of secession and, in the Polish case, the right to follow the path to extension, to Sovietization. This slogan was not successful in recruiting the Ukrainians or Byelorussians and only alienated the Polish people since they perceived the communists to be more closely connected to interests of the Soviet Union rather than to their own national interest.

The Jewish minority was not an issue since the Polish Jews did not have territorial claims to exercise. There was, however, another problem. The Jews presented, in their own way, a threat to the State. Their ethno-cultural cohesion, their numbers, their non-integration, their economic competitiveness, and their religion set Jews apart, and they were perceived as a profoundly foreign entity in Polish society. Similarly, although for different reasons, the Communists were also perceived as a foreign entity, with the added complication that they were considered subversive promoters of the Soviet peril, and simply agents out of Moscow. From the political association of these two groups there arose in the Polish mass media of the time the term "*żydokomuna,*" Jewish Communist Conspiracy, a fitting designation for the "unholy" alliance between communists and Jews, an entity of utter foreignness and a menace to the Polish nation.[8] The term had negative connotations arising both from historic anti-Semitism and the more recently developing anticommunist sentiments in every stratum of Polish society.

On the other hand, within the Communist party itself, strictly along ideological lines, there was no problem regarding the Jewish Communist or sympathizer, since a Jew (as a member) was, first and foremost, a Communist. A member's declaration that he was a Communist implied an automatic loss of Jewishness. This was the case for many leaders of the CPP, exemplified in the famous international revolutionaries Luxemburg and Trotsky. Coming

from the Polish Jewish world, a revolutionary did not have much of a choice, for in general the Jewish community stood well apart from any sort of revolutionism and even secularism. The non-religious sector, whether of revolutionary, radical, or socialist tendencies, was dominated by the *Bund*, a historic Jewish socialist party that did not give the Jewish Communists any room to operate either inside itself or in the sparse secularist fringes of the Jewish communities.[9] Other cases of revolutionary organizations such as the *Fareynikte* or the *Poale Zion-Left* were really negligible and inconspicuous entities. The Jewish component was, nevertheless, an internal complication for the CPP, in part because within the complex Polish political arena, the Party was branded as the *żydokomuna*, and in part because anti-Semitism was still an open question in the history of the workers' movement, as attested by the ideological differences of the communist, socialist, reformist and revolutionary movements. The "Jewish question" was a long-debated issue within the revolutionary movement, always argued about amongst socialists and communists - see the notorious positions of Kautski, Marx, Lenin and, later, Stalin, on the subject. Finally, a certain degree of anti-Semitism in the Polish working class had been established and nurtured for some time, and this, for the Communists, represented another hindrance in their influence within the class itself.

Its numerical, ethnic, and social components are major intricacies and complications in the history of the Communist Party. It is not simple to arrive at a cohesive and logical portrayal of these elements since the documents detailing them are fragmentary and generally refer to only specific and isolated periods. The available sources tend to break down into four distinct types: a) statistical materials and their analyses, sometimes published by the Party presses together with the documents produced at congresses, conferences or by various organs of the party; b) documents of the Interwar period in the files of the State Police; c) a collection of questionnaires and interviews pertaining to Communist militants of the interbellum period, produced by the Archives of the Central Committee of the Polish Unified Workers Party from 1949 onward; and d) materials published from the 1970's onward, devoted to the history of the workers' movement, including biographical dictionaries, together with studies by Polish historians such as Kowalski and more recently, Szczygielski.[10]

While the number of Party members from 1918 to 1938 varied by thousands, it seems realistic to estimate the total number at a minimum of about 5,000 and a maximum of about 25,000 or more (including the youth organizations) according to the period.[11] It remains difficult to establish the exact number both because of incomplete data and a degree of confusion added by official historiographic studies of post-bellum Poland. Probably the original data coming from the CPP itself, even if only partial, may give the best idea of the real substance of the Party. Thus, the following description of the Party's beginnings and growth is based on these data as well as on the other

sources mentioned above.

For the years 1918-22, 1926, and 1929, the available data are sparse. The general difficulty of establishing the exact numbers of party members is a consequence of the fact that certain data were not recorded by anyone, neither by the party itself nor by the State Police. The CPP was always an illegal organization and the number of its members was, among other things, subject to the variations brought about by repression; Communists in prison (from about 1,000 to 5,000, according to the period) were generally not counted among the Party members. Besides this datum of relative importance, the number of Party members was always in a state of "natural" fluctuation; it varied with great rapidity and facility. Moreover, for periods of time and in entire geographical regions, the Party itself simply did not know the numbers of its own members, cells and even local organizations, which came and went. Finally, members and sympathizers were not always easily distinguished. A high degree of "revolutionary spontaneity" was present in the Party, even in the area of organizational questions, during its entire existence. It may be useful to note that after the dissolution of the Party in 1938, various territorial organizations refused to disband and continued to operate on their own, at a local level, until the Nazi invasion and even thereafter. Determining the number of Communists on the run in this period is particularly difficult.

For various reasons, therefore, the above number (from 5,000 to 25,000) remains, together with its fluctuations, approximate as does the numeric distinction, which remains to a certain extent dubious, among the party's distinct ethnic components and varied organizations such as the youth. In consideration of this, the total number of members may be subdivided into three distinct parts: the CPP comprised from a minimum of 40 percent up to a maximum of 70 percent with an average tendency of 58 percent. The CPWU went from a minimum of almost 10 percent up to a maximum of almost 35 percent with an average of about 20 percent. The CPWB, in its turn amounted to a minimum of more than 5 percent up to a maximum of 45 percent with an average of 22 percent. In ethnic terms, the phenomenon of fluctuation appears significant and even more conspicuous for certain years.[12]

	Total Members	CPP	CPWU	CPWB
1923	7,590	72.5%	20.5%	7.0%
1930	6,600	50.0%	19.7%	30.3%
1933	17,800	51.7%	25.8%	22.5%

It should be added that the CPP operated over approximately half of the national territory containing about 60 percent of the population; the CPWU operated over an area (ethnically Ukrainian) amounting to another quarter of the national territory and population, and the CPWB operated over a territory (ethnically Byelorussian) amounting to about one quarter, with a population

of less than a sixth the national total. Finally, the Communists were concentrated in small "red islands," such as Warsaw and the Dąbrowa industrial basin, and not to be found throughout the national territory and absent from it in large part. Around the middle of 1935, the CPP comprised in the Warsaw area alone about a quarter of the total (about 8,000) of its members, while there were just 140 in Kraków and 75 in Poznań. In 1919, the CPP (at that time, the CWPP) had 2,400 members (about 40 percent of the national total) in the mining district of Dąbrowa, while at the end of 1921 it had 500 members and in 1935 only 280.[13]

The ethnic makeup of the Communist Party reflected the mosaic of ethnic groups comprising Polish society, and in terms of communist ideology it represented a plain example of "proletarian internationalism". Among the Communists in Poland there were Poles, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Jews, together with a scattering of Germans, Lithuanians and Russians.

Even with regard to the Party's ethnic composition, the sources are incomplete. The ethnicity of Communist members does not seem to have been an object of particular interest; the documents of the state police did not record ethnic information, nor did the documents produced in postbellum Poland. The major source of such information is the statistical documents produced by the party itself on the occasion of national congresses, analyzed thereafter also in various publications.[14] Of the delegates to the Second National Congress (1923) of the CPP, 85 percent declared themselves Polish. At the sixth and final Congress (1932), that number had gone down to 55 percent with 26 percent Jewish, 9 percent Byelorussian and 5 percent Ukrainian.[15] The level of approximation is in any case high in these cases since in these documents there is confusion as to various designations such as Pole *(polak)*, Silesian Pole *(ślązak)*, Pole of Jewish descent *(polak pochodzenia żydowskiego)* and Jew *(żyd)*. A realistic estimate of the ethnic makeup of the party may be that Poles made up two thirds of the total and Jews almost a third. Also to be taken into consideration are limited numbers of Ukrainians (2.3 percent) together with a few Germans in Upper Silesia and other scattered cases such as the city of Łódź (5 members in 1930).[16]

Here statistical data represent a political problem, most of all as regards the number, previously inflated, of Jewish members, to whom has been attributed the ripening of cosmopolitan ideas, internationalist strategies and anti-nationalism. As has already been said, the estimation of their number as a quarter of party members is approximate, and most likely in the party's leadership - at least in certain of its organizations - the Jewish component was greater. This statistic together with other reasons cited above caused the party to be labelled "*żydokomuna*," a label that in many ways and for a great number of Poles was certainly appropriate. It has to be remembered in any case that the internationalist and anti-nationalist strategies were within the dictates of all communist parties of the Comintern, without any implications for the Jews. The issue regarding a Jewish Communist in a position of leadership (in the

Party and within the institutional power) remained alive, and assumed various forms later in Poland's Peoples' Republic, and still represents a motivation for debate.

As far as the ethnic makeup of the CPWU is concerned, matters are more simplified. The Party was composed of Ukrainians almost in its totality (more than 85 percent), clearly due to the Party's operating in ethnic Ukrainian territory. In specific cases the numbers varied. In the Lwów region, Ukrainian membership fell below 70 percent, with the rest consisting of Poles and Jews. In the city of Lwów itself, the Ukrainian membership comprised 40 percent, while Poles and Jews numbered 30 percent each.[17]

The CPWB operated in Byelorussian ethnic territories, and 80 percent of its membership came from them together with Ukrainians in the Polesie. The Jewish component amounted to over 10 percent, with Poles, mostly concentrated in the urban areas (Białystok, Grodno), comprising 3 percent, and Lithuanians one percent.[18]

The social makeup of the Communist Party was diversified, with elements from almost every social class found within its ranks. Workers, intellectual workers, and peasants formed the three major categories. In the case of the CPP, workers were present in numbers that oscillated from 65 to 80 percent, intellectual workers from 11 to 27 percent, and peasants from 3 to 5 percent.

The CPWU's structure was more centered and focused on the peasant contingent, with workers making up about 42 percent, intellectual workers 7 percent and peasants about 47 percent. Still further influenced by the peasants was the CPWB, whose worker membership averaged 30 percent, with intellectuals comprising less than 4 percent and peasants a majority of 65 percent.[19] Approximation and fluctuation must be taken into account also with regard to these data, together with a lack of precision in statistical documents on certain categorizations such as farmer *(rolnik)*, peasant *(chłop)*, agrarian worker *(robotnik rolny)* and others.

In the mid-1930's, the three parties together, the CPP, the CPWU and the CPWB, retained a "proletarian" majority, even if in a relative sense. The worker membership added up to about 48 percent of the total with intellectuals around 7 percent and peasants 41 percent. In any case, these data remain approximate. The phenomenon of fluctuation is the cause of variable and inconsistent statistics according to the period, which is also the case when data from the Party's various congresses are considered.

The worker component of the Party was concentrated primarily in the metal-working industry, mining, steel, and also in the textile, chemical, glass and tobacco manufacturing sectors. The number of unemployed Party members was constant and high and, because of its fluctuation, is difficult to estimate. The phenomenon of unemployment among Communists was a constant often associated with arrests and detention, and the majority of workers in the party remained unemployed for more or less lengthy periods. As for the Jewish communist workers, they were usually employed in small

industries, in crafts, and as commercial workers. They were a significant presence in specific sectors such as garments, wood and sugar and their characteristic trades as printers, tailors, barbers, house-painters, porters, and waiters. A certain number of Jewish workers and artisans lived in abject poverty, sometimes nearer conditions resembling more those of the "*Lumpenproletariat*" than the "Proletariat."

The contingent of communist intellectual workers represented a very small part of the Polish intelligentsia. A conspicuous number of members were of Jewish origin, most of them teachers, journalists, and office workers. The data of the CPP congresses show a distinct prevalence of teachers and journalists up to the beginning of the 1930's, while the information of the Sixth Congress of 1932 shows a great drop in all categories of intellectual workers and a sharp increase in those defined as "professional revolutionaries" *(zawodowi rewolucjoniści)* to over 65 percent of the total of intellectual worker delegates. This category amounted to 5 percent of the Second Congress of 1923. The criteria for its definition are not clear, but in any case those who were counted within it were functionaries *(funkcjonariusz)* of the Party since they were professional revolutionaries.[20]

The peasant contingent in the CPP was very small, but quite conspicuous in the other two parties, the CPWU and the CPWB. It should be added that the revolutionary peasants also had other specifically agrarian organizations such as the Independent Agrarian Party *(Niezależna Partia Chłopska)*, Byelorussian Agrarian Workers *Hromada (Białoruska Włościańsko-Robotnicza Hromada)* and the Union of the Agrarian Left *Samopomoc (Zjednoczenie Lewicy Chłopskiej "Samopomoc")*, all legal organizations. Relations between these organizations and the CPP were not always untroubled and they sometimes were in conflict. In general the Communist Party did not succeed in taking control of all the revolutionary peasants.

Other data may give a more precise notion of Polish communists. It is known, for example, also from the documents released at the Party congresses, that the Communists began their political activity in almost all cases before the age of thirty, and in half of all cases, they were under twenty. The decided majority of intellectual workers joined the Party before they were twenty years of age, half of the workers before they reached twenty and the other half before their thirtieth year; the peasants in a majority of cases became members between their twentieth and thirtieth years. Almost all of the worker delegates to the Third Congress in 1925 declared themselves independent of their families before the age of twenty at the time they took out membership. The percentage of intellectual workers was low (17 percent) and there was a drop in that of the peasants (to 9 percent).

Regarding political origins, the delegates to the Congress mentioned their prior experiences in other parties: SDKPiL, PPS-Lewica, foreign revolutionary organizations, the Polish Socialist Party, other socialist parties, farm parties, and the Communist Youth Union. The estimated percentages at the

Sixth Congress (1932) were SDKPiL - 25 percent, PPS-Lewica - 11 percent, foreign revolutionary organizations - 14 percent, the Polish Socialist Party - 8 percent, other socialist parties - 11 percent, agrarian parties - 5 percent, and the Communist Youth Union - 26 percent. In 1923, at the Second Congress, political origins stemmed in large part from the two organizations that had led to the founding of the Party itself: SDKPiL - 31 percent, and PPS-Lewica - 15 percent, with the socialists accounting for 28 percent.[21]

Finally, with regard to education, the members of the CPP were almost all literate, with about half of the workers holding skilled jobs. The large majority of members were self-taught, with some years of interrupted schooling or elementary school only. The percentage of those who had finished middle school was low, and it was minimal for secondary school. Among the delegates to the congresses, however, the level of education was quite a bit higher and varied substantially from one Congress to another. The self-taught were between 8 and 13 percent, those with an elementary school education between 16 and 44 percent, those who had finished middle school from 17 to 31 percent, and those with a secondary school education from 10 to 27 percent. Besides Polish, which served as the official language at the Congresses, all the delegates knew at least one foreign tongue, about a third knew at least two, and about a fifth at least three. Almost ten percent knew four or even five languages.[22] Many had been educated in different countries and under different foreign occupiers, and many others had been educated in two countries. Of decisive importance was ethnic background, which was itself the cause of bi- or trilingualism. Finally, the Communist leadership was not only of an international or internationalist political formation. It was characterized, furthermore, by an international militancy in many countries and parties at once, and some of its members had consequently spent their lives in many countries as a matter of course.

An international and internationalist leadership for a polyethnic, multinational, and internationalist Communist Party was only natural. But in a Poland that had only just regained its sovereignty and which maintained strong ties to deeply rooted traditions of heroic and romantic nationalism, with aspirations of expansion and polonization to the east, the Communist Party stood out as a foreign body. Its ideological inflexibility, its incapacity to adapt to reality and to the course of events kept it hampered by the constraints of illegality, making it a negligable entity without perspectives in the political arena, where its strategy resulted in self-destructiveness. It was also of little consequence on the path of revolution, where its strategy was likewise limited and self-confining. With the passing of time, the young Party became more and more the instrument of the volatile whims of the Comintern and Stalin until they decreed its political end and the physical destruction of its leadership and members that had taken refuge in the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of Poland was one of the first communist parties to be born and the first to die at the hands of the Communists themselves.

NOTES

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In the following notes, *CA KC PZPR (Centralne Archiwum KC PZPR)* defines the Central Archive of the Central Committee of the United Polish Workers' Party, where I did research during the tenure of my four annual fellowships granted by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Warsaw University up to the year 1984. Most of this Archive was transferred into the *Archiwum Akt Nowych* in Warsaw. I refer to the old name and classification because I have not used the collection since it moved to its new location. Part of the archival material here cited can be found also in *RAGS (Raccolta Archivio Gabriele Simoncini)*, a private archive in Volterra, Italy.

1. For an extensive bibliography on the CPP and on its leadership see G. Simoncini, *Revolutionary Organizations and Revolutionaries in Interbellum Poland. A Bibliographical Biographical Study.* Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston-New York, Queenston-Canada, Lampeter-United Kingdom, 1992, pp. xi 278. In English, the history of the CPP is outlined in: M. K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland. An Outline of History*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1959 and 1976, pp. 55-154. And further sketched in: J. B. de Weydenthal, *The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline.* Revised Edition, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1986, pp. 1-33. A more focused study on CPP is: G. Simoncini, *The Communist Party of Poland 1918-1929*, Dissertation, Columbia University, New York, 1991. See also: J. Schatz, *The Generation. The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Communists of Poland. Berkeley, 1991.* In Polish, the more or less orthodox Marxist literature lists: J. Kowalski, *Trudne Lata. Problemy rozwoju polskiego ruchu robotniczego 1929-1935*, Warszawa, 1966; J. Kowalski, *Komunistyczna Partia Polski 1935-1938*, Warszawa, 1975; B. Kolebacz, *Komunistyczna Partia Polski 1923-1929. Problemy ideologiczne*, Warszawa, 1984. Of general interest not intended for the specialist see H. Cimek and L. Kieszczyński, *Komunistyczna Partia Polski 1918-1938*, Warszawa, 1984. And a summary simplified sketch: A. Czubiński, *Komunistyczna Partia Polski 1918-1938*, Warszawa, 1985. Studies on the CPP appeared in the journal: *Z pola walki*, published in Moscow in the interwar period, and the homonymous *Z pola walki* published in Warsaw since 1958.
2. On the KPRP see the monograph study F. Świetlikowa, *Komunistyczna Partia Robotnicza Polski 1918-1923*, Warszawa, 1968.

3. On the party's dissolution see J. Maciszewski, ed., *Tragedia Komunistycznej Partii Polski*, Warszawa, 1989.
4. On some theoretical aspects of the early CPP's revolutionary attempts and revolutionary strategies within the working movement see G. Simoncini, *Teoria e prassi nei consigli operai polacchi del 1918-1919*, Dissertation, University of Pisa, 1982.
5. Of interest is *Procesy integracyjne w ruchu robotniczym w latach 1918-1923*, Warszawa, 1979. A collective work produced for internal use by the Wyższa Szkoła Nauk Społecznych of the Central Committee of the United Polish Workers' Party.
6. Very useful are two brief studies by Jerzy Tomaszewski:*Rzeczpospolita wielu narodów*, Warszawa, 1985, and *Ojczyzna nie tylko Polaków*, Warszawa, 1985.
7. Of interest on the two parties are J. Radziejowski, *Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Ukrainy 1919-1929. Węzłowe problemy ideologiczne*, Kraków, 1976. A reworked version appeared later in English. And A. Bergman,*Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Białorusi w latach 1924-1928*, in *Rocznik Białostocki*, Vol. VII, Białystok, 1967.
8. See the recent interesting study J. Schatz,*The Generation. The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Communists of Poland*, Berkeley, 1991.
9. The revolutionary wing seceded from the Bund and organized its own party, the *Kombund*, which joined the CPP in 1923 after having failed to push the Bund toward revolutionary positions or to join the Comintern as an autonomous Jewish Communist party. See Iwański G., "Żydowski Komunistyczny Związek Robotniczy Kombund w Polsce 1921-1923," *Z pola walki*, No. 4, 1974, pp. 43-78.
10. The types of sources:

    A. Archival - Party

    1) A*IML, Archiw Profinterna. f. 538 op. 25. Polsha 1934.* Contains information on the CPP territorial organizations at regional, provincial, and factory level.

    ii) Ma*teriały w sprawie stanu organizacyjnego partii. 1.VIII.1935. CA KC PZPR 151-VII-1, t.19.* Produced by the CPP's Representative Committee to the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

    iii) "Albert"(Wiktor Żytlowski), Z *zagadnień organizacyjnych KPP*, *Nowy Przegląd* No. 2-3, 1932. "Albert,"*Stan organizacyjny Komunistycznej Partii Polski*, *Nowy Przegląd* No.10, 1933. "Albert," *Uwagi w sprawach organizacyjnich*, *Nowy Przegląd*, No.3, 1935. Reports on CPP organization and statistics published in its theoretical organ.

    B. Archival - Police

    i) *Poufny Przegląd Inwigilacyjny (PPI)*, Warszawa, 1921-1939.

Information Bulletin published at different times by different offices of the state political police. Contains detailed information on repressive activities and on individuals.

C. Archival - Questionnaires

i) *Ankiety osobowe. Uczestnicy zjazdów partyjnych. CA KC PZPR.* A collection of 436 questionnaires answered by Party Congresses delegates: II Congress, 1923: 69 delegates. III Congress, 1925: 60 delegates. IV Conference, 1925: 58 delegates. IV Congress, 1927: 95 delegates. V Congress, 1930: 67 delegates. VI Congress, 1932: 87 delegates.

ii) Ank*iety 1949-. CA KC PZPR.* A collection of questionnaires produced by the Central Committee of the United Polish Workers' Party after the war, addressed to the former participants in the workers' movement. From 1949 through the end of the fifties. About 8000 questionnaires answered, a part of them by communists of the period 1918-1939. Partial analyses of this collection were published in the multivolume serial publication *Polska Klasa Robotnicza*, Vol. V, VI, Warszawa, 1970-1971. And also in Z. Szczygielski, *Czlonkowie...*

D. Published studies

i) J. Piasecka, J. Auerbach, *Stan organizacyjny KPP (1929-1933), Z pola walki*, No. 1, 1965.

ii) *Słownik biograficzny dzialaczy polskiego ruchu robotniczego*, Red. Feliks Tych, Warszawa, Vol. I (A-D), 1978. Vol. II (E-J), 1987.

iii) Z. Szczygielski, *Członkowie KPP 1918-1938 w świetle badań ankietowych*, Warszawa, 1989.

iv) Z. Szczygielski, *Warszawska organizacja Komunistycznej Partii Polski. Problemy organizacyjne*, in *Warszawa II Rzeczypospolitej*, Vol. I, Warszawa, 1968.

v) F. Świetlikowa, *Liczebność okręgowych organizacji KPP w latach 1919-1937, Z pola walki*, No. 2, 1970, pp. 187-201.

vi) H. Wajn, *Więźniowie polityczni w Polsce 1918-1939, Z pola walki*, No. 4, 1965.

11. *Materiały w sprawie stanu organizacyjnego partii, CA KC PZPR, 151/ VII-1, t.19.*
12. Z. Szczygielski, *Członkowie...* p. 21.
13. *Sprawozdanie z Rady Partyjnej zwołanej w połowie lutego 1919 r.*, Warszawa, 1919, p. 17. Also J. Kowalski, *Komunistyczna...* pp. 68, 75.
14. Szczygielski, *Czlonkowie...* p. 83.

15. *II Zjazd Komunistycznej Partii Robotniczej Polski. Protokoły obrad i uchwały*, Warszawa, 1968, pp. 307-312. Also "Albert," *Z zagadninen...* p. 50.
16. J. Kowalski, *Komunistyczna...* p. 89.
17. *IV Plenum KC KPZU, VI 1930, CA KC PZPR, 165/III, t.25, k.26.* Also J. Kowalski, *Komunistyczna...* p. 91.
18. J. Kowalski, *Komunistyzcna...* p. 89.
19. Z. Szczygielski, *Członkowie...* p. 31.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND (KPRP - KPP) 1918-1938

List of Members

Abolina Elza
Abolina Emma
Abramowicz Szymon (Sumer Chaim)
Abramson Kiwa KPZB
Adamczewski Stanisław Antoni
Adamczewski Wacław
Adamski Kazimierz
Adamski Stanisław
Adamski Teofil
Ajcher Lipa ZMK
Ajnbinder Szymon KPZB KPZU
Ajzen Lajb-Wolf (Andrzejewski Leon)
Ajzen Towie (Towta, Tobiasz)
Ajzenszer (Eisenscher) Markus
Aizensztajn Eliasz
Aizner Mojżesz
Akselrad KPZU
Albrecht Antoni
Aleksandrowicz Chaim KPZB
Aleksandrowicz Jakub
Alster Antoni
Altberg Helena (Chaja)
Alter Felicja
Alter Leon
Altman Henryk
Altamowa Edwarda (Szafran Estera)
Amster Icchak
Amsterdam (Henrykowski) Saul
Amsterdamski Maurycy
Amszaruk Wincenty KZMP
Andruszkiewicz Justyn
Andruszkiewicz Zenon
Andrzejak KPZB
Andrzejewski Leon (Ajzen Lajb-Wolf)
Andrzejewski Ludwik
Andrysiak Jan
Angiersztajn Alfred (Angierstein)
Aniołowski Wincenty
Ankierman Chaim
Antoniak Józef
Antosiak Maria
Anzelm Konstanty
Arkuszewski Stanisław
Aronowich Helena (Wajntreter)
Aronsztam Łazar
Aschendorf Izrael
Astman (Krzemień) Zosia KPZU
Auerhan Symche
Augsburg Gustaw
Augustyniak Eugeniusz KZMP
Babczyński Paweł
Babicz Władysław
Bachurski KZMP
Baczyńska Katarzyna
Baczyński Władysław
Badura Jan
Bagiński Walery
Bajdo Stanisław KPZU
Bajszczak Stanisław
Bajszczak Szczepan
Baka Adam Teofil KZMP
Bakalik Maksymilian KPZU
Bakoś Marcin
Bakuła Bolesław
Balcerski Jan
Balczerak Józef
Balicki Zygmunt
Ballon Wincenty KPGŚ
Baltykaklis-Gutman Mojżesz
Bames Jan

Banasiak Helena
Banaszek Bolesław
Banaszkiewicz Jan
Bando Tomasz
Banulewicz Aleksander
Baran Bolesław
Baran Roman
Baran Stanisław
Baraniecki Stefan Antoni
Baranowicz Paweł KPZB KPZU
Baranowska Lucyna
Baranowski Tomasz
Barborka Franciszek
Barcisz Antoni
Barczyński Stanisław Kostka
Bardodziej J. (Łabuz Józef)
Bargieł Teofil
Barski Józef
Barth Edward
Bartkiewicz Władysław
Bartman Maksymilian
Bartosiewicz Stefan
Bartosik Stanisław
Bartosik Sylwester
Bartoszek Franciszek
Bartoszewicz (Królikowski Stefan)
Bartoszewicz Wanda KZMP
Bartoszewiczówna Wanda
Bartusiak Andrzej
Bartz Maksymilian
Baryła Jan
Baryła Marian
Baryła Marian Seweryn
Basiewicz Michał
Basiński Kazimierz
Basista Władysław
Baszczyński Emanuel
Bau Józef
Baum Arnold
Baumgarten Leon
Bąk (Bak) Franciszek
Bąk Jakub Jankiel KPZB
Bąk Władysław
Bąkowski Karol
Bąkowski Wacław
Beatus Barbara
Becker Paweł KPGŚ
Bednarczyk Piotr
Bednarski Feliks
Bednarski Wacław
Bednarz Stefan
Beer Zygfryd KPZU
Bei Fedir KPZU
Beiser Izaak
Beiser Józef
Beiser Rubin
Bej Fedir KPZU
Bekerkunst (Bekierkunst Hersz Lejb)
Bekier Gerszon
Bekier Karol
Belier Berko
Belin (Holzer Leon)
Bem (Boem) Alfred Brunon
Bem Fiszel
Bendek Antoni
Bengom Leon KZMP
Berdnarczyk Eugeniusz
Berent Stanisław PPS-L
Bereś Franciszek
Bereza Józef
Berg Czesław
Berg Paweł
Berg-Cywiński Paweł (Zaleski Piotr)
Berkowicz Berek
Berkowicz Oskar ZMK KPZU
Berliner Fajwel (Boczkin Dawid)
Berman Aron (Borowski Wiktor)
Berman Bronisław
Berman Jakub
Bernard Maciej KPZU
Bernstein Alfred
Bernstein-Redens Mieczysław
Bernsztejn Jozef (Józef) KPZB
Bertyński W. (Żytłowski Wiktor)
Better Ernest
Better Gertruda
Better Henryka
Bialer Abram
Białkowski Jakub
Białogrodzki Jan
Biały Marian KZMP
Biały Wiktor
Bibergal Jerzy
Biczysko Stefan
Bida Antoni
Biedny Abram
Biedrzycki Franciszek
Biegajło Jakim KPZU
Biegas Stefan KPZU
Biegun Wincenty
Biel Adam
Biel Adolf
Bielak Wiktor
Bielawski Bolesław ZMK
Bielawski Henryk
Bielawski Kazimierz
Bielawski-Bogusławski Kazimierz
Bielecki Stefan
Bielecki Zygmunt KZMP
Bielenda Kazimierz
Bielewski-Paszyn Jan
Bielicki Roman KZMP
Bieliński Niemir KZMP
Bieliński Teofil
Bieniek Kazimierz
Bieniek Stanisław
Bień Józef
Bieńkowski Antoni
Bier Janina Mira
Bierencwajg Zdzisław
Biernacki Franciszek
Biernacki Henryk
Biernacki-Żelański Paweł
Bierut Bolesław
Bijak Antoni
Bilgorajer (Bolek) KPZU
Billig Wilhelm
Bilski Roman
Bilski Staniław

Biłasz Włodzimierz ZMK
Birnbaum Izaak
Bitner Anatol (Elbaum Daniel)
Bitner (Bicz) Henryk
Blaufuks-Lisowski Michał
Blinczykow Marek (Mark)
Bloch Władysław
Blumenberg Aszer KZMP
Blumenkranc Dawid
Blumenkranc Izaak
Blumbkin Eliasz
Blumsztajn Naftali
Bluszcz Paweł
Błaszkiewicz Franciszek NPCh
Błaszczak Antoni
Błoch Stanisław
Błocho Stanisław
Bobiński Stanisław
Bobiński Stanisław Feliks
Bobrowski Wiktor
Bochanek Józef
Boczkowski Marian
Bodzenta Stanisław
Bogatczuk Sozant KPZU
Bogdan Jan
Bogdanowicz Leon KPZB
Bogdańczuk Sergiusz
Bogocz Karol
Bogucki Roman
Bogucki Wacław
Bogusławski Stefan KPZU
Boguszewski Stefan
Bojanowski Czesław KZMP
Bojczuk Michał
Bojko Stepan (Stefan) KPZU
Bok Józef
Bomba Mieczysław
Bombolski Stanisław
Bomsztyk Rozmaryn
Bon Adolf NPCh
Bonar Roman
Bonat Wacław
Bondarenko-Pawlak Mikołaj
Boniecki-Wasilewski Antoni
Boraks Rafał
Borczyk Kaziemierz
Borejsza Anna
Borejsza Jerzy
Borek Stanisława
Borensztajn (Borenstajn Motek)
Borg Bernard
Borkowicz Leonard
Borkowski Jakub
Borkowski (Burek) Ignacy
Borkowski Roman KZMP
Borkowski-Birencwajg Ignacy
Borowiak Tekla (Wojtczak)
Borowicki Choma KPZB
Borowicz Jan Kazimierz KPZB
Borowik Wacław (1)
Borowik Wacałw (2)
Borowikowa (Modzelewska) Apolonia
Bortnowska Stefania
Bortnowski-Bronkowski Bronisław
Borowski Wiktor (Berman Aron)
Boruchowicz Fajwel
Borucki Stanisław
Botwin Naftali ZMK KPZU
Bożałek Bronisława
Bralski Wacław
Brandes Leopold
Bratman Ignacy
Braun Beniamin KZMP
Braun Józef KZMP
Braun Salomon
Brauner Adolf
Brauner Izydor ZMK KPZU
Breit Olga (Mańkowska-Wendel Janina)
Brejza Alojzy
Breslauer (Krause) Bronisław
Bresler Natan
Brodecki Wincenty
Brodowska Helena (Tannenbaum)
Brodzki Konstanty
Broide (Trepper) Luba KPZU
Bronisławski Edward
Brosz Wiktor KPD
Brudka Stanisław
Brudny Franciszek
Brudys Wilhelm
Brun Eugenia (Hejman)
Brun Julian (Bronowicz)
Brunowa Stefania
Brygier Jan
Bryl Andrzej
Bryskin Aron
Brystygier (Brüstiger) Julia (Prajs, Preiss)
Brzyski Józef
Bucholc Andrzej
Buchwald Meilach KPZU
Buczek Marian
Buczyński Bogusław
Buczyński Henryk
Buczyński Jan
Buczyński Wacław
Buda Andrzej
Budnik Mikołaj KPZB
Budzyńska Helena
Budzyńska Regina
Budzyński Henryk
Budzyński Stanisław
Bugaj Edward KZMP
Bukowicz Abram KPZB
Bukowski Tadeusz
Bukshorn Pinkus (Julski Wiktor)
Bukshorn Pinie
Bularz Józef KZMP
Bularz Stanisław KZMP
Bunic Józef KPZU
Bur (Burzyński Stanisław)
Burakowska Helena (Turkeltraub)
Burczek Paweł

Burdziński Bronisław
Burek Franciszek
Burgin Bernard
Burgin Julian (Juliusz)
Burgin Mateusz (Matys)
Bursa Piotr KPZB
Burski Aleksander (Helman)
Burski Jan
Bursztyn Samuel
Burzyński Stanisław
Butra Michal KPZU
Butrym Kalina
Butterman Henryk
Bychowska Eleonora
Bychowski Jan
Byrski Stefan
Bytomska Władysława
Cabaj Albin
Cacek-Ziólkowski Stefan
Cebo Franciszek
Cebo Bolesław
Cebula Teofil
Cech-Czechowski (Ciechowski) Władysław
Cedler Edmund
Cegiela Jan
Cegiełka Stanisław
Cekiera Edward
Celeda Franciszek
Celler Marian
Celmer-Celmerowski Franciszek
Celmerowski Władysław
Cencek Stefan
Chaber Ferdynand
Chabowski Władysław
Chagowski Kazimierz KZMP
Charkiewicz Władysław KPZB
Charnam Szaja ZMK
Chajn Leon
Charszewska Zofia (Uziembło)
Charszewski Adam Marian ZMK
Chazan Szymon (Majski Michał) KPZB
Chęcinski Marian
Chyb Genowefa
Chłędowski Piotr
Chmiel Józef
Chmielewski Jan
Chmielewski Wirginiusz
Chmieliński Henryk
Chmielis Jan KPZB
Chmielnicki Teodor ZMK
Chmurzewski Władysław
Cholewa Władysław
Cholewiak (Holewiak) Franciszek
Chomyn Nestor KPZU
Choromański Józef
Choruża Wiera KPZB
Chrobak Michał
Chroszcz Emil Adam
Chruściel Józef
Chrzanowska-Warszawska Jadwiga
Chrzanowski Władysław
Chrząszcz Bolesław
Chudy Józef
Chwat Izydor
Chwiałkowski Marcin
Cichecki Stefan
Cichocski Aleksander
Cichowski Kazimierz
Cichy Józef
Ciesielski Józef
Ciesielski Julian
Cieślar Jan
Cieślar Paweł
Ciołkowski Stefan
Ciszewski Józef
Cieśliński Stanisław
Cieśluk Henryk
Conder Jan (Jasiński Antoni)
Cukierber Salomon ZMK KPZU
Cukierman Abram (Zarecki M.) KPZB
Cukierwar Edmund (Szmul) (Jelicz Jerzy)
Cwajgiel Jankiel (Albert)
Cygielnicki Matys (Mowszowicz Makiel)
Cymerman Dawid (Weksler Natan) KPZB
Cymerman Izaak (Majski Juliusz)
Cyterszpil (Cyterszpiler, Kubowski) Jakub
Cytron Leon
Cytryniak Grzegorz
Czajkowski Andrzej KPZU
Czapla Jan
Czapski Wacław
Czarnecki Jan
Czarnes Dawid (Karol)
Czarnocha Dawid Jakub
Czarnota Bolesław
Czarnowski Stefan
Czech Antoni
Czekaj Franciszek
Czerniawski Teodor KPZB
Czernichow Abram
Czerwiński Jan
Czerwiński Marian (Mikołajczyk S.)
Czeszejko-Sochacki Jerzy
Czuban Kaziemierz
Czwórka Stanisław
Czyż Bronisław
Czyż Kazimierz
Czyż Michał
Ćwieląg Stanisław
Ćwiękała Antoni
Ćwiląg Jan
Ćwieląg Stanisław
Ćwik Tadeusz
Dajcz Daniel
Dajek Kazimierz
Dan Aleksander (Weintraub Aleksander)
Danecki Władysław
Danielak Franciszek
Danielak Jan
Danielak Stanisław
Danielski-Moskalik Bolesław
Danieluk Aleksander
Danieluk-Stefański

Aleksander
Daniłowicz Tadeusz
Daniszewski Stanisław
Daniszewski Tadeusz
Darnicka-Gamska Julia
Dawidowicz Stanisław
Dąb Jakub
Dąbal Tomasz
Dąbrowski Michal (Sokołowski A.)
Dąbrowski Bolesław
Dąbrowski Józef (1914-1943) ZMK
Dąbrowski Stanisław (1889-1958)
Dąbrowski Stanisław (1899-1964)
Dąbrowski Szczepan
Dąbrowski Władysław
Dąbrowski Włodzimierz
Dąbrowski Wojciech
Dąbrowski Zygmunt
Dąbski Jakub
Dechnik Józef
Dechnik Jan
Demarczyk Jerzy
Dembiński Henryk KPZB
Deperasiński Mieczysław
Deutscher Izaak (Krakowski)
Dękierowski Antoni
Diamand Bernard
Diamand Irena
Diament Maria (Mindla)
Dietrich Fryderyk
Dillner (Dylner) Józef
Dillner (Dylner) Karol
Diupero (Dupero) Jan
Długoszowa Feliksa
Dłuski Ostap (Langer Antoni)
Dmowski Karol
Dmowski Wincenty
Dobiszewski Antoni
Dobosz Wacław
Dobrowolska Stefania (Prywes)
Dobrowolski Szczęsny (Zamieński Feliks)
Dobrzyński Edmund
Dobrzyński Karol
Dobrzyński Stanisław
Doczkał Karol
Dodzinowska Barbara
Dolecki Władysław (Fenigstein Jakub)
Dolina Franciszek
Doliński Adam
Domagalski Aleksander
Domagalski Władysław
Domogalski Zygmunt
Domagalski Henryk
Domagala Czesław
Domań Antoni
Domański Antoni
Domanski Mieczysław
Domaszycki Z. KPZB
Dominiak Aleksander
Dominiak Władysław
Domkowski (Dąbowski) Michał
Domski-Stein (Stein-Domski) Henryk
Doński Jan
Dorna Jan
Dorobisz Zdzisław
Drabik Władysław
Drajer Jakub Aron
Dranka Jan
Drąg (Drążkiewicz) Piotr
Drescher KPZU
Drobner Irena
Drożdziarz Henryk
Dryga Włodzimierz KZMP
Drzewiecki (Rozenbaum) Henryk
Drzymała Stanisław KPD
Dua-Bogen Gerszon
Dubiński Franciszek KZMP
Dubowski Maciej (Epsztej Owsiej)
Duchliński Stefan
Duczko Alfons Alojzy
Duda Teodor
Duda Jan
Duda Teodor
Dudek Antoni KZMP
Dudziak Stanisław
Dudziński Jan
Dulewski Stanisław
Duracz Teodor Franciszek
Durdella KPZU
Dusik Franciszek
Duszak Franciszek
Duszkiewicz Edmund
Duszyński Zygmunt KZMP
Dutliger Jakub
Dworakowski Władysław
Dwornikow-Tomaszewicz Mikołaj
Dybala Stanisław
Dybala Władysław
Dybec Franciszek
Dyduch Karol
Dygas Władysław
Dyląg Władysław
Dylner (Dillner) Józef
Dymowski Feliks ZMK
Dyszka Feliks
Dzbanek Chaim Mejer
Działek Stanisław
Dziedzic Emil
Dziedzic Mieczysław
Dziekan Jan
Dziekan Maria
Dziekan Piotr
Dziekan Franciszek
Dziemba Marian
Dzienis Stanisław
Dzierzgowski Grzegorz ZMK
Dziesiątnik L. KPZB
Dzięcielski Tomasz
Dzięgiel (Dzięgielewski) Adam
Dzięgielewska Konstancja
Dzijak Albert
Dzikowski Tytus
Dziwirek Kazimierz
Eberle Adolf
Eckstein-Dobrzyński Szymon KPZU

Efenberg Kazimierz
Egid Jankel KPZU
Ehrman Jakub
Eigenberg (Ejgenberg) Moszek Ber
Ejzenman Jakub (Man Jan)
Ekielski Wacław
Ekiert (Ekert) Edward
Elbaum Daniel (Bitner Anatol)
Elbirt Załman
Elgrad Dawid
Eljowicz Aron
Eljowicz Henryk
Engel Samuel ZMK
Eingelman Stefan
Eingelman Szczepan
Englender Abram
Englert Wiktor
Epelbaum Mojżesz
Epstein (Epsztej) Józef ZMK
Epsztajn Dawid KPZB
Epsztejn Owsiej (Dubowski Maciej)
Epsztejn Róża (Rojza, Roza)
Erde Alicja KPZU
Erde Fryma KPZU
Erde Samuel KPZU
Erenrajch (Ehrenreich) Aleksander
Erlich Jakub M. (Oskierko Zygmunt)
Ertel Danil KPZU
Ettinghof (Ettingoff) Anna ZMK
Ettinger Adam Samuel
Fachenhaus (Fachenhauzen) Chiel
Fajl Lejb Icek KZMP
Fajngold-Falkowski Bolesław
Fal (Fall) Józef
Falon Tomasz
Faltenberg Izaak
Faltenberg Maurycy
Faltenberg-Wasilkowski Grzegorz
Faluch Antoni
Faruga Józef
Fąfara Stanisław
Fąferko (Fonferko) Feliks
Fąfora Stanisław
Feder Zofia (Syma) KZMZU
Fedor O. (Dłuski Ostap)
Fedorowicz
Feinmesser Zygmunt
Felczak Władysław
Feldblum Lejb
Feldman Mozes
Feldwurm Jehuda
Epsztein Józef
Feliksik (Feliksiak) Michał
Feld Anna KZMZU
Fenigstein Jakub (Dolecki Władysław)
Ferszt Leon
Ferszt Ludwik Elizar
Ferszt Samuel KZMP
Ferszterowski Szymon
Ferszterowski Jan
Fiałek Edward
Fiber-Haberman Miszulem
Fiderkiewicz Alfred
Fidler Jerzy (Mojżesz)
Fidyk Stanisław (Zadrużny Jerzy)
Fiedler Franciszek
Figuła Mieczysław
Figura Wacław
Figurska Wanda
Figurski Jan
Figurski Wacław
Fijałkowska Marta
Fijoł (Fijał) Michał
Fik Ignacy
Filipczyk Józef
Filipek Jan
Filipiak Adam
Filuś Józef
Finder Paweł
Finderowa (Pawlak-Finderowa) Gertruda
Finkelstein Bluma KPZU
Finkelsztein Julian (Eliasz)
Fiołek Stanisław
Firstenberg Henryka
Firstenberg (Fürstenberg) Stanisław
Fiszer Pinkus
Flak August
Flak Gotfryd Teodor
Flak Ignacy KPGŚ
Flak Jan
Flak Stanisław
Flasinski Adam
Flatau Stanisław
Flato Mojżesz
Flatt Stanisław
Flegel (Flegiel) Antoni
Fliesser Stefan KPZU
Fliederbaum (Flederbaum, Flicherbaum, Fliderbaum) Ferdynand ZMK
Flinker Szmul
Flis Maria
Flis Stanisław
Floriański W. (Kolski Witold)
Focher Zofia
Foksowicz Marian
Foltyn Franciszek
Fondamiński Edward (Efroim)
Forbach Jan
Foremniak Jan
Fornalska Małgorzata
Fornalska Marcjanna
Fornalski Aleksander
Fragstein (Fraksztajn, Franowski) Karol
Frajnd-Majewski Szyja
Franciszok Stefan
Frankiewicz Leon
Frankowska Anna
Frankowski Adam
Frankowski Stefan
Fränkel Henryk
Frejdkes (Frejtkes) Jankiel Mordechaj
Frejlich Kazimierz Jakub
Freud Feliks KPZU

Friedman Wiera Rebeka
Fronczek Władysław
Frontczak (Frątczak) Ignacy
Frost-Schlegier Szymon KPZU
Fryd Syman KPZB
Frydberg Jerzy (Izrael)
Fryde (Friede) Mieczyslaw (Majer)
Frydman (Friedman) Jerzy
Frymer (Frymerman) Jakub Wolf
FryszmanWiktor
Fujarewicz Kornel KPZU
Furmanek Antoni
Furmański Maksymilian
Fürer Wiktor KPZU
Gabara Bronisław
Gabara Marianna
Gabara Stanisław
Gabara Zofia
Gabczyński Wacław
Gabiec Olga KPZB
Gabryel Józef KPZU
Gabryjelski Wincenty
Gabryszewski Antoni
Gacek Jan
Gach Jan
Gadomski Romuald
Gago Jan
Gaik Andrzej
Gajda Stefan KZMP
Gajewska-Szpottowa Kazimiera
Gajewski Władysław
Gajst Izrael
Galik Jan
Galiński Antoni
Galiński Czesław KZMP
Galiński Wojciech
Gałan Jarosław
Gałązka Piotr
Gałecki Józef
Gałek Wacław
Gałka Kazimierz ZMK
Gamlicka
Gan Jan KPZB
Garbuniak-Żabuski Emil
Garczarczyk Stanisław
Gardeła Stanisław
Garlewicz Kacper
Garnfinkiel Salomon
Garnfinkiel Berta
Garlewicz Kacper
Garstka Władysław
Gartenkrant Władysław (Izrael)
Gawenda Szloma KPZB
Gawlicak Franciszek
Gawlicki Julian
Gawlik Edward KZMP
Gawlik Ludwik
Gawlik Stanisław
Gawlikowski Jan
Gaworczyk Władysław
Gawron Jakub
Gawron Michał
Gawron Władysław
Gawroński Stanisław
Gawryszuk
Gawrzyszewski Tadeusz
Gazda Władysław
Gąsior Rachmil
Gąsior Walenty
Gburzynski Zygmunt
Gdalewicz (Gedalewicz) Sura KZMP
Gelbard Abraham KPZB
Geller Mejer
Genat (Feldman) Możes
Gerszon Jakub
Glazer Bluma
Glazer Michał KPZU
Gendek Stanisław
Gensiorowski Włodzimierz
Gerber-Lederman Anna
Germałowicz Stanisław
Germański (Germaniski) Abram
Gębala Stanisław
Gęsiarz Franciszek
Gęsiorski (Gensiorski) Włodzimierz
Gibski Zenon
Gidzinski Bolesław
Giebartowski Edmund
Gierek Maria
Giergoń Leonard
Giermałowicz Stanisław
Giermaniski Abram
Gil Rudolf
Gil Stanisław KZMP
Giliński Ilia
Gintowt Antoni
Ginzig Amalia (Wajsbord Pola)
Giszykter Emilia
Gitlic Mones
Gitman Eliasz Szmul
Glajt Alta
Glanc Rywka
Glasman Jankiel
Glazer Bluma KPZU
Glazer Wolf
Glebow KPZB
Glesman Maria
Gluza Antoni
Gluza Jan
Gładysek Roman
Głażewski Wacław
Głażewski Wawrzyniec
Głąb Bartomiej
Głąb Marian KZMP
Głąbski Tadeusz
Głowacki Antoni
Głowacki Stanisław
Głowacki Teofil
Głowaty Michał
Głuz Fryda KPZU
Gniadek Wałdysław
Gnoiński Aleksander
Goczał F.
Godlewski Karol
Gold Efroim
Goldberg Alina
Goldberg Chaim
Goldberg Jakub
Golde-Stróżecka Estera
Goldfinger Eliasz
Goldfinger Zygfryd
Goldflam Beniamin
Goldkind-Złotnicki Antoni
Goldkorn Ala

Goldkorn Mieczysław
Goldman Jakub
Goldstein Arnold
Goldsztajn Efroim (Karłowski Tadeusz)
Goldszlak Szyfra
Goldsztajn Szymon KZMP
Goldsztein Alter
Goldszyd Chaim
Goldziuk Szloma
Golenia Franciszek
Golędzinowski Józef
Golik Karol
Goliński Tadeusz
Golocz Hanna Maria
Golonko Maria KZMZB
Gołąb Jan
Gołdys Michał
Gołębiewski Maksymilian
Gołębiewski Paweł
Gołębiowski Jan
Gołębiowski Maksymilian
Gomułka Władysław
Gonciarz Lucjan
Gordin-Lenowicz Icchak
Gordon Zygmunt
Gorowaj KPZB
Gostyński (Guzik-Gostyński) Antoni
Goszczycka Irena KZMP
Gościniak Józef
Gowin Józef
Goździński Mordka
Górajczyk Antoni Witold
Góral Wacław
Górecki Jan KZMP
Górecki Paweł KZMP
Górka Chaja Tyla
Górka Józef
Górniak Stanisław
Górnicki Oskar
Górnicki Stanisław
Górnisiewicz Antoni
Górny Wyktor
Górny Władysław
Górska-Grynberg Teofila
Górski Jakub
Górski Józef
Górski Leon
Górski Marian
Górski Mieczysław
Górski Władysław
Graber Jan
Grabowski Andrzej
Grabowski Edward
Grabowski Stanisław
Grabowski Stefan
Grabowski-Widelski Stanisław
Graca Jan
Gracjasz Jan
Gradowski Henryk
Graeser-Kalicki Konstanty
Granas Aleksander
Granas Józef KZMP
Granas Romana
Gransztof Julian
Greszczyński Władysław
Grezel Jan
Groberski Bronisław
Grochowiec Julian
Grochowski Mieczysław
Grochulski Kazimierz
Grodecki Kazimierz
Grodek Jacenty
Grodzicki Roman KZMP
Grodzicki Wiktor
Grodzieńska Estera KPZB
Grodziński Jan
Grodzik Zofia KPZB
Grol Teofil KZMP
Gromkowska Zofia
Gromkowski Władysław
Gross Rachela KPZU
Grosserowa Czesława
Grossman Henryk
Grosz Grzegorz
Grosz Wiktor
Grosz Zygmunt
Groszkiewicz Jacek
Grot Henryk
Grotowski Władysław
Gruba-Sitarski Czesław
Gruchała-Demke Emil
Grudowa Helena
Grudzień Wiktor
Grudziński Józef
Grunberg Teofila
Gruszczyńska Stefania
Gruszczyński Czesław Bogdan
Gruszczyński Jan
Gruszczyński Piotr
Gruszczyński Stanisław
Gruszczyński Tytus
Gruszecka Zofia
Gruszka Zofia
Gruszka Józef
Gruszka Kazimierz
Grygierczyk Antoni
Gryglas Kazimierz
Grynbaum Mojesz
Grynberg Abram
Grynberg-Orłowska Czesława
Gryner Berek
Grynszpan Roman KZMP
Grynszpan Chaim Szmul
Grządzki Stanisław
Grzech Paweł
Grzegorowski M.(Grzelszczak Franciszek)
Grzymski Feliks
Grzywacz Michał
Grzywacz Szloma
Grzywnowicz Roman
Gurfinkiel Izrael
Gurfinkiel Srul
Gurfinkiel Sura
Gurin M. KPZB
Gurwicz Chaim KPZB
Gurwicz Irma KZM KPZB
Gut (Lutek)
Gut Klemens
Guterman Dawid (Wiktor) KPZU
Guterman Dawid (Betzel)
Gutkind Maks
Gutkowska (Hanek-Gutkowska) Rozalia
Gutkowski Wincenty
Gutman Jerzy
Gutman Józef

Gutman Leon
Gutman Salomon
Gutowska Małka
Gutowski Czesław
Gutowski Jan
Gutwińska Ewa
Guz Eugeniusz
Guzicki Stanisław
Guzizk-Gostynski Antoni
Guziołek
Gwiazda Franciszek
Haber Adolf KPZU
Haber Ferdynand
Haberman Dawid KPZU
Habowski Władysław
Hać Michał
Hagiel Mison
Hajczyk Mieczysław
Hajewski Marian
Hakman Michał KPZU
Hakman Zysio KPZU
Halak Grzegorz KZMP
Halarczyk Maria
Halbrajch Bernard
Hałat Józef
Hamera Bogdan
Hamerlak Alojzy
Handelman (Handelsman) Ajzyk
Hanecki Jakub
Hanek Teofil
Hanek-Gutkowska Rozalia
Hanke Wit
Harb Mikołaj KPZU
Harkman Zysio KPZU
Harman Szymon
Hartenberg Roman
Hausknecht Edward
Hawryluk Aleksander KPZU
Hay Henryka
Hećko Jan
Hejman Mieczysław
Helfgot Zelda
Heller Benedykt
Heller Rudolf
Hempel Jan
Henkiel Feliks
Henrykowski G. (Amsterdam Saul)
Herbst Emil KZMZU
Hereda Wojciech
Herman Bronisław KPZB
Hernik Jan
Heryng (Ryng) Jerzy
Heyman Mieczysław
Hibner Bronisława
Hibner Władysław
Hiller Aleksander ZMK
Himelfarb Dawid KZMP
Hilmersztein Sara KZMZU
Hirsch Czesława KPZU
Hirsch Israel KPZU
Hirsh Arseniusz KZMP
Hirth Ceśka KPZU KPCz
Hoffer KPZU
Hoffman Jan
Hoffman Joel
Hofman Paweł
Hojny Franciszek
Holcer Leon
Holzer Dora
Holzer Leon
Hołod Bazyli KZMP
Hołod Jan
Hończyk Franciszek
Hopensztand Jakub Dawid
Hoppe Wiktor
Horbaszewska Stanisława
Hordyk Modest
Horoszkowski Leon KPZU
Horowitz Mojżesz
Horwitz-Kancewiczowa Kamila
Horwitz-Walecka (Heryng) Stefania
Horwitz-Walecki Maksymilian
Hoszowski Adrian KPZU
Hryculak Józef KPZU
Hrynkiewicz Bogusław Eugeniusz
Hubel Jerzy KPZU
Huber Moszko
Huberman Srul
Huberman Stanisław
Hunda
Hutor Czesław
Hylak Wojciech
Hynek Stefan
Idel Edward
Ignaciuk Bazyli
Ignasiak Janina
Ihnatowicz Stanisław
Ilinicz Wincenty
Ilski Franciszek
Imach Roman
Imielski Józef
Ingenda Samuel
Inowolski Władysław
Iwanaszko Wacław
Iwanek Józef
Iwanek Kazimierz
Iwanicki Stanisław
Iwanenko Hryć (Baraba) KPZU
Iwanowska Stefania
Iwański KPZB
Iwinski Bolesław
Izydorczyk Bolesław
Izydorczyk Jan
Izydorczyk Roman
Jabłonko Wolf KZMZB
Jabłonowski Roman Jan
Jabłoński KPZU
Jabłoński Mieczysław
Jabłoński Wacław
Jachimowicz Bronisław KPZB
Jachimowicz Michał KZMP
Jachnicki Józef
Jaglik Ludwik KZMP
Jagodziński Mojżesz
Jakobsfeld Ludwik KZMP
Jakowlew M. (Blinczykow Marek)
Jakrzewska-Buczek Sewryna
Jakubczyk Fiodor KPZB
Jakubowicz Leon
Jakubowicz Rafał
Jakubowski Antoni
Jakubowski Ignacy

Jakubowski Jakub
Jakubowski Jerzy
Jakubowski Henryk
Jakubowski Władysław
Jakubowski Władysław Henryk
Jamiński Jan
Jamróz Wincenty
Janas Herman
Janeczek Andrzej
Janik Franciszek
Janik Michał
Janikowski Mieczysław
Janowska Ludowika
Jankowska Stanisława
Jankowski K. (Brun Julian)
Jankowski Leon
Jankowski Stanisław
Janota Wacław
Janowicz Maria
Jarema Maria
Jaros Józef
Jaros Franciszek
Jarosiński Franciszek
Jarosiński Stanisław ZMK
Jarosz Zygmunt
Jaroszewicz Andrzej
Jaroszewicz Feliks
Jaroszewski Stanisław KZMP
Jasieński Brunon
Jasiński Antoni (Conder Jan)
Jasiński Kazimierz
Jasiński Stefan
Jaskoła Andrzej KPZU
Jaskólski Józef
Jaskuła Stanisław
Jastrzębski Artur
Jastrzębski Józef
Jastrzębski Mieczysław
Jastrzębski Stanisław
Jaszczak Mateusz
Jaszczuk Mikołaj
Jaszuński Salomon
Jaworska Janina
Jaworska Maria
Jaworski Alfred
Jaworski Ignacy
Jaworski Lucjan
Jaworski Wacław
Jaworski Władysław
Jazurek Stanisław
Jedynak Florian
Jedynak Wiktor
Jegier Samuel KZMP
Jelicz Jerzy (Cukierwar Edmund, Szmul)
Jerschina Marian Stanisław KZMP
Jezierska (Wolf-Jezierska) Romana
Jezior Adam
Jerzychowski Stefan KPZU
Jędrych Aleksander Boleslaw
Jędrychowski Stefan
Jędrzejczyk Zygmunt
Jędrzejowski Henryk
Joachimczak Franciszek
Joachimczak Leonard
Joksch Karol
Jolles Salomon
Jonis Kazimierz ZMK KPZB
Jórczak Szczepan
Jórek Franciszek
Jóźko Bronisław
Jóźko Lucjan
Jóźwiak Franciszek Witold
Jóźwiak Jan
Jóźwiakowa F. P. KPZU
Jóźwicki Marek
Juchniewicz Romana
Juchnowiecka Henrietta
Jugend Samuel KZMZU
Jung Dawid KZMZU
Jugerman Sura-Stella
Jungman Josef ZMK KZMP
Jura Franciszek
Jurczak Jan
Jurczak Szczepan KZMP
Jurek Wjciech
Jurkowski Józef
Jurys Marceli
Juryś Roman
Jurzak Szczepan
Juszkiewicz Leonard Jan
Juzoń Janina
Kabiniecka Olga
Kac Abram ZMK
Kac-Łozowski Grysza
Kacpura Antoni
Kacprzak Józef
Kacy Emanuel
Kaczalski Mojżesz
Kaczmarczyk Antoni
Kaczmarek Ksawery
Kaczmarek Stanisław
Kaczmarek Władysław
Kaczmarski Wilhlelm
Kaczmarski Władysław
Kaczor Czesław
Kaczor Mieczysław
Kaczor Wiktor
Kaczor Zdzisław
Kaczorowski Adam
Kaczorowski Jan
Kaczorowski-Sławiński Adam
Kagan Abram
Kagan R. S. KPZB
Kagan Mojżesz
Kaim Stanisław
Kaizer Paweł
Kajzer Otto
Kalaga Ignacy
Kalandyk Franciszek
Kalecki Edward (Tenenbaum Szymon)
Kaleta Antoni
Kalfus Józef
Kalicki-Graeser Konstanty
Kalinowski Bolesław
Kalinowski Józef
Kalinowski Mieczysław KZMP
Kalinowski Ryszard KZMP
Kalinowski Stanisław
Kaliński (Karaluch) Stanisław
Kaliszewski Franciszek

Kalmewicki Michał
Kałuża Roman
Kamela Aleksander
Kamerman Lejb KPZU
Kamieniecki Henryk
Kamieniecki Leon KPZB
Kamińska Maria
Kamiński Franciszek KZMP
Kamiński Stefan
Kamiński Wiktor
Kancewiczowa (Horwitzków) Kamilla
Kandel Jan
Kaner Sender
Kania Juliusz
Kania Stanisław
Kaniewski Julian
Kanner Fredek KPZU
Kanner Giza KPZU
Kanner (Welykanowicz) Jadwiga KPZU
Kansi Taodor KPGŚ
Kantor Abe
Kantor Emil
Kantor Felks
Kantor Franciszek
Kantor Marian
Kapa Franciszek
Kapała Jan
Kapcewicz Fajwel
Kapica Józef
Kapitański Marian
Kapitułka Tomasz
Kapłan-Podolski Henryk
Kapłan Eugenia KPZB
Kapłan Feliks
Kapłan Josel-Józef KPZB
Kaplan Regina
Kapota Abel
Kaptur Szmul
Karbowiak Leokadia
Karbownik Leokadia
Karenkowski Władysław
Karkowski Jan
Karkowski Józef
Karkut Stanisław
Karliński Zygmunt
Karlowski T. (Goldstein Efraim)
Karłowski Tadeusz (Goldsztain Efroim)
Karmanski Jerzy
Karmanski Karol
Karnak Michał
Karoluch Stanisław
Karpiński Henryk
Karpiński Marian
Kartin Pinkus (Szmidt Andrzej)
Kaseja Józef
Kasjaniuk Wasyl KPZB
Kasman Leon
Kasman Lidia ZMK KZMP
Kaspruk Paweł KPZU
Kasprzak Adam
Kasprzyk Stefan KZMP
Kaszewski Józef
Katz-Suchy Juliusz KPZU
Kaufman Adam KPZU
Kaufman Mojżesz
Kawa Stanisław (Kawczyński Józef)
Kawczyński Józef
Kawe Hersz (Henryk)
Kawenicki Izaak
Kawulok Józef
Kazimierczak Franciszek
Kazior Antoni
Kaździoł Mieczisław
Kaźmierczak Stanisław
Kącówna Helena Genowefa
Kądziela Jan
Kąkol (Konkol) Antoni
Keksztas Józef KPZB
Kempa Franciszek
Kempisty Piotr
Keppel Adolf KPZU
Ketti Anna
Kędzielawa Władysław
Kędzierski Edmund
Kędzierski Feliks
Kędzierski Jan
Kibel Gabriel KZMP
Kibryk Szaja
Kichler Nesonel
Kichler Nataniel
Kiciński Dominik
Kielian Stanisław
Kieliszczyk Jan
Kiełb Józef
Kiełczewski Kazimierz
Kiełza Adolf Ludwik
Kieniewicz Bolesław
Kierczyńska (Cukier) Melania
Kierzkowski Władysław
Kierszniewska Aniela KPZB
Kierul Anna
Kieruzalski Kazimierz
Kiliński Stanisław
Kino Cyla
Kirchner Jan
Kirkowicz Jakub
Kirkun Stefan
Kirszbraun Dawid (Daniszewski Tadeusz)
Kirszenbaum Seweryn
Kirszencwajg Dawid
Kiryluk Józef
Kiryluk Karolina
Kiryluk Władysław
Kisiel Jan
Kisiel Stanisław
Kisielewski Piotr
Kiszka Stanisław
Kiszczak KPZU
Kitel Jan KZMZB
Kizlyk Włodzimierz
Klahr Leon
Klajman Leib
Klecha Jan
Klecha Józef
Kleif Zlata KPZB
Klejna Jan
Klepner Dora KZMZB
Klimaszewska Ludwika
Klimaszewski Leon
Klimaszewski Wacław
Klimek Stanisław
Kliment Gustaw
Klimiuk Michał KPZU

Klimontowicz Kaziemierz
Klincewicz Siemion KPZB
Klioze Eliasz KZMP
Kloc Zindel KPZU
Klonowicz Stefan (Kotowicz Leon)
Klonowski Adam
Klupiński Wincenty
Klus Paweł
Klusek Stanisław
Kluska Józef KZMP
Kluszyński Piotr
Kłodecki Leon
Kłos Aleksander
Kłos J. (Kagan Mojżesz)
Kłosiewicz Wiktor
Kłosiński Stanisław
Kłyza Franciszek
Knap Feliks
Knapczyk Franciszek
Knapik Stefan
Knapowa Katarzyna
Knieja Antoni
Knieja Józef
Kniewski Mieczysław ZMK
Kniewski Władysław ZMK
Knoll Herman KPZU
Kobiela Antoni KZMP
Kobierski Wacław
Kobryner Izaak
Kobuzek Walenty
Koc Stefan Jakub
Kochanek Antoni
Kochański Władysław
Kocioł Szymon
Kocko (Matuliwna) Olga KPZU
Kocoń Jan
Koczaski Leon KZMP
Koczwarowski Stefan KZMP
Kocwarski Zygmunt
Koen Józef
Kogutek Józef
Kokoszyn Aleksander
Kole Julian
Kolorz-Kostecki Józef
Kolski Witold
Kołkowski Franciszek
Kołodko Teodor NPCh KPZB
Kołodziej Piotr
Kołodziej Stanisław
Kołodziejczyk Bronisława
Kołtonowicz Antoni
Komacki Stanisław
Komander Paweł
Komar Wacław (Cygan)
Kominek Andrzej
Komisarek Franciszek
Komorowska Bronisława
Komorowski Leon
Komorowski Ludwik
Komorowski Władysław
Kon A. KPZU
Konar Teofil
Konarski Edward
Konarski jan
Konarski Tadeusz
Konczewski Arseniusz KPZB
Kondaszewski Antoni
Kondratiuk Fiodor KPZU
Konecki Adam
Konecki-Rozin Józef ZMK
Kongul Bolesław
Konic Eugeniusz
Konieczniak Bolesław
Konieczniak Stefan
Konior Karol
Konkiel Dionizy
Konkiel Stanisław
Konopczyński Maksimilian
Konopczynski Stanisław
Konopka Antoni
Konopka Eugenia
Konopka Marianna
Konopka Tadeusz KZMP
Konopka Witold (Stępien A.) KZMP
Konopka Wiktor
Koob Władysław
Kopacz Bartlomiej KPZU
Kopanski Jan
Kopczyńska-Leszczyńska Jadwiga
Kopczyński Maksymilian
Kopeć Adam
Kopeć Stefan
Kopeć Zygmunt
Kopel-Flek Lonia
Kopińska Anna
Kopiński Stanisław
Kopka Michał
Koppel Adolf
Kopyść Izydor
Korbutiak Wasył KPGW
Korczyk Paweł (Lohinowicz Józef)
Korman Pawel
Kormanowa Żanna
Kornacki Władysław
Kornatowski Stanisław
Kornilowicz Piotr
Korol Grzegorz KPZB
Kozikiewicz Leon
Korzykowski Izydor
Kosiakiewicz Stanisław
Kosiba Franciszek
Kosiba Stanisław
Kosiba Wojciech
Kosiński Józef
Kosowski Stanisław
Kossowski Henryk
Kossowski Marian
Kost Adolf
Kostecki Antoni
Kostecki-Kolorz (Kolorz-Kostecki) Józef
Kostro Władysław
Kostrzewa Kazimierz
Kostrzewa Wera (Koszutska Maria)
Kostrzewski Leon
Koszucki Basia KPZU
Koszucki Józef KPZU
Koszutska Maria (Wera Kostrzewa)
Koszykowski Izydor
Kościanek Stanisław KZMP
Kościński Zygmunt
Kot Antoni

Kot Jozef
Kot Juda KPZB
Kotarba Julian
Kotarski Wacław
Kotas Edmund
Kotas Ludwik
Kotasiewicz Jan KZMP KPZB
Kotaszewicz Jan KZMP KPZB
Kotek Kamil
Kotlarski Władysław
Kotlicki Henryk
Kotowicz Leon (Klonowicz Stefan)
Kotowski Czesław
Kotra Julian
Kott Jakub
Kotuniak Henryk
Kotus-Jankowski Franciszek
Kotwinski Mieczysław
Kowacz Stanisław
Kowal Antoni
Kowalczyk Adam
Kowalczyk Anastazy
Kowalczyk Bronisław KZMP
Kowalczyk Franciszek
Kowalczyk Józef
Kowalczyk Julian
Kowalczyk Szczepan
Kowalczyk Władysław KZMP
Kowalski Zygmunt (Izydor)
Kowalewski (Goldwag) Jerzy
Kowalik Bronisław
Kowalska Halina
Kowalska Stefania
Kowalski Aleksander
Kowalski Bolesław
Kowalski Bronisław
Kowalski Franciszek
Kowalski Ignacy
Kowalski Józef
Kowalski Izydor
Kowalski Jan
Kowalski Michał
Kowalski Mieczisław
Kowalski Władysław
Kowalski Zygmunt
Kowaluk Michał
Kowieńska-Jankowska Ludwika
Kownar Zofia
Kowner Jakub KZMP KPZU
Kowner Leon KPZB
Kozaczuk KPZU
Kozak Mieczysław
Koziak Stefan
Koziarek Tadeusz
Koziarski Walter
Kozibąk Józef
Kozieł (Kozlowski) Adam
Kozieł Janina
Kozikowski Mieczysław
Koziński Bolesław
Koziński Władysław
Koziński Zygmunt
Kozioł Henryk
Kozioł Janina KZMP
Kozioł Piotr
Koziróg Andrzej
Koziróg Stanisława
Kozłowska Helena
Kozłowski Aleksander
Kozłowski Antoni
Kozłowski Icek Hersz
Kozłowski (Szpigiel) Jan
Kozłowski Józef
Kozłowski Ignacy
Kozłowski Kazimierz
Kozłowski Mikołaj KPZB
Kozłowski Wincenty
Kozub Władysław
Kozubowski Jan KPZB
Kozula Jan
Kożan Aleksy
Kożuszek Stanisław
Krachulec Władysław
Krahelski
Krajewska-Warska Zofia
Krajewski (Stein) Antoni
Krajewski Kazimierz (1)
Krajewski Kazimierz (2)
Krajewski Mirosław KZMP (1)
Krajewski Mirosław KZMP (2)
Krajewski Władysław
Krakowiecki Stanisław
Krakowski Aleksander KZMP
Krakowski Szymon
Krakus Aleksy KZMP
Kramarz Chaim
Kramarz Józef
Kramarz Nachman
Kramenczugier-Tabacznik
Kranich Fryderyk
Krasiński Aleksander
Krasiński Ludwik
Krasiński Mieczysław
Kraskowski Szymon KPZB
Krasnodębska Teofila
Krasnopolski Judel
Krasny-Rotstadt Józef
Krasoń Bolesław
Krasowska Franciszka
Krasowski Konstanty
Krasowski Wacław
Krasńik Marian
Kratko Tamara
Kraus Fryderyk
Krauze (Breslauer) Bronisław
Krauze Dawid KPZU
Krauze Maria
Krauze Reinhold
Krauze Wacław
Krawczyk Franciszek
Krawczyk Roman
Krawczyk Ryszard KZMP
Krawczyk Walerian
Krawczyk Wiktoria
Krawczyk Wincenty
Krawczyk Władysław
Krawczynski Władysław KPZU
Krawiec Józef
Krawczuk Matwij KPZU

Krebs Beno
Kreczman Gustaw
Krejn (Krajn) Gitla KPZB
Kremer (Tadek) KZMZB
Kręgiel (Krengiel) Stanisław
Kręglicki Piotr
Kriegel Franciszek KPZU
Kriłyk Osip
Krogulec Bronisław
Kromlicki Jan
Kromlicki Janusz
Kropidło Feliks
Kropiniewicz Romuald
Król Mieczysław
Królik Aloizy
Królikowska-Szewczyk-owa Anastazja
Królikowski Stefan
Królikowski-Bartoszewicz Stefan
Kruc Ignacy
Kruczek Władysław
Kruc Bronisław
Kruk Jan
Kruk Stanisław
Kruk Wincenty
Krupa Adam
Krupa Ludwik
Krupa Stanisław
Krupiński Antoni
Krupiński Piotr KPZB
Krupka Jan
Kruszyna Stanisław
Krygier Edmund
Krygier Zenon
Kryniecka Estera
Kryniewiecki Antoni
Krysiak Ignacy
Kryst Władysław
Krysztofiak (Krzysztofiak) Franciszek
Krzykała Stanisław
Krzemień (Wolf) Leszek
Krzemiński Jan
Krzemiński Wawrzyniec
Krześniak Wawrzyniec
Krzos Jan KZMP
Krzos Józef
Krzyczkowski Zygmunt
Krzykała Stanisław
Krzymiński Czesław
Krzynówek Stanisław
Krzysztofczyk Henryk
Krzysztofiak Franciszek (Jóźwiński Józef)
Krzywanowski Icek ZMK
Krzywnicki Wacław
Krzywolak Franciszek
Krzywolak Zofia
Krzywoń Aniela
Krzyżanowski Antoni
Kubacki Stanisław
Kubar Wiktor (Rapaport Jakub)
Kubasińska Józefa
Kubera Antoni
Kubiak Julian
Kubiak Zofia
Kubica Józef
Kubica Stanisław
Kubica Walenty
Kubica Władysław
Kubicjusz Karol
Kubicki Henryk
Kubicki Stanisław
Kubilus Eugeniusz Paweł
Kubilus Jan Jerzy
Kubik Czesław KZMP
Kubiński Jan
Kubiszewski Maksymilian
Kubowska Eugenia
Kubowski (Cyterszpiler-Kubowski) Jakub
Kubski Szczepan
Kuc Julian
Kucharski Andrzej
Kucharski Józef
Kucharski Stefan
Kucharski Sylwester
Kucharski Wiktor
Kucharuk Mieczysław
Kuchta Bolesław
Kucuński Leon
Kucybała Franciszek
Kuczborski Stanisław
Kudyniuk Aleksy
Kudyniuk Grzegorz
Kuhl Michał KPZU
Kujawa Franciszek
Kukielka Michał
Kula Franciszek
Kula Jan
Kula Józef KZMP
Kulaszek Roman
Kulik Józef
Kulik Mikołaj KPZU
Kulis Franciszek
Kulski-Szcześniewski Stanisław
Kulus Jan
Kuncewicz Emilian
Kuncewicz Jan
Kuncewicz Micha KPZB
Kuncewicz Sergiusz KPZB
Kunicka Joanna
Kunigowski Wacław KPZB
Kupfersztok Henoch
Kuoniewicz Feliks
Kur Stanisław
Kurdziel Józef
Kurkowski Józef KPZB
Kurland Stanisław KZMP
Kuroczko Eustachy
Kurowski Stefan
Kurpik Stanisław
Kurtz Piotr
Kurys Łaja
Kurzawczyk Stanisław
Kusaj Józef
Kusiak Emilia
Kusiak Michał
Kusiński August
Kusiński Bolesław
Kusiński Józef
Kusto Franciszek
Kustosik Bronisław
Kustow Józef
Kusz Paweł
Kuszko Eugeniuzs KPZU
Kuszko Julian KPZU
Kusztelak Józef
Kuś Władysław

Kutesko Stanisław
Kuziemski Karol
Kuźma Jarema
Kuźma Szymon
Kuźmicz Mikołaj
Kuźmin KPZU
Kuźmiński Michał ZMK
Kuźniar Rudolf
Kuźnicki Jakub ZMK
Kwapisz Mieczysław
Kwarciany Konstanty
Kwarta Perla Ita
Kwaśniak Marian
Kwaśniewski Josek ZMK
Kwiatek Ludwik KZMP
Kwiatkowska Anna
Kwiatkowska-Średniawska Bronisława
Kwiatkowski Antoni KZMP
Kwiatkowski Franciszek
Kwiatkowski Hieronim
Kwiatkowski Jan
Kwiatkowski Lucjan
Kwiatkowski Marian ZMK
Kwiatkowski Mieczysław
Kwiatkowski Stefan (Mikołaj) KZMP
Kwiatkowski Wacław
Kwiatkowski Zygmunt
Kwiecień Franciszek
Kwiecień Jan
Kwiecień Mieczysław KPZU
Kwiecień Józef KZMP
Kwiecień Zygmunt KZMP
Kwieciński Jan
Kwoka Wiktor
Lachtara Stanisław
Lajtajzen Zysla
Laks Tauba
Lampe Alfred
Lampkowski Kazimierz
Lamuzga Jerzy
Landau Abraham
Landman Adam
Landowski Maksymilian
Landy Adam
Lange August
Lange Stefan
Langer Edward
Langer Antoni (Dłuski Ostap)
Langier Stanisław
Lanota Edward
Lapon Maksymilian ZMK
Lapter Karol KPZU
Lasek Leon
Lasek Michał
Lasota Antoni
Lasota-Balberg Michał KPZU
Laskowski Aleksander
Laskowski Jan
Laszuk Antoni KPZU
Latało Władysław
Latusek Bolesław ZMK
Latusek Jan
Lau Bolesław
Lauer (Brand) Henryk
Lauer Kazimierz
Lauer-Brand Henryk
Lauerówna Aniela
Laufer Chaskiel KPZU
Lebenwohl Aleksander KPZU
Lebiedziński Franciszek
Leblang Leon
Lechelt Adolf
Lechelt Henryk
Lederman (Gerber-Lederman) Anna
Lederman Aron
Leff Meilach KPZU
Legiec Stanisława KZMP
Legomska Bronisława
Legomski Czesław
Legomski Kazimierz
Lehr Juliusz
Leisser Wacław
Lejbka Lew KPZB
Lekszton Józef
Lelental Seweryn
Leliwa
Lemański Józef
Lemiesz Grzegorz KPZB
Lenart Stanisław KZMP
Lenartowicz Józef
Lenartowski Stefan
Lenc Władysław
Lenczewski Bronisław
Lenczewski Stefan
Lendwicz Aleksander (Gordin)
Lendzion Julian
Leng Edward KZMP KPZB
Leniewicz Stanisław
Leń Bazyli KPZU
Lepa Józef
Lepa Kazimierz
Lepiarz Stanisław
Lernell Leszek
Lerner-Nowak Paweł KPZU
Leski Lejbuś
Lesko Natalia
Lesz Mieczysław
Leszczyński Jan
Leszczyński (Leński) Julian
Leśkiewicz Adam
Leśniak Alfons
Leśniak Alojzy
Leśniak Marian
Leśniak Wiktor
Letko Mieczysław
Lew Leon KPZB
Lewandowski Czesław
Lewandowski Jakub
Lewandowski Józef
Lewandowski Michał
Lewandowski Mikołaj KPZU
Lewandowski Stefan
Lewandowski Szczepan
Lewandowski Zygmunt
Lewartowski Aron
Lewczuk Dymitr KPZU
Lewczuk Florian KPZB
Lewecka Jadwiga
Lewnsztajn Chaim Eliasz
Lewi Mojsze (Mojżesz)
Lewicki Leopold

Lewin Bunia KZMZB
Lewin Chana KPZB
Lewin Gusta KPZU
Lewin Józef KPZU
Lewin Salomon
Lewin Szajndla
Lewińska Maria
Lewiński Józef KZMP
Lewiński Mieczysław
Lewkowicz Aron
Liberman Henryk
Liberman Szmul
Libich Julian
Lichtenbaum Abram ZMKZB
Lichtensztajn Josek
Liebchen Adolf
Lifsches Izaak KZMP
Lifsches Lewi
Lifszyc Sanik
Lifschitz-Sperber Julia (Kropka) KPZU
Lindel Jerzy
Lindenbaum Adolf
Linial Mojżesz
Linke Artur
Lewin Gusta KPZU
Lewin Józef KPZU
Lion Daniel
Lipa Franciszek
Lipert Mieczysław
Lipiński Jan
Lipinski-Koral Jan
Lipska Franciszka
Lipski Antoni
Lipski Leon
Lipski Ludwik
Lipski-Starewicz Antoni
Lipsztein Jerzy
Lipszyc Abram KZMP
Lipszyc Izaak KZMP
Lipszyc Maksymilian
Lisowski Julian
Lisowski Kazimierz
Lisowski Michał
Lityński Tadeusz
Limanowski Jan
Liwoch Ignacy
Loga Stanisław
Londowski Ludwik
Lorek Feliks
Lorek Janina
Lorek Stefan
Lorska Dorota
Lubczański Izaak KPZB
Lubczański Jankiel KPZB
Lubicz Paweł
Lubinicki Jan
Lubieniecki-Rylski Ignacy
Lubieniecki-Rylski Jan
Ludkiewicz Klemens
Ludwicki Józef
Ludwiczak Stefan
Ludwilska Jadwiga S.
Ludyga Sylwester
Lwon Giza
Łabudek Józef
Łabuz Józef
Łciński Stanisław
Łanin Grzegorz
Łańcucki Stanisław
Łapidus Lejba
Łapiński Józef KPZU
Łapot Stanisław
Łaptaś Marian
Łaszczyk Konstanty KPZU
Łażebnik Julian
Łazowert Samuel
Łącki Antoni
Łągwa Roman
Łąkowski Wincenty
Łęczycki Franciszek
Łochinowicz Józef
Łodziana Franciszek
Łohinowicz Józef
Łopacki Feliks
Łotysz Iwan
Łubowski Stefan
Łucki Jan
Łucki Michał
Łucki Pawluć Stanisław
Łuczak Czesława
Łuczak Jakub Adam
Łuczak Jan
Łuczak Michał
Łuczak Władysław
Łukasiak Zygmunt
Łukasiewicz
Łukasiewicz Franciszek
Łukasik Antoni
Łukasik Józef
Łukasik Stanisław
Łukomski Edward
Łuszczak Józef
Łuszczak Stanisław
Łydek Józef
Łysiak Andrzej
Łyszega Piotr KPZU
Macewicz Paweł KPZB
Machler Borys KPZB
Maciejewska Pola
Maciejewski Franciszek
Maciejewski Leon
Maciejewski Tomasz
Macura Jerzy
Maćkowiak Jan
Madej Stanisław
Maga Józef
Maj Stanisław
Majcher Jan
Majchrowski Andrzej
Majchrzak Edmund
Majchrzak Florian
Majchrzak Franciszek
Majchrzak Józef
Majchrzak Stefan
Majchrzak-Walter Janina
Majdak Feliks
Majdak Franciszek
Majer Teodor
Majewska Czesława
Majewska (Hibner) Maria
Majewski Aleksander
Majewski Bolesław
Majewski Edmund
Majewski Jan
Majewski Józef
Majewski Karol Hubert
Majewski Kazimierz
Majewski Stanisław
Majewski (Fraind-Majewski) Szyja
Majewski Teofil
Majewski Zygmunt

Majselman Ber KZMZU KPZU
Majski Juliusz (Cymerman Izaak)
Majski Michał (Chazan Szymon)
Majster Tadeusz
Majteles Gerszon
Majzelman KPZU
Majzeles
Majzels Karol KPZU
Majzler Abram
Majzler Natan KPZU
Majzlik Wiktor
Maizner Alfons Bruno
Makar Jan KPZU
Makowska Maria
Makowski Edward
Makowski Jan
Makowski Wacław
Makówka Franciszek KZMP
Maksymowicz Karol KPGW
Makuch Stefan KPZU
Malak Stanisław
Malanda Paweł
Malarowicz KPZB
Malec Antoni KPZB
Malec Iwan (Jan) KPZB
Malec Michał KPZB
Malesa Jan
Malik Jan
Malik Stanisław
Malinowska Maria
Malinowski Bolesław
Malinowski Franciszek
Malinowski Henryk
Malinowski Józef
Malinowski Leon
Malinowski Wacław
Malipan Adela KZMP
Malipan Anna KZMP
Maliszewski Antoni
Malko Samuel
Malracki Wołdzimierz
Małaczyński Lejb
Małecka Maria KZMP
Małecki Józef
Małecki Kazimierz
Małecki Michał
Małecki Stanisław
Małecki Teofil
Małecki Paweł
Małeska Paweł
Małkowski Józef
Malkuszewski Albin
Mamoński Józef
Mamoński Szczepan
Man Jan (Ejzenman Jakub)
Mandel Mojżesz
Mandel Ozjasz (Muszyński Wiktor)
Mandelbaum Bernard (Drzewiecki Stefan)
Mandelbaum Dawid
Mandelkorn-Próchniakowa Teodora
Maniszewski Antoni
Manikowski Józef
Mankiewicz Stanisław
Mansfeld Maksymilian
Mansfeld Mina
Manugiewicz-Żołna Jan
Mańkowska-Wendel Janina (Breit Olga)
Mańkowski Wacław
Marbarch Ozjasz KPZU
Marchewczyk Jan
Marciniak Adam
Marczak Mieczisław
Marczak Zofia
Marczak Zygmunt
Marczewski Bronisław
Marczewski Marcin
Marczewski Michał
Marczewski Roch
Marczuk Aleksander
Marczuk Foma KPZU
Marczyk Aleksander KPZB
Marecki Ignacy KZMP
Marek Edward
Marek Lucjan
Marek Samuel (1)
Marek Samuel (2)
Marek Stanisław
Marek Wacława KPZU
Margolin Hirsz (Liwszyc Szloma)
Margolis Fryda KPZB
Margolis Samuel
Margules Józef
Mariański Kazimierz
Mariański Seweryn
Mariański Wacław
Mark Bernard
Markiewicz Abram Noach KPZB
Markiewicz Borys KZMP
Markiewka Paweł
Markocki Stanisław
Markow Fiedor KPZB
Markowiak Roman
Markowicz Roman
Markowski Feliks
Marks Alojzy
Marks Bronisław
Markus Samuel
Markwiok Paweł
Marmur Szymon
Marolski Teodor
Maroń Józef
Marski Janusz KPGW
Marszał Franciszek
Marszałek Bronisław
Marszałek Feliks
Marszałek Franciszek
Martynowicz Ignacy
Marusik Maciej
Maruszewski Jan
Maryszczuk Trofin KPZU
Marzec Antoni
Marzec Jan
Marzec Michał
Marzec Stanisław
Marzysz Bronisław
Marzysz Kazimierz
Masłowski Mikołaj KZMZB
Mastalerz Konstanty
Mastalerz Władysław
Maszner Józef
Maślag Jan
Maślinski Lucjan

Matejko Czesław
Matejuk Michał KPZU
Matiaszek Karol
Matlak Stanisław
Matuszewicz Jan KPZB
Matuszewicz Władysław KPZB
Matusiak Feliks
Matus Bronisław
Marusiak Feliks
Matuszczak Stanisław
Matys Roman
Matysiak Józef
Matysiak Michal KPZB
Matysiak Zenon
Matysewicz Adolf
Matyszczak Jan
Matywiecki Anastazy KZMP
Mauer (Maurer) Piotr
Mazgalski Stanisław
Mazur Franciszek
Mazur Marian
Mazur Michał
Mazurek Jan
Mazurkiewicz Stanisław
Mączynska Julia
Mądrakiewicz Jakub
Mąka Bencjan
Mąkola Helena
Mąkola Stanisława ZMK
Medyńska Adela
Mehr Władysław
Meissnerowa Julia
Mejzner Srul
Melhior Maria
Meller Stefan
Melman Moiżesz
Melman Szymon (Milecki Stanisław)
Meluch Maksymilian
Melpert Karol
Mendak Stanislaw
Mendel Mojżesz
Mentel Franciszek
Mentel Stanisław
Merc Bronisława
Meretik Samuel (Adam)
Meretik Szmul
Merin Aron
Merkel Ludwik
Mertens (Skulski) Stanisław
Mertens Stanisław Franciszek
Mertwart Paweł
Messaros Władysław KPZU
Messner Manes
Meszberg Lejzor
Metalmann Marian Roman
Meter Zygmunt
Miara Szyja
Miarka Antoni
Mical Gustaw
Micał Augustyn
Michacz Paweł KPGŚ
Michalak Antoni
Michalak Klemens
Michalak Seweryn (Gold Izrael)
Michalak Stanisław
Michalak Tadeusz
Michałak Władysław
Michalczuk Igor
Michalczyk Naum KPZB
Michalewska Wanda
Michalski Kazimierz
Michalski Michał
Michalski Stanisław
Michalski Stefan
Michalski Wiktor
Michałski Józef
Michlewicz Anna KPZU
Michałowska Weronika (Korczak J.)
Michałowski Mikołaj
Michnik Helena KPZU
Michrowski Mendel
Mieczkowski Kazimierz
Mieczyński
Miedziogórska Dwojra
Mielcarek Józef
Mielnik Daniel
Miernik Piotr
Mierzejewski Bolesław
Mierzwa Edmund
Mierzwa Franciszek
Mierzwiński Stanisław KPZB
Migalski (Migdalski) Józef
Migała Mieczysław
Mikiel Ludwik
Mikitiuk Danil KPZU
Miklas Wawrzyniec
Mikler Andrzej
Miklos Edward
Miklus Józef
Mikołajczyk Kornelia
Mikołajczyk Ludwik
Mikołajewski Franciszek
Mikołajewski Władysław Jan
Mikuła Józef
Mikułowski Stanisław
Mikuś Wacław
Milbauer (Milbaum) Matys
Michtajan Chaim
Milecki Stanisław (Melman Szymon)
Milewski (Milecki) Jan
Miler (Miller) Teofil
Milgrom Anna KZMP
Milka Adolf
Milke Wacław
Miller Adolf
Miller Ludwik
Miller Szloma (Salomon)
Miller Teofil
Miller Wacław
Milsztejn (Dreher) Irena KZMP
Milsztejn Maria
Miłostan Stanisław
Minc Henryk
Minc Hilary
Minc Pinkus Aleksander
Minich Jerzy
Minin Jan
Minkowski Maksymilian
Minor Marian
Minorski Aleksander
Minorski Sergiusz
Miozga Ryszard

Mirek Ignacy
Mirer Golda
Mirosławski Antoni
Mirski (Tabacznik) Michał
Misiak
Misiaszek Andrzej
Misiaszek Stefan
Misieniewicz Tadeusz KZMP
Misiewicz Stanisław
Misuk Stanisław
Miszczak Piotr
Miszczak Stanisław KZMP
Miszkurko Edward
Miszkurski Edward
Mital Józef
Mitura Antoni
Mizerek Jan
Mizerkiewicz Jan
Mizerski Stefan
Mizes Józef
Mleczko Franciszek
Młodawski Edward
Młotkiewicz Roman
Młudzik Marian
Młynarski Zygmunt
Moczek Szymon
Modzelewski Władysław
Modzelewski Zygmunt
Molczyk Tadeusz
Molicki Marceli
Mołojec Bolesław
Monderer Zygmunt
Montrel Bernard
Morawiec Franciszek
Morawski Jan
Morawski Stanisław
Mordziak Leon
Mordzialek Tomasz
Morgenstern-Pastor Bronka KPZU
Morgenstern-Pastor Mateusz KPZU
Mordziak Leonard
Morgensztern Abram ZMK KPZB
Morgensztern Mojżesz ZMK
Morgensztern Abram
Moroń Józef
Morsztynkiewicz Jerzy
Mortas Bolesław
Morzyński Piotr
Moskal (Danielski-Moskalik) Bolesław
Moskalik (Danielski-Moskalik) Bolesław
Moskalik Piotr
Moskalik Władysław
Moskwa Władysław ZMK
Mosykowicz Daniel
Mowszowicz Makiel (Czygielnicki Matys)
Mozyrko Aleksander
Możdżen Eugeniusz
Mózg Wincenty
Mrocheń Jan
Mroczek Eugeniusz
Mroczkowska Stefania
Mroczkowski Stanisław
Mroczkowski Jan
Mrożek Józef
Mróz Józef
Mróz Zdzisław
Mrugacz Tadeusz
Mruklik Teofil
Mucznik Beniamin
Mularski Piotr
Mulko
Mundrzyk Ryszard
Murawiec Izrael Menasze
Murawski Konstanty
Murzyński Stanisław
Musialik Czesław
Musiał Jan
Musiał Roman
Musiał Stanisław
Musielak Józef
Musioł Franciszek
Musioł Karol
Musioł Krystyna
Muszkat Henryk
Muszyński Jan
Muszyński Liber ZMW
Muszyński Wawrzyniec
Muszyński Wiktor (Mandel Ojzasz)
Muzyczuk
Mukyk Adam
Muzyk Wojciech
Mützenmacher Mieczysław
Myszera Józef
Myśliwiec Józef
Nachtman Marian
Nachtman Władysław
Nagiel Antoni
Nagórska Danuta KPZU
Nagulewicz (Nakulewicz) Bazyl
Naguszewski Jan
Najdek Ksawery (Najdyk Josek)
Najdyk Josek
Najder Leon
Najmark Rajzla
Najmuła Julian
Nalazek Jan
Nalepa Emil
Namiot Liza
Namysłowska (Żeromska) Maria
Nankiewicz Stanisław
Narewski Gabriel KPZB
Nasberg Ksawery (Kolski)
Naszewski Mojżesz KPZB
Naszkowski Marian
Natal Abram
Natanson Szymon
Naumberg Sara
Naumowiec Włodzimierz KPZB
Nawłoka Jan KPZU
Nawrat Franciszek
Nawrot Franciszek
Nazarko Piotr
Nejman Chil (Neuman Jechiel)
Nejman Estera KPZB
Nejtlich (Majer Szymon) KZMZU
Neubauer Wacław
Neuman Artur
Neuteich Zygmunt
Nędza Piotr

Niczyporuk Aleksander
Niebieski Abram
Niećko Wacław
Niedziałek Jan ZMK
Niedzielski Józef
Niedzielski Piotr
Niedzieluk Agafia KPZU
Niedzieluk Wasyl KPZU
Niedziński Jan
Niedziółka Franciszek KZMP
Niedźwiedzki Teofil
Niemirska Emilia
Niepostyn Bolesław
Niestroj Jerzy KZMP
Nieszporek Ryszard
Nieścierowicz Aleksander KPZB
Nieścierowicz Eugeniusz KPZB
Niewiadomski Kazimierz
Niewiadomski Stefan
Nijakowski Walenty
Nikoniuk Jan
Nikonowicz Antoni KPZB
Nisenbaum Abram Chaskiel
Nisenbaum (Nusenbaum) Icek
Nisenbaum Rajzla
Nitenberg Karol
Nizioł Antoni
Noga Klemens ZMK
Nogal Jan
Nomberg (Izrael) Menachem
Nomberg Sara
Norska (Drajzensztok) Eugenia
Nosek Michal
Nowacki Antoni
Nowaczyński Stanisław
Nowak Antoni
Nowak Antonia (Langer)
Nowak Bolesław
Nowak Czesław
Nowak Edward
Nowak Feliks
Nowak Józef (Icek) ZMK KPZB
Nowak Józef
Nowak Kaziemierz
Nowak Leon
Nowak Roman
Nowak Zofia
Nowak Zenon
Nowak-Kurlandzka Mirosława
Nowakowska Maria
Nowakowski Adam
Nowakowski Jan
Nowakowski Józef
Nowakowski Zygmunt
Nowicka Wiktoria
Nowicki Andrzej KPZB
Nowicki Julian
Nowicki Stanisław
Nowicki Władysław
Nowik Litman KPZB
Nowogródzka Judyta
Nowogródzki Mojżesz
Nowosad Andrzej KPZU
Nowosad Sawa KPZU
Nowotko Marceli
Nożyński Władysław
Nycek Franciszek
Nycz Alojzy
Nysenbaum Baruch
Obiedzinski Bonifacy
Obórko Józefa
Ochab Edward
Ochab Aleksander
Ogierman Jan
Ojzer Abram
Okarmus Stanisław
Oksyńczuk Iwan KPZU
Olczak Stanisław
Oleksiuk KPZU
Olesiowa Władysława
Olszewski Jan
Opieszyński Józef
Oppman Tadeusz
Orbach Michał
Orechwo Mikołaj
Orensztajn Perec
Orlowska (Grynberg) Cecylia Czesława
Orłowska Edwarda
Orski Henryk KZMP
Orzechowski Ignacy
Osetek Kazimierz
Oskierko Zygmunt (Erlich Jakub M.)
Ostadły Jan
Owczarek Roman
Ozór Kazimierz
Pacanowska Rachela
Paciorkowski
Pacyna Józef
Pakulska Paulina
Pakulski Marian
Paluch Walenty
Paluszkiewicz Józef
Pałczynski Stanisław
Pałczynski Władysław
Pancer Jakub
Panic Alfred
Panic Wincenty
Parczyński Bogdan
Partyka Władysław
Passini Józef
Pasternak Władysław
Pasterny Jan
Pastwiński Bolesław
Paszkowski Zbigniew S.
Paszta Józef
Paszta Tadeusz
Paszyn Jan
Paszyn-Bieliewski Jan
Pawin Aron
Pawlak Bolesław
Pawlak Franciszek
Pawlak Władysław
Pawlak-Finderowa Gertruda
Pawlik Antoni
Pawlik Bronisław
Pawlik Piotr
Pawlowski Jan
Październerski Jan
Penconek Stanisław
Perelmuter Symcha KPZU
Perelsztajn Berek KPZB
Peremyśli Samuel

Perlberger Abraham
Peter Fryderyk
Petrejko Aleksander KPZB
Petroniuk R. W. KPZU
Petruczenia Konstanty KPZB
Petrykiewicz Władysław
Pękalski Kazimierz
Pflug Abraham A.
Piątkowski Stanisław
Piecha Alfred
Piecha Jan
Piecuch Konrad
Pieczko Franciszek
Pieczka Augustyn
Pieczyńska Maria
Piekarz Stefan
Piegat Sylwester
Pieprzyk Władysław
Pierges Józef
Piesch Karol
Pietrusiak Władysław
Pierzynka Stanisław
Pietrykiewicz Władysław
Pitrzak Wacław
Pietrzyk Władysław
Pietrzykowski Antoni
Piękniewski Zygmunt
Pilch Jan
Pilch Jerzy
Piltz Franciszek
Piotrowski Władysław
Piórko Paweł KZMP
Piprek Józef
Pirutin Augustyn
Piryszko Teodor KPZB
Pisarek Feliks
Pisera Tadeusz
Pitucka F.
Piwowarska Irena
Pleszeluk
Płaczyński Stanisław
Płochocki Marian E.
Płoński Dorian J.
Płotnicka Emma H.
Płużycki Stanisław
Płuciennik-Dyszyńska Marianna
Płudowski Franciszek
Poczymok Jakub
Podlewski Eugeniusz
Podraza Stanisław
Pohorille Izydor ZMK
Pokorski Józef
Polański Aleksander KZMP
Polewka Adam
Pollak Stanisław
Popiel Eustachy
Porembski Konstanty
Posner Szymon
Posnerowa Zofia
Poturaj Aleksander KPZU
Pożywiłek Michał
Półgroszek
Późniak N. KZMZB
Prawin Jakub
Press Izydor KZMP
Proper KPZU
Próchniak Edward
Pryma Jerzy KZMP KPZU
Przedecka Stefania
Przybył-Stalski Kazimierz
Przybyszewski Eugeniusz
Przybyszewski Stefan
Przysuski Abram
Przysuski Salomon
Przysuski Zygmunt
Pszczola Augustyn
Pszczółkowski Edmund
Pszenicki Zygmunt
Ptaszewska Danuta KPZB
Purman Leon
Putkowski Lucjan
Putrament Jerzy
Pydzik Andrzej
Pyrek Józef
Pyrek Wacław
Pytlas Marian
Pyzik Kazimierz
Rabczuk Andrzej KPZU
Rachliński Tomasz
Radek Karol
Radkiewicz Stanisław
Radkiewiczowa Ruta
Radwański Tadeusz
Raff Abram
Rajner Tadeusz
Rajnkopf Lejzor KZMP
Rajnsztajn Jakub
Rajski Andrzej ZMK KPZU
Rajszczak Feliks
Rak Jan
Rak Józef
Rakowski Józef
Rapaport Jakub (Kubar Wiktor)
Ratusiński Antoni
Rauch KZMP
Redens (Bernstein-Redens) Mieczysław
Reicher Gustaw
Rejminiak Stanisław
Restel Kurt
Reszke Julian
Ritan Fryderyk
Ritter Adolf
Rol Stanisław
Rogow Tobiasz ZMK KPZB
Romaniuk Mikołaj KPZU
Romaniuk Stefania KPZU
Romanowicz (Sandler) Ignacy
Ronda Wawrzyniec
Rosiński Marek
Rosenbusch Emil KPZU
Rossner Michał
Rostkowski Marceli
Roszko Jerzy
Rot Bronisław ZMK KPZU
Rot Julian
Rotmensz
Rotszadt (Krasny-Rotstadt) Jozef
Rozdajczer Artur KPZU
Rozen Alek
Rozenbaum (Drzewiecki) Henryk
Rozenberg Abram KPZB
Rozenberg Chil
Rozenberg Ludwik KPZU
Rozenberg Mojżesz KZMP

Rozenek Aleksander
Rozek Wacław
Rózga Wacław
Rubin Henryk KZMP
Rubinsztajn Józef
Rubinsztajn Marian
Rudel Chaim KPZU
Rudel-Pomirska Genia KPZU
Rudniański Stefan
Rudziński Jarosław KZMZU
Rumiński Bolesław KZMP
Rusak Antoni
Rusek Franciszek
Rusin Karol
Rustecki Jan
Rutkiewicz Wincenty
Rutkowski Ignacy
Rutkowski Czesław
Rutkowski Stanisław
Rutkowski Tomasz
Rwal (Reicher) Gustaw
Rybak Piotr
Rybarczyk Józef
Rybicki Marian
Rybka Franciszek
Ryczek Paweł
Rydygier Juliusz A.
Rykowski Stanisław
Rylski (Lubiniecki-Rylski) Ignacy
Rylski Henryk
Ryło Fiodor KPZB
Ryng (Heryng) Jerzy
Ryttau Fryderyk
Sadowski Tymoteusz KPZB
Safir Dolcio KPZU
Samuel Marek
Sandel Marek KPZU
Sankowski Paweł
Sankowski Piotr
Sawicki Teodor KPZB
Shafel KPZU
Schaff Adam KPZU
Schapiro-Suchy Natan KPZU
Schleien Klara KPZU
Schleien Szlomo KPZU
Schneck Fryderyk KPZU
Schulsinger Bernard KPZU
Schulsinger Szulim KPZU
Schwarz Michał
Segda Stanisław KZMP
Sekulski Józef
Semeńczuk Mikołaj KPZU
Seniuk Adrian KPZU
Serafin Edward
Siedlecki Jerzy
Siegman Edmund KPZU
Siekierski Alfred KZMP
Sielańczyk Iwan
Sielanczuk
Sieriankiewicz Paweł
Sierp Justyna (Elza)
Sierpiński (Kagan Mojżesz)
Siudalski Ryszard
Siwy Kazimierz KPZB
Skalski Józef
Skibiński Franciszek
Skoczek Jan
Skonecki Czesław
Skorek Władysław
Skowronek Józef
Skowroński Bolesław
Skórnicki Roman
Skórnik Marceli
Skórzewska Stanisława
Skrzeszewska Bronisława
Skrzynecki Stanisław
Skrzypek Józef
Skulczyk Dawid
Skulski-Mertens Stanisław
Skuteli Bruno KZMP
Słabuszewski Jan
Słama Emil
Sławiński (Kaczorowski) Adam
Sławny Roman
Słowes Chaim
Smaga Jan
Smolar Hersz KPZU
Smolarczyk Franciszek
Smugała Franciszek
Smyrkowski Wojciech
Snopek Aleksander
Sobański Stanisław
Sobiesiak Józef
Sobczyński-Spychaj Władysław
Sochacki (Czeszejko-Sochacki) Jerzy
Sokolicz Antonina
Sokół J. (Burzyński Stanisław)
Sokołowski Aleksander (Dąbrowski M.)
Sokołowski Janusz
Sokołowski Michał
Sokorski Włodzimierz
Solak Maria KZMZU
Sołoniewicz Iwan KPZB
Sowiński Stanisław
Spandorfer Henryk KPZU
Sperber Samuel (Turner Ryszard) KPZU
Spruch Ludwik
Spychaj (Sobczyński-Spychaj) Władysław
Spychalski Marian
Spychała Władysław
Sroczynski Jan
Stachurski Aleksander
Stanclik Jan
Stande Stanisław Ryszard
Stanek Bronisław
Stanik Marian
Starewicz (Lipski-Starewicz) Antoni
Stasiak Leon
Stasiak W. (Berman Bronisław)
Stankiewicz Włodzimierz
Staszko August
Stawar Andrzej
Stec Józef
Stecki Marek
Stefaniak Stanisław
Stein Władysław (Krajewski Antoni)
Stein-Domski Henryk
Stein-Krajewski

Władysław
Steinman Izrael
Stelmach Jan
Stern Jonasz
Sternal Andrzej
Stępień A. (Konpka Witold)
Stopka Stanisław
Strasser Wilhelm KPZU
Strasser-Keller Rachela KPZU
Straszum Siemion KPZB
Strójwąs Edward
Strzałkowski Tadeusz
Strzelczyk-Barwiński Józef
Strzeszewski Jan
Stup Anzel KPZU
Stup Eugeniusz
Styczyński Wojciech
Stypuła Ryszard
Suchanek Aleksander
Sudak Włodzimierz
Sufa Józef
Sumerowski Marian
Sumiga Adam
Surgiewicz Symeon
Suski Stanisław
Susuł Stanisław
Suwalski Antoni
Suwart Adam
Sylman Mojżesz
Sypuła Konstanty
Syzdek Władysław
Szabatowski Ludwik
Szadkowski Stanisław
Szadkowski Wacław
Szafirsztajn Chil KZMP
Szajewicz Borys
Szarfharc Dawid
Szczekociński Dawid KZMP
Szczepaniak Wacław
Szczepański Józef
Szczerbak P. I. KPZU
Szczęśniak Jan
Szczęśniak Józef
Szczot Stanisław
Szczotka Stanisław
Szczupiel Franciszek
Szechter Ozjasz KPZU
Szejn J. (Zachariasz Szymon)
Szell Leon
Szenauk Aleksander
Szenwald Lucjan
Szewczyk Józef
Skolnik Mojżesz KPZB
Szlama Władysław
Szlechtarz Józef KZMP
Szleyen Mietek KPZU
Szleyen Zofia
Szlinger Józef
Szlosberg Dawid KPZB
Szlusinger Bernard KPZU
Szołomow-Glebow Jefim
Szot Stanisław
Szota Stanisław
Szpancer Zygmunt
Szpak Władysław
Szpilman Aleksander
Szpottowa (Gajewska) Kaziemiera
Szpryngier Michał KPZU
Szraga Chil
Sztachelski Jerzy
Sztern Aleksander
Szternfeld Ezryl
Sztrycher-Orlowski Abram KPZB
Szulc Henryk
Szulkin Michał
Szumiec Jan
Szumlewicz Adam
Szwarc Szymon
Szwajda Jan
Szybiak Anastazja
Szybiak Piotr
Szybisty Stanisław
Szymański Czesław
Szymczuk Marek
Szymborski Aleksander
Szypuła Władysław
Szyszkowski Stanisław
Śliwa Roman
Śliwa Józef
Śliwa Jakub
Śliwa Karol
Śliwka Karol
Świetlik Franciszka
Świerczewski Karol
Świerczyna Florian
Świtał Józef
Taborowicz Andrzej
Tajgenblit Chaskiel
Tajtelbaum Niuta
Talik Antoni
Talanda Piotr
Tancer
Tański Dawid
Tarasiejski Eliasz KPZB
Targosz Paweł
Tarkowski Stanisław
Taub Bronisław
Tenenbaum Szymon (Kalecki Edward)
Teper Michał
Tewel Juda
Tkaczow Jan
Tkaczow Józef
Tkaczow Stanisław
Tobiasz Henryk
Tom Ignacy
Tom-Lasocki Ignacy KZMP
Tomczak Antoni
Tomaszewski Antoni
Tomorowicz Witold
Toporowski Stanisław
Toruńczyk Henryk
Toruńczyk Romana
Tracz Edward
Trauman Józef
Treblińska Małgorzata
Treblinski Chaim
Trochimczuk Julian
Trojan Klemens
Trojanowski
Trućko S. KPZB
Truskier Efraim (Fiedler Franciszek)
Trylski Witold
Truczyk Teofil
Tureniec Mieczysław
Turianski KPZU

Turlejski Zdzisław
Tybura Stanisław
Tykociński Nyson KPZB
Tyszyk Iwan KPZU
Ulanowski Stanisław
Ulman-Ulanowski Władysław
Umschweif Bronek KPZU
Unszlicht Józef
Urbanowicz Mikołaj KPZB
Uzdański Edward Maksymilian
Wagner Ozjasz KPZU
Wahl Aron
Wahl Nusia KPZU
Wahrsager Mania KPZU
Wahrsager Nella KPZU
Wahrsager Nusia KPZU
Wajchendler Lejb
Wajcner Hersz
Wajsbard Edward
Wajsborg Pola (Ginzig Amalia)
Wajntraub Jankiel
Waksman Chaskiel
Walczak
Walecki-Horwitz Maksymilian
Walkowicz Władysław
Wałęsa Stefan
Wandersman Chaim KZMP
Wandurski Witold
Waniołka Franciszek
Warski (Warszawski) Adolf
Warszawski Dawid (Alek)
Wasilkowski (Faltenberg) Grzegorz
Wasylkin Kryłyk KPZU
Wasyńczuk Stefan
Waszek Władysław
Wat Aleksander
Wawrzyniak Franciszek
Wąsikiewicz Jan KZMP
Wątorek Józef
Weinberg
Weintraub (Dan) Aleksander
Weintraub Nusia
Weintraub Zygmunt
Weksler Natan (Cymerman Dawid)
Wełykanowicz Juryj KPZU
Wenclaw Brunon
Wenzel Gustaw
Werfel Roman
Werner Henryk
Węcławek Andrzej
Weizman Herman
Welker Ignacy KPZU
Whithof-Wolicka Eugenia KPZU
Wicha Władysław
Widelski (Grabowski-Widelski Stanisław)
Wieczorek Leon
Wieczorek Józef
Wieczorek Julian
Wielogórski Władysław
Wiejska-Śledź Felicja
Wierbłowski Stefan
Wierna (Burgin) Maria
Wierzba Mieczysław
Wierzbowski Abram
Wiesenberg-Kolska Janina KPZU
Więckowski Stanisław
Wikierski Wojciech
Wilczek Edward
Wilczyński Józef
Winer Stefan KZMP
Winiarski Romuald
Winter Szymon
Wiśnicki Szymon
Wiśniewska Hanna
Wiśniewski Tomasz
Wit Józef
Witaszewski Kazimierz
Witaszyński Władysław
Witlin Dawid KPZU
Wizel Majer KPZU
Wolf-Jezierska Romana
Włodarski Stanisław
Wodzik Grzegorz
Wodzisławski Emanuel
Wojciechowski Franciszek
Wojciechowski Grzegorz
Wojtasik Władysław KZMP
Wolf-Jezierska Romana
Wolski Władysław
Wołkowyski Wolf KPZB
Wołoszyn Marian Stefan
Wołowik Michał
Woźniak Jan KPZU
Woźnica Michał KPZU
Wójcik Jan
Wójcik Karol
Wójtowicz Jan
Wójtowicz Zygmund
Wrona Władysław
Wróbel Ignacy
Wróbel Stanisław
Wróblewski Marian
Wróblewski Wacław
Wrzosek Leon
Wyka Jan
Wyrodek Stefan
Wyrwas Kazimierz
Wysocki (Mausberg) KPZU
Wytrychowski-Wróblewski Daniel KZMP
Zaborowski Szczepan
Zachariasz Abram
Zachariasz Szymon
Zachmyrda Robert
Zagórski Ludwik
Zajączkowski Miron (Kosar) KPZU
Zając Czesław
Zając Franciszek
Zając Józef
Zając Wacław
Zając Zygmunt
Zaleski Piotr (Berg-Cywiński Paweł)
Zambrowski Roman
Zamiata Jakub
Zamieński Feliks (Dobrowolski Szczęsny)
Zańko Jan
Zapała Bronisław

Zarecki Michał (Cukierman Abram)
Zarębski Józef
Zasuń Henryk
Zatorska Helena
Zatorski Aleksander
Zawadka Józef KPZU
Zawadzka Janina KPZU
Zawadzki Aleksander
Zawadzki Józef (Denis) KPZU
Zawadzki Stanisław
Zawadzki Włodzimierz
Zawistowska Janina
Zawistowski Czesław
Zdunek Władysław
Zduński Piotr
Zdziarski Mirosław
Zdziechowski Mieczysław
Zdzieniecki Mieczysław
Zgraja Ludwik
Ziaja Stanisław
Zielonka Paweł
Ziemian Henryk
Zięba Józef
Ziller Marian
Zimler Henryk KZMP
Ziółkowski Józef
Złotnicki Antoni (Goldkind-Złotnicki)
Zmożek Andrzej
Zmożek Paweł
Zołotow Henryk
Zukierberg-Horoszowski Salomon KPZU
Zylberg Zelik
Żabiński Edward
Żak Ryszard
Żarnowiecki Majer KZMP
Żarski Tadeusz
Żbikowski Stefan
Żelańska Maria
Żeromska (Namysłowska) Maria
Żertka Rudolf
Żolatkowski Bohdan
Żymla Franciszek
Żyrman Szolem KZMZB KPZB
Żyrnik Bogdan
Żytlowski Wiktor (Albert)
Żyto Artur

KPP	Komunistyczna Partia Polski
KPRP	Komunistyczna Partia Robotnicza Polski
KPGW	Komunistyczna Partia Galicji Wschodniej
KPGŚ	Komunistyczna Partia Górnego Śląska
KZMP	Komunistyczny Związek Młodzieży Polski
ZMK	Związek Młodzieży Komunistycznej
NPCh	Niezależna Partia Chłopska
KPZB	Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Białorusi
KZMZB	Komunistyczny Zwiazek Młodzieży Zachodniej Białorusi
KPZU	Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Ukrainy
KZMZU	Komunistyczny Związek Młodzieży Zachodniej Ukrainy
KPCz	Komunistyczna Partia Czechosłowacji
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands

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SOVIET POLONIA, THE POLISH STATE, AND THE NEW MYTHOLOGY OF NATIONAL ORIGINS, 1943-1945

Joan S. Skurnowicz

In a time of international crisis, a small group of Polish Communist intellectuals on Soviet territory, with approval from the Stalinist government, harnessed the national myths of a people faced with total destruction in the name of fascist Aryan supremacy. These intellectuals, ethnic Poles and Polish Jews, rejected, revitalized, or revolutionized old national myths and created a new mythology. They coordinated their efforts closely with the anti-Hitlerite National Front Strategy adopted by the Comintern following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941. They sincerely, albeit naïvely, believed that their creation manifestly assured the Poles of their national identity. They also believed that the new mythology promised not only the survival of an honorable people but also the rebirth of their state in a brighter future in solidarity with fellow Slavs, and ultimately with the Stalinist Soviet state which they admired.[1]

In their efforts, appeals to history served an important purpose, and in service to their cause, they frequently distorted Poland's most recent history. Simultaneously, these same intellectuals created effective structures for the dissemination of messages inherent in the new mythology and ultimately proposed a patriotic, national political program which was, in fact, briefly adopted in the summer of 1944. Their efforts were guided by the Comintern, especially after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in 1941. Its head, Georgi Dimitrov, continued to advise them even after that body was dissolved in the spring of 1943. Stalin approved directly and encouraged them until he abandoned the National Front Strategy beginning in October, 1944, in favor of a "cosmetic national front" in the interests of realpolitik.[2]

This essay focuses on that small group of Communist intellectuals and on their activities in the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1945. Two of their leaders were Wanda Wasilewska (1905-1964), an ethnic Pole, and Alfred Lampe (1900-1943), a Polish Jew.

Traditionally, Wasilewska's surname is associated with the Polish Socialist Party (*Polska Partia Socialistyczna* - PPS) and Poland's independence after World War I. Both her parents were political activists. Her father, Leon, a prominent PPS leader, was a close collaborator of Marshall Pilsudski. Prior to the outbreak of war, she gained a reputation as a writer and political activist in the PPS-Left. She fled eastward because of the Nazi invasion in September, 1939. Soon after, she chose Soviet citizenship, joined the Soviet Communist Party (the KP(b) - the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks), and promptly resumed both her writing and political activities. She quickly gained the trust of Soviet authorities and personal access to Stalin. By 1943, she and Alfred

Lampe emerged as two of the most influential Polish Communists in Soviet exile during World War II.[3]

Alfred Lampe, a Polish Jew, was a seasoned Polish Communist Party (*Komunistyczna Partia Polski* - KPP) publicist, theorist, and activist since 1921. For three years prior to joining the KPP (1918-21), the young Lampe had participated in the Jewish socialist movement (in the Poale-Syjon), but because of his growing internationalism, he found the KPP more appealing[4] The small, unpopular but determined, KPP was internationalist, expressed open hostility to the Polish state (increasingly oppressing its national minorities by 1939), and was unquestioningly loyal to the Soviet Union - the citadel of world revolution.[5] Between 1929 and 1933, Lampe, as a member of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, served on its politburo and in its foreign secretariat. Unlike most of his comrades, he survived the Stalinist purges which decimated the Party, and like Wasilewska, he sought refuge in the Soviet Union because of the Nazi invasion.

Once brought to Stalin's attention, Lampe, like Wasilewska, assumed a critical role in the Polish Communist camp. He emerged as the chief ideologist and liaison with the Comintern. In contrast to Wasilewska, he worked largely behind the scenes, and in his publications frequently used his pseudonyms[6]

Lampe's untimely death in December, 1943, left an acknowledged void in the Polish Communist leadership in the Soviet Union, but his ideological influence persisted. He was (posthumously) the author of the Manifesto of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (*Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego* - PKWN) which served to define the strategic aims of the Polish Communists in the Soviet Union as the war drew to a close.[7] Wasilewska also played a role in the PKWN, as a vice-president. However, she remained in the Soviet Union after the war's end.[8]

In keeping with Comintern guidelines which stressed the need for national unity and defeat of Nazi Germany, Lampe and Wasilewska created the Union of Polish Patriots (*Związek Patriotów Polskich* - ZPP) in the Soviet Union, adopting the name Stalin proposed for it.[9] Its official weekly newspaper, *Wolna Polska* ("Free Poland"), began publication on 1 March 1943, several weeks before the official and well publicized founding congress of the ZPP in Moscow, 9-10 June 1943.[10] Wasilewska, in a taped interview shortly before her death in 1964, recalled how anxious she and others were to have a bona fide official meeting of the Union of Polish Patriots and admitted that she identified the delegates that the Soviet authorities then got to the meeting![11]

The Tadeusz Kosciuszko Division, the first Polish Infantry Division attached to the Red Army, was also organized. It began training in Sielce, and, in keeping with the patriotic, national focus, took its oath on 15 July 1943 - the anniversary of the historic victory over the Germans at Grunwald (1410)![12]

The ultimate purpose of these new structures was "a capable organization" which eventually would include all Polish people in the USSR in an effective anti-Hitlerite national front. In reality, the new structures were effectively

controlled from their inception by a small group of Polish Communist activists whose political fortunes ultimately depended on Stalin. Once in place, Wasilewska and Lampe, and others, also enveloped their structures and their activities with a mythology which purported to traditional national aspirations. This newly created and widely disseminated mythology also contributed to the practical political success to which they aspired for their homeland, once the fascist threat was destroyed and peace restored. The political reality which they helped to create, *i.e.*, People's Poland, was ultimately the product of Stalinist objectives and hardly in keeping with the aspirations of most Poles; but this issue is beyond the chronological scope of this study, except as an epilogue.[13] However, the mythology created by these Polish Communists is worthy of further comment.

Poland as a state, between the third partition of 1795 and the establishment of the Second Republic at the end of the First World War, was a name, an abstraction that could be remembered from the past or aspired to for the future, but only imagined or dreamed of in the war-torn present - a phenomenon of "collective memory" deeply rooted in a consciousness of history. In September, 1939, after a brief generation of statehood, the newly partitioned and occupied Polish state again became an abstraction. The only precarious element of its continuity was the Constitution of May 1935, which assured the legal succession of a new government in exile in London.[14] Otherwise, deprived of their statehood, geographically isolated, and faced with the unprecedented extinction promised them by the Nazi objective of creating an Aryan dominated world, the need of the Poles to maintain their historical consciousness and to retain their national identity assumed critical proportions.

Their remembrance of the more immediate past, based on numerous shared experiences in the Second Republic and the recent tragic defeat reminded the Poles of the failures of their government now in London - one which many leftists held directly responsible for the September 1939 catastrophe.[15] The more remote past conjured up images of the politically frustrated but romantically heroic nineteenth century of Polish statelessness, and uprisings as well as images of earlier "golden" times.[16] In their present state of crisis, did their past, immediate or remote, offer the Poles any hope for the future?

Polish leftist, and specifically Communist, intellectuals who found themselves (by choice or circumstance) in the Soviet Union during the war years ultimately answered this question selectively but in the affirmative. The recent arrivals found precarious refuge in former Polish territories newly incorporated into the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics.[17]

In Lwów, an important refugee center, Soviet authorities belatedly recognized their potential. When this occurred, the Polish leftists joined their "Soviet" counterparts (Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, *etc.*) in an intellectual united

front.[18] Soon they engaged in a variety of cultural activities - all critical to the preservation of their individual national heritages as well as the collective culture. Indeed, Soviet policy purported to favor equality, solidarity, and opposition to overt discrimination, the USSR being a "revolutionary" multi-national state. Theoretically, the culture here was "socialist in content and national in form," but Jews were expected to disappear as a distinctive ethnic entity, *i.e.*, the final goal being assimilation.[19]

The recent Polish arrivals and their ethnic counterparts produced nationally inspired plays and organized historically significant commemorations. For example, a commemoration of Adam Mickiewicz's anniversary was held.[20] The Union of Soviet Writers published their work, including recent emigré Wasilewska's short fiction.[21]

Gathering around the new Polish language monthly, *Nowe Widnokręgi* ("New Horizons"), their activities soon expanded beyond cultural concerns. Quite rapidly, they evolved a political mythology designed to preserve Polish national identity and to assure conditionally national survival. They also inaugurated a strategy intended to inculcate new "civic virtues" which, in due time, would help consolidate political change. They justified the rejection of the present state of affairs in general as well as the more specific state of affairs regarding the legitimacy of the Polish government in London, and they projected an eschatological vision of the future in which their present, unsatisfactory world no longer existed.[22] With Stalin's tacit encouragement, they assumed the role of chief executors of Poland's historical legacy and the presumed goals and aspirations of the Polish nation.

The myth-making began modestly but deliberately with the precarious appearance of the first issue of *Nowe Widnokręgi* on 1 January 1941, in Lwów.[23] Preservation of Polish national identity received top priority. The editors promised new horizons to both readers and contributors. Initially, they chose not to address directly either the prospects for the resurrection of the Polish state or its boundaries. Instead, they dedicated their services to the immortal nation now faced with the formidable threat of extinction?[24] The new executors assumed the role of spokesmen for the Polish nation:

> *We are the defenders of what was the best, the noblest in the Polish nation. We assign ourselves the task that we are the Ark of the Covenant between the old and the new years. We have stood on the threshold of two worlds, two epochs, and have bridged the frontiers. We believe that our responsibility is to preserve that which is best and dearest to us. We want to break with our past and to show only its permanent, true, and uncompromising worth.*[25]

The editors then extended an invitation to others to join in the work - to identify the permanent and uncompromisingly worthiest aspects of Poland's

past as expressed in its language, culture, and art, and to contribute their thoughts to future issues.[26] The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union six months later (22 June 1941) and the subsequent capture of Lwów forced the evacuation of *Nowe Widnokręgi* to Kuibishev, disrupting temporarily both publication and myth-making.[27]

The state of war between the Soviet Union and Germany resulted in the Comintern's adoption of the new formula of the anti-Hitlerite national front. Coincidentally, the new state of war also provided new roles and expanded opportunities for the Polish myth-makers. They participated in the first Pan-Slav Anti-Hitlerite Congress in Moscow on 11 August 1941, shortly after the German invasion. Wasilewska attended and appealed to the Polish nation for a unified struggle against Hitlerite Germans. Her appeal was to the Polish nation of heroes and to the nineteenth-century Polish traditions of uprisings.[28]

The now shared, devastating experience of war against a definable enemy invader and the growing Soviet political antagonisms toward the London Poles resulted in an environment conducive to the establishment of new structures. The Polish Communist intellectuals welcomed opportunities to expand, popularize, and politicize the myths already germinating in *Nowe Widnokręgi*. When it resumed publication in Kuibishev in May 1942, *Nowe Widnokręgi* was an overtly political biweekly, dominated by the Lwów group, *i.e.*, the Communists Alfred Lampe, Helena Kon Usiejwicz (Usiejvich), Janina Broniewska, *etc.*[29]

In less than a year, in the spring of 1943, as the Nazi threat diminished, *Nowe Widnokręgi* moved to Moscow, and the Soviet Commissariat of Nationalities approved requests submitted by Wasilewska and Lampe which resulted in the prompt establishment (in Moscow as well) of the Union of Polish Patriots (Związek Patriotów Polskich - ZPP), its official newspaper *Wolna Polska* ("Free Poland"), and the Tadeusz Kosciuszko First Polish Infantry Division, sponsored by the Union of Polish Patriots.[30] For the Polish Communist myth-makers, these would serve to make interpretations of select national myths understandable to Soviet Polonia and to elicit acceptable behavior in achievement of the aspirations and goals implicit in these myths.[31]

Soviet Polonia appeared to welcome the opportunity for more active participation, as the broad based struggle began officially in the pages of *Wolna Polska* - designed for popular consumption - and in the military arena. The First Polish Infantry Division, named for the heroic Tadeusz Kosciuszko, promised to restore honor by the active pursuit and achievement of military victory at the side of the Soviet armed forces.[32]

In addition to the obviously patriotic appeal of their names, the Union of Polish Patriots, the two newspapers, and the infantry division guaranteed the broad dissemination of uniform ideas throughout the Soviet Union. They became the major vehicles for popularizing a new, overtly political mythology which the Polish Communist intellectuals promptly created and would manipulate to their own ends - at least as long as Stalin approved.[33]

The Polish executors of these newly created wartime structures benefitted significantly from the sustained support of Stalin. However, their proper and effective functioning also depended on the Poles themselves - on their ability to reject, revitalize, or revolutionize old national myths in order to explain credibly, albeit selectively, the present in terms of both the past and the future. They proved equal to their task. They took advantage of a shared language, history, and cultural tradition, and drew on the high level of Polish consciousness. They capitalized on the present, shared catastrophic war experience, and they selectively linked the present and the more remote past and the future (as they envisaged it) as well. In so doing, they created a new myth of origin for the postwar Polish state - the People's Republic of Poland - and for the new Polish nation it was to encompass. Apparently, Poland would be national in form and socialist in content.

All the basic components of the new myth appeared in the inaugural issue of *Wolna Polska* of 1 March 1943 and were repeated in subsequent issues.[34] The first editorial, titled "Poles Must Struggle," reminded Polish readers of their heritage of struggle. It reiterated the ideological and political goals of the Union of Polish Patriots, and it proposed to attract as readers all those residents of the Soviet Union willing to struggle with pen and sword for a Poland liberated from the Hitlerite yoke where the new Polish nation, consisting of peasants, workers, and intellectuals, could live with dignity.[35]

In an appealingly articulate manner, readers were informed, also, that a genuine opportunity existed for the imminent realization of the "new" Polish nation and state - the latter free, independent, just, and at peace with its Slavic neighbors in the east.[36] The future promised to become a reality soon, if all Poles, but especially those in the Soviet Union, gathered around *Wolna Polska* and the Union of Polish Patriots in a genuine Polish national front. Cooperation with fellow Slavs, especially Ukrainians and Byelorussians, in the name of Slavic solidarity against Aryan supremacy, and faith in the "Anglo-Soviet-American" alliance, but especially faith in the victory of the Red Army and the concrete opportunities it presently afforded the Poles in their common struggle, provided additional assurances for the realization of the future as envisaged in the opening lines of the editorial.[37]

Further articulation of the myth of the new Polish nation and the new Polish state appeared in two major articles by Wanda Wasilewska in that same inaugural issue. In one, she evoked the need to restore the nation's honor by active struggle, implying the imminent (but not yet official) creation of the Kosciuszko Division. In the other, entitled "Szlachta Appetites," she attempted to discredit the gentry, Poland's traditional nation, by accusing them of exploitation of Ukrainian and Byelorussian peasants in the east - in Polesia and Wolyn, lands to which the Poles had no rights but which had been part of the Second Republic. Simultaneously, she affirmed that the possibility existed for a free, powerful, and independent Poland, without specified frontiers but with Ukrainians and Byelorussians as good neighbors.[38] There

would be no place in postwar Poland for the *szlachta*, and the new Poland's eastern border would differ, implicitly, from the one legitimately established for the Second Republic in 1921.[39]

The myths of the new state (free, independent, powerful, and at peace with its Slavic neighbors) and of the Polish nation (consisting of peasants, workers, and intellectuals) were reiterated in subsequent issues of *Wolna Polska*. In further anticipation of the creation of the Kosciuszko Division, a lengthy article about Tadeusz Kosciuszko appeared in the mid-March issue of this weekly.[40]

Within one month and coincidental with the date on which Germany revealed the Katyn massacre and just prior to the rupture of Soviet relations with the London Poles (on April 24, 1943), another major article appeared, entitled "Poland's Place in Europe," by Alfred Lampe (signed A. Marek). In it, the author openly broke with the immediate historical past. He rejected outright the post-World War I Polish state: its boundaries; its politics and diplomacy; its society; and the multinational composition of its population. Lampe reiterated the previously expressed eschatological vision of a future Poland and added that it must not bear the stigma of its predecessor: must avoid the kinds of errors committed between November 1918 and September 1939. He proposed a Poland with western boundaries to strengthen defenses against the German enemy and eastern boundaries as a source of strength and friendship with fellow Slavs - implicitly a Piast Poland on the Oder and the Baltic. He then accorded to this visionary Poland, a new, vaguely articulated mission of national self-renewal:

> *Strengthened in the East and West we will quickly be able to renew ourselves internally...We will quickly heal the wounds given us by war and German occupation and thrust our homeland to its rightful progressive development.*[41]

The Soviet government's official public announcement of the formation of the Kosciuszko Division coincided with Lampe's (Marek's) article in *Wolna Polska*.[42] The Division was to represent the concrete and active means by which Polish honor would be restored; the myth-makers clearly suggested that the new Poland would become a reality as the result of a joint Polish-Soviet sacrifice.

What they neglected to announce was party control over the Division. Indeed, Lampe insisted on political indoctrination so that the "Polish" character of the Division be emphasized, despite its rather diverse ethnic composition.[43]

In cultivating its Polish character, the Soviet Poles drew further on the legends of Kosciuszko and his national rising of 1794; on Napoleon's Polish legions which marched under the French Tricolor but wore distinctive Polish uniforms; and on the romantic national traditions associated with the uprisings

of 1831 and 1863. Such historical traditions and legends were part of the Polish collective consciousness.[44] They served as important sources of patriotic inspiration for Poles of all political hues during the war. However, the Polish myth-makers in the Soviet Union deliberately invoked only those aspects of both the legends and traditions which proved most useful to their political perspectives and goals. This was most evident in their establishment of the Kosciuszko Division. (Janina Broniewska, a member of the inner circle of both *Nowe Widnokręgi* and *Wolna Polska*, at her close friend Wasilewska's request, designed both the distinctive uniform and the battle standards for the Kosciuszko Division.[45])

Concurrently in *Wolna Polska*, Roman Lang, a frequent contributor, justified the use of the Polish national hero's name by the Division to the readers of that weekly.[46] In addition, the publication section of the Union of Polish Patriots, in conjunction with the Soviet Publishers of Literature in Foreign Languages, produced a series of works by or about prominent Poles, including a biography of Kosciuszko by the Communist Roman Werfel.[47] According to Lang, Tadeusz Kosciuszko's name suggested images of old tsarist Russia and new Soviet Russia. Kosciuszko fought against the former, and would have, Lang suggests, like his namesake the Division, proudly joined the new Soviet Russia - "the leader of all progressive mankind" - in its struggle against the German Hitlerites, the gravest enemy of all "free nations."[48]

The name Kosciuszko evoked images of patriotism as well, Lang continued. Kosciuszko loved freedom in general, and as a freedom fighter of the Polish nation, he raised a truly authentic people's army on behalf of the fatherland. He had struggled for the same goals that the Division now prepared to struggle for. Once again, the soldier in the Kosciuszko Division prepared to fight for his nation and other nations in the name of freedom.[49]

In essence, Kosciuszko had personified the aspirations of all stateless Poles for over a century for a democratic Poland. He had attempted to rise above the existing political weaknesses and faulty social structures. He had organized a truly national uprising by calling on all social classes to share equally in Poland's defense. Lang selectively excluded from his depiction of Kosciuszko elements that did not enhance the mythology being created: notably, that Kosciuszko had commanded a Polish army in 1792 which defended the country against an invading Russian army and had led the national uprising in 1794 against the Russian and Germans who partitioned Poland in 1795 and, more recently, in 1939.[50] Lang also conveniently ignored Kosciuszko's views expressed rather prophetically, it seems, in a pamphlet he composed with his secretary Józef Pawlikowski in 1796 on his release from Russian imprisonment. In the pamphlet, Kosciuszko argued that Poles cannot rely on any foreign power to achieve independence but must rely exclusively on their own strengths and resources.[51] One needs to be reminded periodically that historicity is not a requisite for myth-makers, and Lang and his compatri-

ots simply emphasized about Kosciuszko what they believed to be sufficient and relevant to assure popular acceptance of the Division's character and unconditional support for the patriotic aspirations it symbolized.

The adoption of the Piast eagle completed the Kosciuszko Division's character and provided one more symbol to be utilized effectively by the Polish myth-makers for other overtly political purposes as well. Janina Broniewska's diligent search for an illustration of the Piast eagle at Wasilewska's request is a popular story variously described in the memoir literature of the period and in more recent historians' accounts of the Kosciuszko Division and the Polish People's Army.[52] Broniewska recorded her version of the story in her journal. She included remarks about Wasilewska's and Lampe's insistence on the Piast eagle and their emphatic rejection of the more popular and recent symbol, the Jagiellonian eagle. Both Wasilewska and Lampe recognized, pragmatically, that the Polish eagle was not just a mythical beast. Rather, it was the valid sovereign sign of a state that exists in reality.[53] The Piast eagle would serve effectively the pro-Soviet political and ideological viewpoints of the Polish Communist myth-makers in putting forth their myths of the *new* Polish state and the *new* Polish nation.[54]

The word "Piast" suggests a foundation myth in Polish history. It is the name of a legendary Slav peasant who ostensibly founded the indigenous first dynasty and whose grandson Mieszko I (died 992 A.D.) created the first Polish state centered around Poznan-Gniezno-Kraków. Western and northern in its orientation, the Piast state defended Poles against the thrust of the historical (and recurring) threat of the German *Drang nach Osten.*

What mattered especially was that the symbol of the Piast eagle concretized succinctly those attractions which the Polish myth-makers in the Soviet Union desired to put into action. First, the Piast eagle with its Western orientation represented the continuation of the Piast idea of opposition to and struggle against the oldest national enemy - the German intruder. Secondly, the Piast eagle, representing an indigenous dynasty originating in the peasant class, added support for the idea inspired by Kosciuszko that the Polish nation included the numerically dominant peasants. In the 1794 uprising, the Polish peasants were to establish their claim to equal rights by sharing equally with the gentry the difficult task of defending their country.[55] Peasant participation in and support of the Division seemed crucial now. The Piast eagle substantiated the Division's claims that it was a truly Polish military force. Thirdly, the Piast eagle could also attract the support of those peasants who confused the symbol with the Piast Party - a peasant party and the largest political party in Poland at the time of the outbreak of the war. Most significantly, the Piast eagle stood for the new Poland in direct opposition to the symbol of the more popular Jagiellonian eagle - associated with another, more recent, Polish foundation myth - and rejected by both Wasilewska and Lampe.

The Jagiellonian eagle is associated with the large, eastward oriented multinational empire of the Jagiellonian dynasty (1386-1569) and with its

successor, the gentry (*szlachta*) dominated Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita Polska*, 1569-1795). Both had identified the major enemy as Russia (whose drive westward remained a constant concern). The Jagiellonian eagle assumed symbolic significance once again in the twentieth century when it was adopted after the Great War by the Second Republic. Wlodzimierz Sokorski, political deputy to General Zygmunt Berling, the Commander of the Kosciuszko Division, served with that Division under the Piast banner and with the Red Army, until his dismissal for political insubordination. He believed that the Jagiellonian eagle could have been retained, suggesting that its crown could have been removed as it was by rebels during the Kraków uprising in 1846.[56] However, the decision of Sokorski's political superiors prevailed. He was advised that the Piast eagle represented, above all, the "Eagle of Struggle with Germany."[57]

For the myth-makers, the Piast eagle not only provided an effective military symbol for a national fighting force with a clearly defined enemy. The Piast eagle also represented, in symbolic form, their political ideals for Poles and Poland's place in Europe as defined by the Union of Polish Patriots and enforced in the pages of *Wolna Polska* by Lampe, Wasilewska, and others. The postwar Poland promised was to be national in form - potentially an ethnically homogeneous state

Prior to the Soviet break with the London Poles in the spring of 1943 and coincidental with the beginnings of the Red Army's ultimately successful westward counteroffensive, the Union of Polish Patriots, *Wolna Polska*, the Kosciuszko Division, and the new mythology, all publicly sanctioned by the Soviet government, were functioning effectively. The final phase of the war held out the bright promise of a decisive military victory for the Soviet forces.[58] The Division fought bravely at Lenino (October, 1943) and was joined by additional Polish divisions formed in the east, each bearing the name of a Polish national hero.[59] Their active participation in the final struggle against "Hitlerite occupiers" assured Soviet Polonia of national survival with honor and the "liberation" of German occupied Poland from the east.

The diplomatic rupture also afforded the Polish myth-makers the unique opportunity to speak out about political issues with greater confidence. Their public statements now openly encouraged disaffection between Soviet Polonia and the Polish government in London. The first overt rejection of the London government by Polish Communist intellectuals in the Soviet Union occurred within three days of the diplomatic break. It assumed the form of a radio address via Moscow Radio by Wanda Wasilewska. As head of the Union of Polish Patriots, she purported to speak for all of Soviet Polonia.[60] She unequivocally rejected the London government. She stated that it no longer represented the Polish nation because its policies were detrimental to the best interests of that nation. She accused the London Poles of disloyalty to their Soviet ally and vowed to cooperate actively with the Soviet Union in the common struggle to liberate the homeland.[61] Scathing verbal criticisms and

denunciations of the London Poles continued in *Wolna Polska.* These intensified in direct proportion to the potential for a Soviet military victory on its western front and to Stalin's growing stature as a global leader?[62]

Simultaneously with these denunciations, *Wolna Polska* published an increasing number of signed articles and letters devoted to the question: What kind of Poland are we struggling for?[63] This created the impression that open discussion about Poland's future was welcomed by the editors?[64] Collectively, one common belief was expressed: that the new Polish state, "Liberated from the Hitlerite occupier" would be great, strong, independent, democratic, and friendly specifically toward the Soviet Union, not merely toward its Slavic neighbors.[65]

The myth of the new Polish nation, consisting of peasants, workers and intellectuals, found reinforcement as well. The editors of *Wolna Polska,* recognizing that the association of people with nation was crucial to this myth, cleverly linked dates of important Soviet and Polish holidays to cement this desired relationship. The anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (November) and May Day were the chief manifestations of the revolutionary and socialist labor tradition and, respectively, the two oldest mass holidays in the Soviet Union. These were cleverly synchronized: May Day with May Third, a Polish national holiday that commemorates the anniversary of the Constitution of 3 May 1791,[66] and November 7, the anniversary of the Bolshevik victory, was linked with November 11, a national holiday celebrating Polish independence of 1918.[67] This manipulative linkage suggested a close, mythical relationship between the revolutionary, multinational Soviet Union and its people and the new, imminently liberated and ethnically homogeneous Polish state - both with societies ideally consisting of peasants, workers, and intellectuals.

As the war drew to a close, the Polish Communist myth-makers in the Soviet Union transferred control of the mythology which they created and cultivated to the Polish National Liberation Committee (*Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego* - PKWN), a new instrument formed under Soviet auspices and subordinated to Stalin's authority. Its Manifesto, adopted on 22 July 1944, was Lampe's work. With some minor adjustments the Polish National Liberation Committee became the *de facto* government of the "liberated" Polish territories.[68] The perpetuation of the myths seemed assured, even though the patriotic, idealistic Communists such as Wasilewska and the late Lampe were superseded by the likes of Boleslaw Beirut and Hilary Minc who opted with Stalin to utilize the latter's formidable power to assure effective Communist control of postwar Poland. Once peace was declared and the pro-Stalinist government began to function in Poland, the Union of Polish Patriots and *Wolna Polska* disbanded.[69] Those Polish intellectuals most closely associated with with these wartime organizations in the Soviet Union, went their separate ways. Some, for example, Janina Broniewska, returned to Poland and assumed positions of authority in the new order. Others, notably

Wanda Wasilewska, remained in the Soviet Union.[70]

The influence of the dominant personalities, especially Lampe and Wasilewska, persisted, nevertheless. During the five-year isolation from German-occupied Poland and the West, these emigrés laid the foundations for a "revolutionary" state. In an unprecedented period of crisis and despair, a handful of ethnic Poles and Polish Jews on Soviet territory had created an effective national mythology. It appealed to the Poles' historical consciousness and offered seemingly plausible explanations of reality to them. It had re-affirmed that nation's identity and served to cement solidarity (at least among Soviet Polonia and with the seemingly benevolent war-torn Soviet Union and its leader Stalin). The myth-makers also provided a hopeful vision of the future. It promised to fulfill the Poles' noblest aspirations. Ultimately, these myth-makers provided the official myths of origin for the new, postwar Polish state.

The myths persisted. A precarious post-war Polish state and nation were created, and the myths, under the Piast banner became an integral part of the postwar Polish national consciousness.[71] The close Soviet-Polish friendship envisaged in the myth linking November 7 and November 11 became a postwar reality - on Soviet terms. A further attempt to revamp history followed, and July 22 replaced November 11 as postwar Poland's national holiday - until recently.

15 October 1992

NOTES

1. Leon Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas In Europe*, translated by Edmund Howard (New York: Basic Books, 1974)
2. Wanda Wasilewska, "Wspomnienia (1939-1944)," *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego,* VII, (1982), 371-2. John Coutouvidis and Jaime Reynolds, *Poland 1939-1945* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986), 147-48.
3. Helena Zatorska, *Wanda Wasilewska: Życie i twórczość* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Szkolne i Pedagogyczne, 1976). Eleanora Syzdek, *Działalność Wandy Wasilewski w latach drugiej wojny światowej* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1981). Also see Stanislaw Kot, *Listy z Rosji do Generała Sikorskiego* (London: Skład Główny, 1959), 561. And Stanisław Kot, *Rozmowy z Kremlem* (Londyn: Skład Główny, 1959), 55-60, 118-129. Kot refers to his former student as an example of a Pole who voluntarily chose Soviet citizenship. She retained it after the war.
4. Antoni Przygonski, *Alfred Lampe* (Warszawa: Współczesne Życiorysy

Polaków; Iskra, 1976), 9-12. This is a brief, inadequate biography.

5. Coutouvidis and Reynolds, 117-19. Ben-Cion Pinchuk, *Shtetl Jews Under Soviet Rule: Eastern Poland on the Eve of the Holocaust* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). Pinchuk offers some interesting insights as to why so many Jews found both Communism and the Soviet Union so attractive in this period of history.
6. *Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polskich-radzieckich*, ed. Euzebiusz Basinski et al (9 volumes; Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1967-74), VII, 577. Hereafter cited as *Dokumenty i materiały*. Also Przygonski, 38-39.
7. Coutouvidis and Reynolds, 126-136. The Manifesto called for a mild social program and a platform of national liberation that would bring about a truly broad coalition. But between October, 1944 and May, 1945, Stalin replaced it with the Bierut-Jozwial concept of a "cosmetic national front" based on the Polish Workers' Party and sustained by Soviet might.
8. For an empathetic eulogy by a prominent Polish socialist see Adam Ciolkosz, "Po prostu miłość," *Kultura*, nr 12/106 (1964).
9. Wasilewska, *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego*, VII, 383-85. Wasilewska and Lampe headed the organizational committee responsible for its formation.
10. Janina Broniewska, *Notatniki korespondenta wojennego* (wydanie 4 skrócone; Warszawa: Iskra, 1961), 61. She recorded in March, 1943, that with the publication of this issue "We already have an organization." *Dokumenty i materiały*, VII, 429-32. Also Maria Wilusz (ed.), *Protokoły Prezydium Zarządu Głównego ZPP w ZSRR (czerwiec, 1943-1ipiec, 1944)* (Centralne Archiwum KC PZPR, Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego; Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1973), II, 64-75. Zbigniew Kumos, *ZPP: Założenia programowoideowe* (wydawnictwo l; Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1983).
11. Wasilewska, *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego*, VII, 384.
12. *Dokumenty i materiały*, VII, 395-96.
13. For a thorough analysis see Krystyna Kersten, *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-48*, translated and annotated by John Micgiel and Michael H. Bernhard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
14. Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland* (two volumes; New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), II, 435-91. Also Jan Karski, *The Great Powers and Poland, 1919-45: From Versailles to Yalta* (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1985), 378-401.
15. The memoir and journal literature of emigré Soviet Poles suggests that they resented, if not openly opposed, the London Poles. They represented a variety of leftist political views but did not publicize their politics initially, for obvious reasons. See Jerzy Putrament, *Pól*

wieku: wojna (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1969). Wlodzimierz Sokorski, *Tamte lata* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1969). Wanda Wasilewska, "Wspomnienie," *Z Pola Walki*, XI, nr 1/42 (1968), 115-195. Wasilewska, *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego*, VII, 339-432.

16. Claude Backvis, "Polish Tradition and the Concept of History," *The Polish Review*, VI (1961), 125-58. For the uses of history in People's Poland, see Rudolf Jaworski, "History and Tradition in Contemporary Poland," *East European Quarterly*, XIX, no 3 (September, 1985), 349-74.
17. Wasilewska, *Z Pola Walki*, XI, 194-95. Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Alexander Korneichuk (1905-1972), Wasilewska's soon to be (third) husband was a Ukrainian writer assigned to Lwow for political work soon after the Soviet occupation. He helped lay the groundwork for the rigged elections in Western Ukraine which resulted in that territory's annexation by the USSR. Wiktor Sukiennicki (ed.), *Biała księga: Fakty i dokumenty z okresów wojen swiatowych* (Paryz: Instytut Literacki, 1964), 138.
18. Wasilewska, *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego*, VII, 344-49. Also Putrament, 23-7. Putrament, a Polish Jew and war exile from Wilna, recalled that Soviet authorities never expected to find such a "nest of creative Polish intellectuals, sympathetic leftists, and politically active communists," *e.g.*, such as the self-professed Communist Putrament, among the refugees in Lwów and only belatedly took advantage.
19. Pinchuk, 97. Wasilewska addressed some of the cultural issues created by this new situation directly with Stalin. Wasilewska, *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego*, VII, 346-51.
20. *Dokumenty i materiały*, VII, 210-13.
21. Wanda Wasilewska, "Earth in Bondage," *International Literature* (Moscow: State Literary Publishing House), I (January, 1940), 3-73. Wanda Wasilewska, "Light in the Marshes," *International Literature* (Moscow: The Stat Publishing House), VII and IX (August-September, 1940), 3-73. The stories are in English.
22. Henry Tudor, *Political Myth* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 114.
23. Wasilewska, *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego*, VII, 358-60. Also Putrament, 56-7. Lwów and Białystok were the main centers of the Polish communist emigration between 1939 and 1940. Also Przygónski, 34-40.
24. *Nowe Widnokręgi*, January 1, 1941, quoted by Syzdek, 100-01. The editors deliberately avoided addressing the prospects of the resurrection of the Polish state. The Nazi-Soviet Boundary and Friendship

Treaty of 28 September 1939 had stipulated that the Soviet-German border would be the (later called) Ribbentrop-Molotov line. Karski, 39-41.

25. *Nowe Widnokręgi*, January 1, 1941, quoted in Syzdek, 100-01.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Seven issues of *Nowe Widnokręgi* (January, 1941-July, 1941) were published as a monthly organ of the Union of Soviet Writers. The temporary suspension occurred between August, 1941 and April, 1942. Then it reappeared as a bi-weekly, published by the ZPP in the USSR. See Jan Kowalek, *Bibliografia czasopism Polskich* (Lublin: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, 1976), II, 166.
28. *Dokumenty i materiały*, VII, 236-38.
29. Wasilewska, *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego*, VII, 358. Broniewska, 23-34. Putrament, 140-45. Also Bronislaw Kusnierz, *Stalin and the Poles* (Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1981), 159. Wasilewska served at the front at this time. She is listed with Lampe as editor, but she claims she had little contact with *Nowe Widnokręgi* in Kuibishev. Wasilewska, *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego*, VII, 376-79. Broniewska, 8-28, describes the background, in March, 1942, when *Nowe Widnokręgi* started up again.
30. The first issue appeared on March 1. Wasilewska recalled how the "troika" (Hilary Minc, Wiktor Grosz, and she) put out the first three issues. Wasilewska, *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego*, VII, 383-87.
31. Four months after the German invasion of the USSR, a new Polish communist party, the Polish Workers's Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza - PPR) was created with Moscow's official blessing, but Stalin officially began to support them only in May, 1943, after Katyn and the rupture of diplomatic relations with the London Poles. Coutouvidis and Reynolds, 127; *Dokumenty i materiały*, VII, 432. See Also M. Remiszewska (editor), *Publicystyka Związku Patriotów Polskich, 1943-44: Wybór* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1967), 64.
32. Wasilewska, "O czećź narodu," *Wolna Polska*, March 1, 1943, 3. Also *Dokumenty i materiały* VII, 408-09. Broniewska, 88, noted that Lampe decided on a politicized military force and that the Polish communists would assume the responsibility for mounting a "real national front against fascism."
33. Wasilewska was elected Head (*przewodniczka*) of the Central Committee of the Presidium of the ZPP (June 10, 1943), a post she held, at least nominally, until the ZPP disbanded. As head of the ZPP and editor of and contributor to *Nowe Widnokręgi* and *Wolna Polska* her role is of special significance. Of added interest: By mid-March, 1943, *Nowe Widnokręgi* and *Wolna Polska* shared interlocking editorial boards. Both publications were dominated by the same people, yet each retained its public individuality. *Nowe Widnokręgi* was

designed to appeal to intellectuals and Wolna Polska to Soviet Polonia at large. Wasilewska, *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego*, VII, 387-88. Also Jerzy Myslinski, "Prasa terenowa Związku Patriotów Polskich w ZSRR," *Z Pola Walki*, Rocznik XV, nr 2 (1972), 51-70. Radio Kosciuszko is also an important factor in the activities of the Poles in the USSR. It is beyond the scope of this essay but is worthy of a separate study.

34. *Wolna Polska*, March 1, 1943, 1.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*, 3. Also see Wasilewska, Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego, VII, 380.
39. *Wolna Polska*, March 1, 1943, 2. For the war, see Norman Davies, *White Eagle-Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-1920* (London: Orbis Books, 1983). For diplomacy see Piotr Wandycz, *Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-21* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).
40. *Wolna Polska*, March 16, 1943, 2.
41. *Wolna Polska*, April 16, 1943, 2. Also Sokorski, 148.
42. *Wolna Polska*, May 8, 1943, 1. On June 6, 1943, the Soviet government announced that it had agreed, at the request of the ZPP in the USSR, to the formation of the Polish Division Kosciuszko. *Dokumenty i materiały*, VII, 408-09 and 535.
43. *Dokumenty i materiały*, VII, 439. Sokorski, 64-5, confirms that Lampe's and Wasilewska's views about this prevailed. See also F. Zbiniewicz, *Armia Polska w ZSRR* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1963) and Klemens Nussbaum, "Jews in the Polish Army in the USSR, 1943-45," *Soviet Jewish Affairs* (London), no 3 (1972), 94-104.
44. Stephen P. Mizwa, *Great Men and Women of Poland* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1942). Manfred Kridl *et al.* (editors), *For Your Freedom and Ours: The Progressive Polish Spirit Through the Centuries* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1943).
45. The standard bore a large portrait of Kosciuszko, the Piast eagle, and two patriotic slogans: "Fatherland and Honor" and "For Your Freedom and Ours." The latter slogan, a famous battle cry of the uprising of 1830, is attributed to Joachim Lelewel, the historian, political republican, and social democrat. Broniewska, 138. See also Kazimierz Sobczak, *Lenino-Warszawa-Berlin* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Narodowego, 1978), 8-9.
46. Roman Lang, "Imie Kosciuszko," *Wolna Polska*, June 8, 1943, 2.
47. *Dokumenty i materiały*, VII, 86.
48. *Wolna Polska*, June 8, 1943, 2.
49. *Ibid.*

50. *Ibid.*
51. Davies, *God's Playground*, II, 34.
52. Sokorski, 46. Putrament, 176. Sobczak, 48.
53. Jaworski, *East European Quarterly*, XI, 358.
54. Broniewska, 140, describes how with the help of an old Moscow art book dealer, she found a picture of the stone crypt of a late eleventh-early twelvth century descendant of the earlier Piasts (Boleslaw Krzywousty/Wrymouth) with an eagle on it. She sketched the eagle, at Wasilewska's request, and the latter, upon seeing it, promptly approved. Sobczak, 86, also mentions that a sketch was made of Casimir the Great's "Jagiellonian" eagle, but Wasilewska rejected it.
55. See Stephen P. Mizwa, "Tadeusz Kosciuszko,"*Great Men and Women of Poland*, 136.
56. Sokorski, 65.
57. *Dokumenty i materiały*, VII, 259 and 420-21. Sokorski fought at Lenino but afterward was sent to work in a Soviet factory beca.~se he had played a key role in formulating "Thesis I" which claimed the leading role for the army and not the Communist party in postwar Poland. Sokorski was relieved of his post in the Presidium of the ZPP and as political chief of the Ist Polish Corps for "ideological inconsistency." Wilusz, II, 66.
58. *Wolna Polska*, August 16, 1943, 1. *Wolna Polska*, December 31, 1943, 1. Headline: THE YEAR OF VICTORY:
59. *Wolna Polska*, October 23, 1943, 1. Also Wanda Wasilewska, "Dywizja walczy," *Nowe Widnokręgi*, October 20, 1943, 1, reprinted in Zatorska, 253-56. The II Infantry Division Henryk Dąbrowski, the III Infantry Division Romauld Tragutt, the IV Infantry Division Jan Kilinski all bore the names of heroes. *Dokumenty i materiały*, VII, 464-66. Also Kusnierz, 164-5.
60. *Wolna Polska*, May 1, 1943, 3. *Dokumenty i materiały*, VII, 404-06.
61. *Ibid.*
62. *Wolna Polska*, June 24, 1943. *Wolna Polska*, August 24, 1943, 1.
63. *Wolna Polska*, August 16, 1943, 2, 4.
64. *Ibid.* Also *Wolna Polska*, October 31, 1943, 2. *Wolna Polska*, December 16, 232, 1943, 4. *Wolna Polska*, January 8, 1944, 2. (A new numbering system begins.)
65. *Wolna Polska*, November 1, 1943, 3. All of page 3 is devoted to the question of the new Poland. *Wolna Polska*, December 1, 1943, 4. *Wolna Polska*, March 1, 1944, 4.
66. *Wolna Polska*, November 1, 1943, 3. *Wolna Polska*, December 16, 1943, 3. *Wolna Polska*, January 16, 1944, 1. *Wolna Polska*, April 24, 1944, 1. *Wolna Polska*, May 1, 1943, 1. The linkage is repeated the following year. *Wolna Polska*, May 1, 1944, 1.
67. *Wolna Polska*, November 7, 1943, 2.Coutouvidis and Reynolds,153-5.

68. Davies, *God's Playground*, II, Chapter 23.
69. The last issue of *Wolna Polska* is dated August 15, 1946. The ZPP officially disbanded on November 23, 1946. The last issue of *Nowe Widnokręgi* is dated January 30, 1946. Obviously Soviet Polonia no longer needed such organizations or their services.
70. Putrament, *e.g.*, became editor of *Rzeczpospolita*, a newspaper which began publication in August, 1944, in Lublin. It was described as a "national front" and not a communist party paper.
71. Davies, *God's Playground*, II, 518.

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GOMULKA'S 'RIGHTIST-NATIONALIST DEVIATION,' THE POSTWAR JEWISH COMMUNISTS, AND THE STALINIST REACTION IN POLAND, 1945-1950

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The first years of Communist rule in Poland profoundly shaped the 45 year political experience of the country until the 1989 democratic breakthrough. These formative years encompassed such historic developments as postwar reconstruction and central economic planning, the emergence of new and the disappearance of old political parties, the heretical notion of a Polish road to socialism but also the advent of high Stalinism. Even with the redrawing of Poland's postwar boundaries and with increasing Communist hegemony over political life, the period between 1945 and 1948 was characterized by considerably more political and ethnic heterogeneity than the decades that followed. A significant and, ultimately, controversial role in the shaping of postwar Poland - in its rebuilding, in its economic program, political configuration, national security organization, and in its minorities policies - was played by Jewish Communists.

This article examines Wladyslaw Gomulka's rise to power in the Polish Communist party in the immediate postwar period, and the importance of his concept of a Polish road to socialism. It describes the relationship between Gomulka's nationalist faction,[1] his Muscovite opponents inside the party, and Jewish Communist party leaders. It examines whether Gomulka's "rightist-nationalist deviation" - the term used by his Stalinist critics - was aimed at an exclusion of Jewish Communists from positions of power as well as at his Muscovite adversaries. Furthermore, it examines whether Jewish Communists in Poland had a separate political agenda, were indeed allied to the Muscovites as often alleged, and were instruments or victims of the resurgent Stalinists after 1948.

Gomulka and the National Communists

Whatever its long term effect of making postwar Polish Communism flawed, the factional struggle between nationalists and Muscovites waged within the Communist party that culminated in 1948 had less drastic consequences for protagonists than prewar struggles in the interwar Polish Communist Party (KPP) In 1938 Stalin had decapitated the KPP, executed most of its alleged Trotskyite leadership, and ordered the Comintern to dissolve the entire organization. Not long afterwards, in the war years, the first leader of the newly-constituted Polish Workers' Party (PPR), Marceli Nowotko, was murdered. Stalin's part in this political assassination could not be documented, but it was known a party member had committed the murder.[2] Although the political stakes were raised for participants when Communists took power in Poland after the war, the violence of earlier struggles was,

paradoxically, not to recur in the period of high Stalinism. Jewish Communists ensconced in the security organs were pivotal in organizing but also in moderating the postwar party purges.

Since the founding of socialist organizations in Poland in the 1870s, ideological tension had always existed between one current that depicted, explicitly or implicitly, a Polish road to socialism, and another that stressed internationalist values.[3] But in no period did the notion of a Polish road become more crystallized than when Gomulka headed the Communist party after 1944. While today it is easy to dismiss his role as a party theoretician and political engineer of Communism, it is worth recalling the words of maverick ex-Communist Wladyslaw Bienkowski: "Gomulka was one of few politicians - the fingers of both hands would be too many - who placed hope in a Polish road to Communism. And such a road existed: a gradual, tactical liberalization."[4]

Only weeks after the European war had ended, a Central Committee Plenum of the PPR returned to themes that had long divided the Polish socialist movement. At a meeting on May 20-21, 1945, a leading exponent of the hard-line Muscovite group admitted that sectarianism - a Communist euphemism for conservatism - had plagued the party. This surprising admission was made by Jakub Berman, future Politburo overseer of the security apparatus and arguably the most powerful of the postwar Jewish Communists. If a Jewish Communist mafia existed in Poland after the war, then its leader had to be Berman.

But as Anthony Polonsky and Boleslaw Drukier interpreted his position at the Plenum, Berman was agreeing with Gomulka - the future rightist-nationalist - that there were "negative features of the Polish Communist tradition."[5] About the internationalist program put forward by the most famous Polish Jewish Marxist, Berman said: "Luxemburgism created sectarianism over the problems of nationality and the peasantry." In the interwar period, "The Polish Communist Party (KPP) did not give a death-blow to sectarianism and so it is springing up again." Berman was endorsing a less internationalist, more national road to socialism.

More surprisingly still, Berman lavished praise on Stalin for being an *advocate* of a Polish form of socialism: "Stalin's position is one of support for Polish sovereignty and he well understands PPR ideas on the subject." If Stalin was depicted as a champion of a Polish road, then, by contrast, Berman alleged that it was Trotskyite to inflate the importance of the Soviet role: "Jasny [Wlodzimierz Zawadzki] devised the theory that all Polish problems could be solved with the help of the Red Army. This is a Trotskyite theory, the theory of 'Revolution carried forward by bayonets.' We must first complete the bourgeois revolution and for this we need the allied parties."[6]

Berman's May 1945 address to the Central Committee was conjunctural, then. In an ingenious way, he attacked the misguided internationalist position of Rosa Luxemburg, the hypocritical pro-Soviet subservience inherent in the

Trotskyite line, and the authentically Polonophile approach embodied in the Stalin position. The fact that such sophistry was employed by a security head known subsequently for his own obsequiousness to Stalin tells us much about Communist leaders' malleability. It also furnishes a rare example of a Jewish Communist expressing his sensitivity to Polish nationalism while disowning the cosmopolitanism of the Luxemburgist approach

At the May 1945 Plenum, other prominent party officials addressed the issue of Polish sovereignty. Going further than Berman, Central Committee member Edward Ochab argued: "Our central problem is state sovereignty. Since the war is over, the Red Army should quit Poland.... Perhaps more public emphasis should be put on the differences between our [democracy] and the Soviet Union's."[7] Shortly after Khrushchev's attack on Stalinism in 1956, Ochab became leader of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). Notwithstanding his earlier-expressed reservations about the USSR, when he was replaced by Gomulka in October 1956, it was because Ochab was considered not committed enough to a Polish road to socialism.

Gomulka's address to the 1945 Plenum contained more explicitly nationalist assertions than evidenced in Berman's or Ochab's remarks: "The long period of foreign rule in Poland makes some people see the USSR as a continuation of the old Tsarist Russia.... Deportations and the mistakes the Soviet organs have made in dealing with the Poles have also influenced views." Gomulka went further: "Agitation about the Sovietization of Poland makes a great impression on the Polish mind, on a large part of the country and on our coalition allies, especially the more independent PPS.... There is a danger that we may come to be seen as Soviet agents. The masses should see us as a Polish party. Let them attack us as Polish communists, not as agents."[8] Gomulka did not take up the call, issued by Ochab and several other Central Committee members, that Soviet troops should leave Poland. But in his summing up at the Plenum, he vowed: "We are not establishing a Soviet system. We want to establish a democratic coalition."[9]

Gomulka's outline of a democratic Polish form of socialism was not directly assailed at this Plenum, but neither was it greeted with enthusiasm by all Central Committee members. Thus Leon Finkelsztajn was more sanguine about the country going it alone: "Poland's foreign policy must coincide with the tenets of the Soviet Union's policy, although within this framework we have the possibility of defending our own interests and lots of room for independence." Finkelsztajn shared other members' concerns about the Soviet military presence in Poland, but he also shared Berman's faith in Stalin's determination to stand by Poland. Indeed, Finkelsztajn expressed annoyance that Soviet military leaders in Poland might not be heeding Stalin's orders: "The danger lies in the divergence between Stalin's position on our sovereignty and the position of Soviet people working in the field. It is vital to be tougher with the military commanders on account of the outrages committed by their troops."[10]

The May 1945 Plenum was largely a nationalist celebration, then, in which Stalin was portrayed as the champion of Polish national interests. Jewish Communists like Berman and Finkelsztajn already differed from the emerging nationalist group in the leadership by extending discernibly lukewarm support for Polish solutions while being careful to cite Stalin as ultimate guarantor of the country's sovereignty. In this respect they anticipated the imminent factional conflict centered on Gomulka's program and, like Boleslaw Bierut and other Moscow-trained communists, foresaw the problems Gomulka would encounter with his Kremlin overlord. The reservations about Gomulka became even more justified when it became evident that his position was not purely conjunctural. That is, his advocacy of a distinct Polish type of socialism remained constant over the next decade and was not a function of ideological opportunism, as was the case of many other leaders of the PPR

Gomulka's unswerving espousal of a nationalist program owed much to his personality. Both his removal from power in 1948 and his physical survival in the era of East European show trials were related to an often remarked upon obstinacy and uncompromising streak found in his character.[11] The postwar conflicts between nativists and Muscovites were partly ideological, therefore, and partly grounded in the trust Kremlin leaders placed in competing leaders. But personal antagonisms exacerbated these differences. According to Jozef Swiatlo, a Jewish security chief who eventually defected to the West, "Bierut's relationship to Gomulka was always hostile. The political rout of the Gomulkowszczyzna was led by Bierut personally. He calibrated the charges over time and surprised the X Department with ever newer conceptions which had to be backed up with facts. He chased after us to complete the accusatory materials. Yet these materials and facts could not be found despite our best efforts."[12] Bierut relied on Jewish Communists in the security apparatus to compile accusatory materials indicting Gomulka, but they served more as a Greek chorus in the personal struggle between the two protagonists

At the same time that the lively exchange over the Soviet role in liberated Poland was occurring in May 1945, the organs of coercion were undergoing Sovietization. Polonsky noted how this period saw "the creation of a large Polish army and of a security apparatus which was already showing disturbing signs of independence from the Polish government and which was, in fact, effectively controlled by the Soviet 'advisers' within it."[13] This apparatus sought new recruits, and a pool of candidates it showed special interest in consisted of Jewish Communists.

Launching the Attack on Nationalists: The Jewish Recruits

The defeat of Gomulka and his official program of Polish socialism in 1948 has been viewed retrospectively as a turning-point in Communist fortunes. The party commission appointed after the 1980-81 Solidarity interlude to investigate the sources of Poland's postwar crises highlighted the

importance of the 1948 intraparty struggle and suggested that the wrong side won.[14] While the commission was careful to put most blame on the Stalinist group, popular perceptions in Poland of the 1948 crisis often focus on the Jewish group in the security apparatus that assured the defeat of the nationalists. For Polish opponents of Communism at the time, "traditional anti-Jewish prejudice was reinforced by conflicts in which the new sociopolitical system was taking shape, and the stereotype of the Jewish and Communist danger was interlaced in the new, up-to-date version of *Żydokomuna* (Jewish-Communist conspiracy)."[15] The "*Żydokomuna* myth" holds, then, that at a decisive moment in Polish history - when the Yalta order conceivably held out the promise of democracy in the country - Jewish Communists, particularly those at the top of the security apparatus, tilted the balance of power in favor of Stalinism. What has fed this myth and in what measure did Jewish Communists hold strategoc power after 1945?

The myth of a Jewish-Communist conspiracy has origins that predate 1948 and is examined elsewhere in this volume. But the myth coloring interpretations of the 1948 power struggle is founded upon another myth - that had Gomulka not been toppled, Poland's Communist future would have been different. It is true that Gomulka was pursuing a political agenda not derived exclusvely from the Soviet model. The agenda comprised no commitment to democracy nor even to reform socialism, but in its highlighting of national traditions the agenda was sufficiently heretical for the Stalinizing forces in the country to diagnose a "rightist-nationalist deviation" and, in the end, expel its advocates from leadership posts.

The security apparatus was assigned the task of investigating party officials and determining who were guilty of the anti-Soviet heresy. It was crucial that the investigators themselves not be susceptible to the nationalist virus, and, therefore, criteria of recruitment had to be defined in such a way as not to permit fellow-travellers or sympathizers of Gomulka into the apparatus. The logical approach was to obtain recruits from among members of minority groups

As Michael Checinski succinctly noted, "the NKVD officers charged with the training and indoctrination of Polish cadres often favored Jews, who were considered less vulnerable to Polish nationalistic deviations or anti-Russian prejudices."[16] Polish Jews also faced none of the linguistic barriers that Russians confronted when infiltrating various organizations. Other national minorities, too, such as Ukrainians and Byelorussians, had the potential to serve Soviet interests in Poland. Often marginalized and at times persecuted in interwar Poland, such minorities welcomed the Communist program of equal rights for all nationalities.

But motives other than ideological bonding could be exploited by the Stalinist builders of the Polish police state. Thus they could have realized that a disproportionately large number of Jewish survivors of the war were polonized Jews not interested in holding a minority identity but seeking

integration instead. Some polonized Jews welcomed the new regime and recalled that before the war it had been the Communist Party that had fought anti-Semitism most energetically. In the Soviet logic, personal loyalties of recruits to the new order would go to patrons who assured them of successful careers. Some might even wish to take vengeance on Poles - individually or as a community - because they were implicated in carrying out repression against minority groups. Some Jews, in particular, might regard some Poles as partners of the Germans in perpetrating the Holocaust. Finally, the Soviet reasoning went, these uprooted people would react positively to the exhortation to build a new order.[17] A side effect of Gomulka's ouster, Stalinists could promise new recruits, was the promotion of Jews to high positions. This argument had particular force since the party leadership was generally poorly-educated while many prewar Jewish Communists were very well-educated.

The Muscovites calculated, then, that as with other groups there would be cynical careerists within the Jewish population prepared to carry out their dirty work. Staff for the security apparatus represented a diversity of ethnic, social, and occupational backgrounds. But minorities, and especially Jewish Communists, had special qualities that would strengthen the security organs and could help crush the Polish nationalist forces.

Wlodzimierz Rozenbaum, among other writers, underscored the fact that few surviving Jews in Poland after the war displayed sympathy for the new order: "To most Jews the new Poland had no appeal and they chose to make their home somewhere else, often in Israel." Thus out-migration of Jews was substantial and steady between 1945-48, and most Jewish returnees from the USSR and elsewhere left Poland during 1945-46. The repatriates who stayed wanted to settle down and succeed and they included a sizeable number of Communists. But Rozenbaum questioned the Jewishness of these repatriates: "As for the Jewish communists, they were communists first and Jews second, or they felt no affinity with other Jews at all."[18] In short, the vast majority of Jews had no affection for People's Poland and showed no interest in taking sides between Polish national Communists and Polish Stalinists. But in the case of Jewish Communists, is it accurate to portray them as ideologically-driven individuals shorn of ethnic identity or loyalty?

In a comprehensive study of the Jewish Communists of Poland, Jaff Schatz offered a nuanced assessment of their identity: "at the end of their Soviet odyssey, some [Jewish Communists] retained the balance among Jewish, Polish, and Communist subidentities, while the Jewishness of others declined in favor of a Polish identity as the predominant complement of their Communist conviction."[19] Schatz was concerned exclusively with what he termed the "generation" - "Polish Jews who became Communists at the end of 1920s and in the beginning of 1930s and stayed in the Polish Communist movement until the end of the 1960s...." This generation formed a unit in terms of their radicalism, but it was also internally differentiated into "three antagonistic units" - young Communists, Zionists, and Bundists.[20] Schatz

left open the possibility, therefore, that not all Jewish Communists were assimilationist at the time the new order in Poland was being forged.

Krystyna Kersten offered a different typology of the complex relationship among Poles, Jews, the postwar Polish state, and the new Communist regime. "The relationship between Jews and Communist authorities consisted of two axes: Jews' [approach] to the authorities, and the authorities' [approach] to the Jews - including to Jewish-Jews and Polish Jews alike. The broader context was shaped by other mutual relationships: Polish society-Jews, and Polish society-Communist authorities."[21] Adopting categories different from Schatz, Kersten distinguished Jews who were assimilationist in their objectives, other "Jewish-Jews" who asserted their identity as members of a separate but "progressive" nation (in the socialist sense; therefore they parted ways with Zionists), and others still who found themselves in "no man's land" - no longer Jewish, not yet Polish.

This historian then described the myths held by these groups about each other. For many Poles, including the anti-Communist government-in-exile in London, the Home Army, and the forest detachments of the civil war, "in the very first years of Communist rule, it wasn't so much that the Jew was the enemy as much as the enemy was the Jew."[22] Not surprisingly, Kersten deduced, "Jews who decided to remain in Poland were, in a way, fated to support the new authorities, or at least be neutral and loyal to them."[23]

In turn, for many Jews, including early Communists like Alfred Lampe, the new state was viewed as a national Polish state with little political space for minorities. Even in the security organs said to be dominated by Jews, 1945 data given to Bierut listed 25,600 employees of the UB (*Urząd Bezpieczeństwa*) of whom only 438 (that is, 1.7 percent) were Jews. To be sure, 67 of 500 high-ranking UB officials (13%) were Jewish but, Kersten contended, "just one Jew was sufficient for an institution to be regarded by public opinion as 'Jewish.'"[24] Staffing of the new national state, therefore, was generally carried out in the spirit of creating a Polish national state. But where Jews *were* overrepresented, as in the higher echelons of the security organs, it was more a cause for concern than a reassuring sign, as we see below.

To summarize, for numerous reasons the Russian-organized security organs in Poland had need for minorities such as Jews. Jews from the old KPP, as well as Jews discovering they now had marginal status in Polish society, served as potential recruits to the apparatus. Politically-active Jews remembered the support for minority rights expressed in the programs of Luxemburg's party (the SDKPiL) and the KPP. Important for the Soviets was that assimilationist or de-ethnified Jews might be counted on to display as much and possibly more loyalty to the USSR than to Poland.

The Soviets sought to drive the wedge between Jewish Communists and the ascendant nationalist group deeper. As Schatz put it, Jews who had belonged to or sympathized with the KPP "felt deeply offended by Gomulka's criticism of its ideological traditions and were less susceptible to the nation-

alist flavor of his Polish way to socialism.[25] At the June 1948 Plenum Gomulka reportedly attacked the KPP for its erroneous national policy, suggesting that its error lay not its internationalist position (Stalinism) but in its inappropriate national composition (between one-quarter and one-fifth of KPP membership had been Jewish).[26] Gomulka had not concocted the Polish road as an anti-Semitic program, but it was the logical product of his distrust of KPP cadres, many of whom were Jewish. It was fertile ground for Soviets to use divisive tactics.

In recruiting Jews, then, Muscovites skillfully identified Gomulka with an anti-Jewish cadres policy and the nationalist deviation with anti-Semitism. Indeed in the Muscovite witch-hunts against nationalists, anti-Semitism was initially considered proof of such deviation. As a result, "the members of the generation had many reasons to welcome and support the ideological struggle against what they perceived as a dangerous deviation from Communist ideals."[27]

At the same time that they played nationalist and Jewish Communists off against each other, Polish Muscovites and their Soviet sponsors engaged in damage-limitation measures. As Checinski noted, "whether by coincidence or evil design, Jewish officials were often placed in the most conspicuous posts; hence they could easily be blamed for all the regime's crimes." By appointing Jews to controversial posts, for example, managing state-church relations or supervising the campaign against the anti-Communist underground, Jews would effectively "deflect antiregime feelings into anti-Semitism."[28]

Checinski provided data on Jewish numbers in the security organs. Of approximately 120 senior positions in military counter-intelligence (called "Informacja") between 1949-54, Poles held only some 15-20 posts; 5-7 of these people were Jewish. The Second (Intelligence) Department of the Army General Staff had an even higher proportion of Jews. It was headed by General Waclaw Komar, a veteran Jewish Communist. In the civilian security service the proportion of Jews was low except for the Tenth Department of the Ministry of Public Security, whose task it was to investigate top party officials. Its head was Anatol Fejgin, and the three deputy heads were Lieutenant Colonel Swiatlo, Colonel Henry Piasecki, and Colonel Kazimierz Michalak; only Michalak was not Jewish. The Tenth Department was given responsibility for prosecuting Gomulka and Marian Spychalski, and Jews in the Department had to carry out the dirty work: Swiatlo arrested Gomulka while Fejgin and Roman Romkowski - deputy minister and KGB confidential agent - tried to get him to confess. They answered to Berman, the Politburo's security overseer. The Tenth Department organized the trials of Polish generals in 1950-51 which resulted in a number of executions. Berman later claimed he did everything to postpone them, but the decision had been taken at a higher level. The names of the decision-makers were never revealed, and Checinski concluded this was "to give credence to the thesis, widely publi-

cized in Poland and often repeated in the West, that Jewish Communists were mostly to blame for the years of terror and lawlessness in Poland."[29]

There was no Jewish solidarity within the security organs and, if anything, there were symptoms of "Jewish anti-Semitism."[30] Schatz contended that the anti-Polish policy of the Stalinists was implemented primarily by Poles. By contrast, "The Jews could be found in practically all the party factions and were never in any way organized as a group within the party."[31]

The Defeat of the Nationalists

The battle lines in the 1948 party struggle that so profoundly affected Poland's future were clearly demarcated. The Moscow-trained group was led by Bierut and three Jewish Communists - Berman, Hilary Minc, and Roman Zambrowski; the nationalists were made up of Gomulka, Spychalski, Zenon Kliszko, and Ignacy Loga-Sowinski.

At the June 3, 1948 Plenum of the Central Committee, Gomulka reaffirmed his support for fully respecting the traditions of the Polish workers' movement. As Krystyna Kersten summarized {and cited from) Gomulka's speech, "The report was full of innuendos but clearly expressed a central argument that if a ruling party is to have the support of society, it has to come out in support of the independence of the state and has to defend that independence. Neither the SDKPiL nor the KPP understood this, while on the question of Polish independence the PPS [Polish Socialist Party] expressed considerable political realism and better grasped the political reality than did the SDKPiL."[32]

At the next Central Committee Plenum in July, Berman spoke of the need for a new ideological offensive whose major objective was to win "the very difficult struggle with nationalism and opportunism." In interpreting this line of attack on Gomulka, Kersten observed that "From the viewpoint of the Kremlin leadership, the most satisfactory result would have been Gomulka giving way and accepting the new political direction."[33] But, instead, Gomulka objected to several Stalinist policies: collectivization, the need for a Cominform, and condemnation of the nationalist current in past Polish socialist movements. He refused to engage in self-criticism or to admit to an ideological affinity to Titoism and, on August 15, Bierut left for Moscow to report personally on the rightist-nationalist deviation. Stalin needed little convincing that it was time to eliminate the nationalists.

At the Politburo meeting of August 18-19, Gomulka was formally ousted as party leader. Berman reputedly led the attack on Gomulka and convened the Politburo to have the party leader removed. That Gomulka was not executed for his political crimes may also, however, have been the work of the same Berman, who had to resist pressure applied by Soviet security chief Lavrentii Beria to have Gomulka shot.[34]

On August 31 the historic four-day meeting of the Central Committee opened. It formally charged Gomulka with rightist-nationalism and with

revisionism of the Leninist assessment of the Polish socialist movement during Gomulka's June speech. The first point of the Plenum's concluding resolution asserted that the address had been "a *de facto* ideological capitulation to the nationalist traditions of the PPS." Two weeks later it was the turn of the PPS leadership to criticize its own negative traditions other than the "tradition of cooperation with the SDKPiL, KPP, and PPR." Over the decades the faults of the PPS had been "nationalism, anti-Sovietism, and conciliation towards the bourgeoisie."[35]

The correct internationalist position for Communists was charted out in a seminal (more accurately, notorious) article published by Minc in 1949: "The line of development of the USSR and the line of the people's democracies can never be two parallel lines." The goal of a people's democracy was, with time, to "diminish its systemic idiosyncracies when compared with the USSR" and "to make up the historical retardation, catch up with the USSR, and march together under its leadership to communism."[36] Bierut may have been Gomulka's chief protagonist, but we observe how Jewish Communists like Berman and Minc played highly-visible roles as supporting actors.

Gomulka's last important political address before his arrest was at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee held in November 1949. While defending his position on Polish socialism he now acknowledged some mistakes: "Nationalism in the ranks of workers' parties represents the best fodder for imperialist agents and spies.... I didn't fully understand the nature of this problem before and at the August [1948] Plenum."[37] But Gomulka rejected charges that his speech to the first Congress of the PZPR in 1948 was Titoist and nationalist and he held out from acknowledging that Polish socialism should be specifically grounded in the Soviet-Stalinist model. In his final statement at the Plenum he remarked: "I am perfectly aware of where the future of Poland, of the Polish nation and the Polish working class, lies - it is not based on the West." And he spoke cryptically of how the controversy over the rightist-nationalist position went beyond the question of his leadership: "The issue isn't as simple as this - let's finish with Wieslaw [*i.e.*, himself] and then we'll have done with everything."[38]

Clearly frustrated with Gomulka's obstinacy, Bierut's summing up at the conclusion of the meeting was that "the Plenum proved beyond any doubt that the rightist and nationalist deviation, and political blindness and lack of vigilance, are two sides of the same phenomenon."[39] In their testimony to Toranska many years later when "correct" views were no longer expected, both Ochab - who had questioned the presence of Soviet troops in 1945 - and Berman continued to insist that in 1948-49 Gomulka's position on the importance of preserving the pre-war Polish socialist tradition (espoused in particular by the PPS-Revolutionary Faction) was "incorrect, anti-Leninist, anti-Marxist, and ran counter to the party."[40]

Already in 1948 the seeds of a later conflict were being sown. While Gomulka was removed from power, deputy security chief Mieczyslaw Moczar

was only demoted, to a provincial post. Moczar had cushioned his fall by disassociating himself from the nationalist line. In a memorandum to the Politburo in August 1948, the future leader of the partisan group sounded nothing like the nationalist he projected himself to be two decades later: "For us the Soviet Union is not an ally - that is a slogan for the nation. For us party members, the Soviet Union is our fatherland, and I cannot say what our borders are: today they are beyond Berlin and tomorrow beyond Gibraltar."[41]

It is clear that the Muscovite leadership sought to foment disagreements within the nationalist faction. In the Gomulka-Moczar case, for example, one prominent party official observed: "We must remember that Boleslaw Bierut and Jakub Berman knew how to divide, antagonize, stir up quarrels, and break their opponents."[42] Shortly afterwards, as described below, Bierut split his own camp by disowning the Jewish Communists.

Swiatlo, the former deputy head of the Tenth Department, reexamined the purge of the nationalist faction and, for an ex-secret police boss, put forward surprisingly sophisticated theories. He argued that the Gomulka ouster demonstrated how "it is an impossible task to reconcile belief in ideals and love of homeland when in Communist ranks."[43] Further, "ideological differences in the party occur in the sense that some faithful and devoted agents of Moscow have no difficulty in accepting changes in tactics since they reconciled themselves long ago with the principle that the so-called party line is nothing else but the interests and will of Moscow." But other party members conceived the party line as not simply a function of the Kremlin's interests. As a result, "The so-called rightist or leftist deviations occur when some comrades do not differentiate between party tactics and the real political line. Tactics change, depending on circumstances, political conditions at a given time, and Moscow's needs. But the real party line always remains the same. Those who understand changed tactics as a new political line have to take the consequences later."[44]

In similar fashion, ethnic politics was primarily a function of Moscow's preferences. Jews were favored for certain leadership positions immediately after the war but, once they had contributed to Gomulka's removal, they were quickly turned into the political targets of the next Kremlin-orchestrated campaign.

Gomulka's demise engendered conflict within the ruling elite throughout much of the period between 1948 and the Polish October of 1956. In May 1950 a little known but dramatic confrontation took place at a Central Committee Plenum. It resurrected the controversy over the Polish road. A powerful party and government official, reportedly linked to the Beria police faction in the Kremlin, made a bid for power that surprised the Bierut leadership. The line of attack was ingenious: the Bierut team had adopted the program of a Polish road to socialism after having purged its principal author and proponent.

Wladyslaw Wolski was Minister of Public Administration at the time and used the signing of an accord between the party and the Polish Episcopate to

attack national Communists. In seeking to discredit the Polish road, he paraphrased a favorable report about the agreement published in the Catholic press: "the *Catholic Weekly* writes how, faced with one of the most difficult problems of the contemporary world, we took our own Polish road.... Normalizing relations between church and state is seen as a*pioneering* act bringing about coexistence between these institutions in the socialist era."[45]

Wolski also referred to a farmers' newspaper as a further example of a return to the Polish road under Bierut: "Today's issue of*Gromada* propagates love of the private farm..., love for the private farm at a time when we want to collectivize farming. There is no need for further comment."[46] Wolski went on to pour scorn on the policy of appointing cadres based on their qualifications rather than political loyalty, and he then specifically charged Politburo member Zambrowski (a Jewish Muscovite) with maintaining contacts with the disgraced Gomulka (the Polish nationalist). Wolski's hidden agenda was to 1ink Jews to the Polish road they had fought against a few years earlier.

The party establishment hit back at Wolski. Berman referred to his speech as "a sad example of political shiftiness and deception." Ochab charged Wolski with displaying "lack of confidence in the leadership." Bierut concluded that whereas Gomulka had at least been crafty - at the 1948 unification Congress he signalled the dangers of cosmopolitanism, at the Third Plenum he made an appeal to women - Wolski lacked even that quality and his "leftist-sectarian style and tone" was transparent.[47]

Wolski's response seemed to disprove Bierut's implication that he possessed little political finesse. Interpreting democratic centralism in Leninist fashion, he asserted: "I believe it is important for our Party that when someone among the fifteen members of the Politburo in one way or another manifests a kind of liberalism..., a member of the Central Committee should have the opportunity at a Plenum to say this publicly."[48] Referring to his alleged contacts with Soviet officials, Wolski sought to turn the tables on Bierut: "Comrade Bierut asserted that I am involved in intrigues and am carrying out political diversion on behalf of Soviet comrades. From this it follows that I am being attacked for maintaining relations with Soviet comrades."[49] Wolski then followed with his own dramatic accusation: "the one thing which is clear and obvious is the political diversion and intrigues that you carry out through your acquaintances with Soviet comrades "[50]

The Plenum's verdict on Wolski was a foregone conclusion. Accusing him of working on behalf of unknown persons, of "intrigues, hypocrisy, and diversionary and schismatic activity harming the party," the Central Committee stripped Wolski of his party membership. For our purposes, the Wolski episode revealed how some Polish Communists, with backing from Soviet hardliners, stressed continuing vigilance over the Polish road program even after Gomulka's fall. The episode also revealed increasingly more public attacks on Jewish Communists, now retroactively depicted as sponsors of the nationalist program. The Polish security apparatus had come full circle and

now was expected to link the nationalist deviation to Zionism.

The Defeat of the Jewish Communists

As early as 1941 Gomulka was supposed to have approved a recommendation made in the Ministry of Public Security to open the files of Jewish employees in the security apparatus and have Jews replaced with Poles?[51] In October 1947, at a briefing for top officials in the Ministry, Colonel Adam Kornecki - chief of the Kielce and later Poznan District Public Security Office - reported that the matter of dismissing Jews had arisen after a Polish delegation had returned from Moscow. At the meeting Kornecki pointed out to Gomulka that he was Jewish himself, but Gomulka would not have it and insisted Kornecki was not a Jew. At that point the Kielce security boss recalled what Goering had once said on the subject: "Wer ein Jude ist, bestimme ich!" (I decide who is a Jew).[52]

Gomulka's ouster and the end of the nationalists' influence in the party gave Jewish cadres a very brief respite. But a corresponding anti-nationalist offensive was launched in late 1948 by Jewish Communists aimed at their own community. As Schatz described the campaign, "the existence of a universal Jewish community was denied in favor of unity with Socialist Poland, and an uncompromising struggle against Jewish nationalism, in general, and the competing Jewish parties, in particular, was declared."[53] In 1949 the promotion of Jews to party posts came to an end, and Berman and other leading Jews began to sense that today's executioners were being set up to become tomorrow's victims. A tide of anti-Semitism swept Russia, and its love affairs with Israel came to an end as the Jewish state failed to take up an anti-Western foreign policy. Checinski revealed the logic the Soviets developed: "once they [Jewish Communists] had fulfilled their assigned task and exterminated the Polish right-wing nationalist deviationists," they themselves could well become expendable and be exterminated for 'cosmopolitanism,' 'petty-bourgeois Jewish nationalism,' 'Trotskyism,' 'Zionism,' or any other crime in Stalin's book."[54]

The Noel Field affair was part of the setup. An American Communist who came to Poland in 1948 and contacted Berman about party membership, he was accused by the KGB a year later of having been a Western spy all along and was asked to provide evidence about other East European spies. These turned out to be Jewish. Given the Jewish presence in the security apparatus a cruel irony resulted: "Among those who over-zealously implemented the new anti-Semitic line were the leading Jewish officials of the Tenth Department." Checinski captured the irony: "Thus, it can be said that the Tenth Department nearly earned itself the title of the 'Department of Self-Extermination.'"[55] All twelve persons arrested by the Department in connection with the Field affair were Jewish. The plan was to have them, in turn, serve as witnesses for the prosecution against Gomulka, Spychalski, Kliszko and, later, Berman. Especially vulnerable leaders who could be tainted as Zionists

were Gomulka and Stanislaw Radkiewicz - Minister of Public Security - for both had Jewish wives. "Informacja" also arrested 16 Jewish army officers, mostly from the Second Department. In general, about 40% of those affected by secret police purges may have been of Jewish descent?[56] Yet with fewer victims and no show trials, the anti-Jewish Stalinist campaign was not as severe in Poland as elsewhere in the region. This may well have been the result of a Jewish presence in the security organs.

The Slansky show trial in Czechoslovakia in 1951-52, where 11 of the 14 prominent Communists accused of being spies were Jews, indicated the direction that the purge in Poland could have taken. "Informacja" and the Tenth Department duly sought, too, to find proof of collusion between Polish right-wing nationalist deviationists and Zionist or Trotskyite plotters. Zambrowski - identified by some subscribers to the *Zydokomuna* myth as the mastermind behind the Jewish effort to seize power after the war - now had to supervise the removal of Jews from army, security, and party organizations during 1953-54.[57]

But by late 1954, as Stalinist forces came under attack in Poland, the purges ended and Jews implicated in the Field affair were released. No trial was held of those who had participated in the security apparatus repression. A trial would have made obvious the fact that Soviet superiors and their Polish agents - not a handful of Jews in the Ministry of Public Security - were responsible for the crimes. Nonetheless after Gomulka's return to power in 1956 the party investigated past security operations and assigned responsibility almost exclusively to Jews - Romkowski, Rozanski, Fejgin, Swiatlo, Mietkowski, Berman. The only non-Jew cited was not Bierut or Ochab but Radkiewicz (he with the Jewish wife).[58] To dramatize the background of those responsible for Stalinist repression, both Berman and Radkiewicz were forced in 1956 to resign their security posts in a highly-publicized manner.

In a final display of revisionism, Soviet leader Khrushchev praised Gomulka for having very early on exercised needed vigilance over the Jews: "Gomulka understood how mistaken - indeed, how harmful - it was to let this virus [of a Jewish takeover] grow unchecked in the Polish leadership". But Bierut aligned himself with Berman, Minc, and Zambrowski, and "the Jews treacherously accused Gomulka, not of being anti-Semitic, but of being pro-Yugoslav."[59]

In summarizing the role of Jewish Communists in the formative years of People's Poland, we can do no better than to invoke Schatz's conclusion about the more general role they had played on the Polish left: they had been both "triumphant builders of communism and victims of its wrath."[60] These two historical roles combined provide a broader understanding of the *Żydokomuna* experience.

NOTES

* I am grateful to Leszek Gluchowski and Wlodzimierz Rozenbaum for valuable assistance in the preparation of this article.

1. The term usually employed to describe the Gomulka group is the nativist faction, that is, Communists who spent the war years in occupied Poland. Yet virtually all native Polish Communists - Gomulka, Franciszek Jozwiak, Mieczyslaw Moczar - had under gone NKVD training at some point in their careers. In order to highlight what separated the group ideologically from the Muscovites, I use the term nationalist. By earlier interwar or later postcommunist standards, Gomulka was hardly a nationalist but contextually, in the era of high Stalinism, he was. The term is also helpful here in directing attention to the subjective understanding that Jewish Communists had of Gomulka's national road.
2. In the view of Jakub Berman, head of Poland's security apparatus in the Stalin era, Nowotko was killed by a provocateur. See Teresa Toranska, *Oni*, London: Aneks, 1985, p. 243.
3. See Raymond Taras, *Polish Communists and the Polish Road to Socialism*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993.
4. "Jest tylko jedna rzecz głupsza od komunizmu - antykomunizm," Wywiad z Wladysławem Bienkowskim rozmawia Jan Marx.*Dziś;*, nr. 7 (10), lipiec 1991, p. 90.
5. Anthony Polonsky and Boleslaw Drukier (eds.), *The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, p. 114.
6. Document No. 75, "Extracts of the Minutes of the Plenum of the PPR Central Committee, 20-21 May 1945," in Polonksy and Drukier, p. 434. Jasny was subsequently expelled from the party, in November 1945, for "a panicky overestimation of the reactionary forces" together with the fact "he had rejected the possibility of a broad-based democratic front." See Document No. 80, "Central Party Control Commission Resolution of 28 November 1945 Concerning Zawazki, Wlodzimierz (Jasny)," in Polonsky and Drukier, p. 450. Shortly thereafter, however - as was so often the case of those found guilty of sectarianism and dogmatism - Jasny was reinstated with the party.
7. Document No. 75, in Polonksy and Drukier, *The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland*, p 430.
8. Document No. 75, in Polonksy and Drukier, *The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland*, p. 426.
9. Document No. 75, in Polonsky and Drukier, *The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland*, p. 440.
10. Document No. 75, in Polonsky and Drukier, *The Beginnings of*

Communist Rule in Poland, p. 436.

11. On this, see Nicholas Bethell, *Gomulka his Poland and his Communism*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972.
12. Józef Swiatło, *Za kulisami bezpieki i partii*, Warsaw: Bis, 1990, p. 29.
13. Polonsky and Drukier, *The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland*, p. 2.
14. "Sprawozdanie z prac komisji KC PZPR powołanej dla wyjaśnienia przyczyń i przbiegu konfliktów społecznych w dziejach Polski Ludowej," *Nowe Drogi*, special issue, undated (*ca.* autumn 1983). The commission chairman was Hieronim Kubiak.
15. Jaff Schatz, *The Generation: The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Communists of Poland*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991, p. 207.
16. Michael Checinski, *Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism*, New York: Karz-Cohl, 1982, p. 11.
17. These motives are listed by Checinski, *Poland*, p. 64.
18. Wlodzimierz Rozenbaum, "The Road to New Poland: Jewish Communists in the Soviet Union, 1939-46," in Norman Davies and Antony Polonsky (eds.), *Jews in Eastern Poland and the USSR, 1939-46*, London: Macmillan, 1991, p. 224.
19. Jaff Schatz, *The Generation*, p. 194.
20. Schatz, *The Generation*, p. 328.
21. Krystyna Kersten, *Polacy, Żydzi, komunizm: anatomia półprawd 1939-68*, Warsaw: Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1992, p. 78.
22. Krystyna Kersten, *Polacy, Żydzi, komunizm*, p. 73.
23. Krystyna Kersten, *Polacy, Żydzi, komunizm*, p. 86.
24. Krystyna Kersten, *Polacy, Żydzi, komunizm*, pp. 83-84.
25. Schatz, *The Generation*, p. 249.
26. Wlodzimierz Rozenbaum, "The Background of the Anti-Zionist Campaign of 1967-1968 in Poland," *Essays in History*, 17 (1972-73), p. 75. Rozenbaum also notes (p. 87) that the first public denunciation of the "Jewish" KPP was made by Władysław Wolski in an article in *Życie Literackie* in 1967. Wolski had already been at the center of an anti-Jewish surge within the party in 1950.
27. Schatz, *The Generation*, p. 249.
28. Checinski, *Poland*, pp 62-63.
29. Checinski, *Poland*, p 57.
30. Checinski, *Poland*, p. 72.
31. Schatz, *The Generation*, p. 258.
32. Krystyna Kersten, *Narodziny systemu władzy: Polska 1943-1948*, Poznan;: SAWW, 1989, p. 382.
33. Kersten, *Narodziny systemu władzy*, p. 390.
34. Ochab's testimony to Toranska, *Oni*, p. 39.
35. Kersten, *Narodziny systemu władzy*, p 398.

36. Hilary Minc, "Niektóre zagadnienia demokracji ludowej w świetle leninowsko-stalinowskiej nauki o dyktaturze proletariatu," *Nowe Droqi*, no. 6, 1949.
37. "Stenogram III Plenarnego Posiedzenia KC i CKKP PZPR w dniach 11-13 listopada 1949 r," Dokument 237-II.2, p. 218.
38. "Stenogram III Plenarnego Posiedzenia KC," p. 237.
39. "Stenogram III Plenarnego Posiedzenia KC," p. 455.
40. Toranska, *Oni*, pp. 32, 300.
41. Cited in Kersten, *Narodziny systemu władzy*, p. 393.
42. Franciszek Szlachcic, *Gorzky smak władzy*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo FAKT, 1990, p. 100.
43. Swiatło, *Za kulisami bezpieki i partii*, Warszawa: Bis, 1990, p. 27.
44. Swiatło, *Za kulisami bezpieki i partii*, p. 27.
45. "Stenogram III Plenarnego Posiedzenia KC PZPR w dniach 8-10 maja 1950 r," Dokument 237/II-3, p. 326.
46. "Stenogram III Plenarnego Posiedzenia KC," p. 327.
47. "Stenogram III Plenarnego Posiedzenia KC," pp. 365, 403, 594.
48. "Stenogram III Plenarnego Posiedzenia KC," p. 626.
49. "Stenogram III Plenarnego Posiedzenia KC," p. 629.
50. "Stenogram III Plenarnego Posiedzenia KC," p. 630. Wolski defended his position subsequently in letters addressed to the Central Committee; see *Gomułka, i inni: dokumenty z archiwum KC 1948-1982*, London: Aneks, 1987, pp. 57-63.
51. On the basis of research into military and security archives, Leszek Gluchowski has concluded that Russian officials, not Poles, kept the log on the ethnic origins of cadres. Personal communication.
52. Checinski, *Poland*, p 90.
53. Schatz, *The Generation*, p 254.
54. Checinski, *Poland*, p. 76.
55. Checinski, *Poland*, pp 80, 82.
56. Schatz, *The Generation*, p. 225.
57. Zambrowski had little or no Jewish self-identity as is attested by his diaries published in *Krytyka*, no. 6, 1980.
58. For the resolution of the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee held in May 1957 resolution, see Checinski, *Poland*, Appendix A, pp. 264-267.
59. Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, Boston: Little Brown, 1974, pp. 179-182.
60. Schatz, *The Generation*, p. 1.

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THE LAST TRUE COMMUNISTS

Jaff Schatz

I *After the Thaw*

The 1960's formed the last stretch of the path that was to end in the existential defeat of a generation of Polish-Jewish communists.* The 1960's were preceded by the shared experience of turmoil of the thaw, the so-called Polish October, which gained its peak in October 1956. For most members of the generation, the thaw meant a painful awakening from the trance of holy madness, shocking realizations, new hopes - and subsequent frustrations.

As the frequency and intensity of the anti-Jewish mood during this period was clearly surpassing anything that had happened since 1947, and as emigration was again permitted, the bulk of the general Jewish community reacted to this situation with their feet. Between 1956 and 1959 approximately 50,000 Jews left Poland,[1] mostly for Israel, reducing the remains of Polish Jewry to some 30,000.[2] About one-third of these emigrants were those who just shortly before had come back to Poland, the result of the second repatriation that Gomulka had negotiated with the Soviets.[3]

Preceding their final defeat, the thaw and its aftermath formed an important, shared experience for the generation. Besides confirming their decline on the ladder of social and political influence, this experience affected their world outlook and their self-perception was shaken. They never wholly recovered from the blow and, in varying degrees, they all suffered a loss of ideological innocence. Most retained their faith in the basic emancipating capacity of the Communist vision, but its intensity and their expectation of its approaching realization considerably lessened.

Could they, when the thaw was finally over, imagine what was to come in less than a decade? In addition to their gradual slide down the ladder of status and power, there were several worrying signs which could have prepared them for the outcome. However, most went undetected. Despite misgivings, increasing disillusionment and a growing sense of ideological estrangement, especially intense in the second half of the 1950s, their rootedness, the seeming stabilization of their lives, and the dullness of the period caused them to disregard the strength of the threats or to consider them a temporary aberration. In addition, most were no longer in a position to appreciate clearly the forces operating behind the scenes. Thus, from their different locations in society, they saw only limited aspects of the events forming their present and, like most human beings, were to be caught by surprise by the future towards which they led.

II *Clouding skies, fading sparks*

Under the influence of the withdrawal from the policies and climate of the

thaw, the enthusiasm of the mid-1950s gradually turned to stagnation, opportunism and petty compromise, a malaise the Polish writer Tadeusz Rozewicz called "the little stabilization." The stagnation of the 1960s typified this situation both in the party and in society at large. Seemingly, nothing indicated that "the little stabilization" would end in a violent eruption. However, beneath the surface of apparent normalization were accumulating factors and forces that would explode in the set of events leading to the existential defeat of the generation.

Often interlaced and mutually connected, some of these factors had been inherent since the beginning of Communist rule. Others were part of the unsolved inheritance of the thaw, and still others emerged as a result of the impact of this particular decade's social, ideological and political developments.

Latent or manifest, popular nationalism and anti-Soviet feelings formed a constant feature of the country's social climate throughout the postwar period. Founded on the historical layer of the partition experience, the perception of Polish-Soviet relations (including the wartime German-Soviet second partition of Poland) and the Communist take-over, these deeply rooted sentiments produced a seemingly unbridgeable gap between the party and society in general. Forming a constant variable in the postwar situation, perceived as a threat, a promise or instrument in a power struggle, a blunted, latent nationalism was there when the decade began. Mainly in its anti-semitic variant, this nationalism was to become a forceful weapon for the heirs of the Natolinians in their thrust for power. It was also used in settling old accounts rooted in the not too distant political past.

The old hostility between the "Muscovites" from the Soviet-based Union of Polish Patriots and the political apparatus of the Polish army on the one hand, and the "natives" of the PPR on the other was not forgotten. During the Stalinist years the former most often had the upper hand, thanks to Moscow's more reserved attitude toward the latter. Since among these there was a very large proportion of Jews (and also of old KPP members), the "natives'" frustrations and resentment had a strongly anti-Jewish touch. Although many "natives" wholeheartedly joined in the party's postwar ideological condemnation of and political action against Gomulka's "rightist-nationalist deviation," that period's line of division largely paralleled its wartime form, thus further reinforcing mutual aggression. These resentments continued to play a vital role behind the ideological arguments between the so-called Pulawska and Natolin factions during the thaw, and were later inherited by the police faction which, led by the Police General and Minister of Interior Mieczyslaw Moczar,[4] was to design the generation's final defeat.

The party apparatus inherited by Gomulka after his return to power[5] formed a strongly conservative force with a long professional tenure. Resisting change and determined to retain its dominant position, its most conservative core labelled every attempt at critical analysis and reform a "revisionist

deviation from Socialism." The goal of the post-thaw conservative counter-offensive was to create an atmosphere of immanent danger to the foundations of the system. Hence, revisionism was described as the major threat to Socialism, and conservatives claimed that therevisionists regarded the Polish October as a starting-point for a "second stage,"*i.e.*, for abolishing Socialism in Poland. Attempting to win the support of the apparatus, increasingly believing in the "revisionist danger," and convinced that this was the way to restore the unity of the party, Gomulka and his initially centrist team joined and subsequently headed the offensive against the liberals.[6] Thus, while the party formally adopted a two-front strategy against both the "dogmatics" and the reform-minded "revisionists," a decisive battle was waged against the latter, and the campaign against the "revisionist threat" was declared the main ideological task of the party throughout the course of the 1960s.

This conservative counter-offensive resulted in a continual downgrading not only of liberal reformers, but also of old KPP members and Jews. As these categories often overlapped, for the conservative core of party apparatus the struggle against revisionism became increasingly synonymous with the struggle against Jews. The reverse was also the case: anti-Semitism and the struggle against Jews in the party became increasingly labelled as the battle against revisionism. By 1964 most of reformers and Jews were purged from central party positions[7] and liberal tendencies were finally averted. However, the struggle against revisionism continued as a form of ghost hunting, ideological exorcism, a war-cry of the conservative party apparatus and a weapon in factional struggles for power.

This all took place in a party whose core, its large activist strata, was undergoing deep social and ideological change. The thaw and its aftermath had resulted in an officially proclaimed policy of national unity, as opposed to an earlier revolutionary confrontation. An extremely important effect of this change was that the party opened its doors to new members. After the purges in the second half of the 1950s, party membership had decreased to over one million. However, as the result of a determined recruitment policy the party grew rapidly in the 1960s, reaching a membership of nearly two million in 1967 and crossing the two million threshold in 1968. As the early postwar resistance to the Communist regime seemed to be melting away, this rapid growth of the party had far-reaching consequences. Although the leadership attempted to reconcile the policy of mass recruitment with the goal of retaining the proletarian character of the party, the resulting growth led to a substantial increase in non-proletarian segments of its ranks and a relative deproletarization.[8] As was to be dramatically manifested in the workers' rebellions of the 1970s and 1980s, in a longer time perspective this was to result in a widening gap between the party and the social classes within which it claimed legitimization. In a shorter time perspective, as the new intelligentsia and white-collar groups entered the ranks of the party cadres, the latter became increasingly permeated by the middle-class values, attitudes and

ambitions carried by its new members.

In the conditions of the 1960s, the initial ideological backbone which the new members brought into the party had a much larger penetrative power than previously. During the Stalinist years, the political and ideological authority of the central party leadership over the cadres was a holy principle supported by the sword of terror. Compromising the previous model, the thaw and its aftermath resulted in a situation in which the cadres acquired a more independent position towards the power center. On the level of inter-party power relations the result was an increased degree of independence - a "parcelling out" of democratic centralism[9] - of regional party leadership groups and different personal power constellations. On the ideological level the result was a decreased resistance to and increased assimilation of the values, norms and attitudes which in the 1940s and in the 1950s had been regarded as incompatible with the Communist ethos. Hence, to a substantially larger degree than before the party opened up to ideological influences from outside or, concretely speaking, to that part of society which now decided to actively join it. Thus, behind the shrinking curtain of an official Communist ideology, the values, attitudes and ambitions which typified the conservative party apparatus merged with those that inspired the new party cadres.

Against the background of the increasing dissatisfaction with the stagnation associated with Gomulka's regime, this changing composition of party cadres and its accumulating ideological effects generated two main trends: a new, technocratic orientation on one hand, and the reappearance of an aggressive nationalism and anti-Semitism on the other. As for the former, a significant segment of the new cadres were young technicians and engineers who brought into the party a managerial, technocratic pragmatism, largely devoid of the customary Communist ethos. Those people, who in the mid-1960s accounted for approximately one fourth of the entire 261,000 activist stratum, were spokesmen for economic and industrial development, and advocated the primacy of efficiency over ideological deliberations. They represented a strong orientation toward rationalism, pragmatism and professionalism. Although the quantitative and qualitative expansion of the technocrats often met with resistance from the older Communists, it was largely successful as a modernizing reorientation away from the conventional communist virtues.[10] Their main societal base lay in Poland's industrial engine, Silesia. Edward Gierek, the Silesian first Party Secretary and since 1959 a member of the Politburo, was seen by the technocrats and their top strata, the managerially bent *apparatchiks*, as their main spokesman, a symbol of the necessary changes and Poland's future party leader.

Another main trend typifying the new ideological spirit of the times was reemergence of a strong nationalistic and anti-Semitic tendency within the party cadres connected to the unsolved legacy of the thaw and the frustrated popular ambitions for national independence. This trend was based on the changed general ideological profile of the party and reinforced by the political

aspirations and ideological influence of the police faction. Its main social proponent was the young generation of the party cadres and a segment of its new intellectual laborers of "predominantly peasant and middle class" origin, grown up in the new Poland. Seeing in the rising might of the police faction (which by the mid 1960s had become increasingly clear) a chance to replace those who blocked their progress up the social ladder, they could illustrate a mere customary conflict of generations or, in their particular spheres of activity, a particular pattern of career lobbies, were it not for the fact of their unusually strong anti-Semitic images and projections. In their eyes Jews in general and Jewish Communists in particular became the symbol of and the reason for everything that went wrong in modern Polish history and in the fulfillment of their ambitions. Moreover, anti-Semitism and romantic nationalism offered a substitute for their repressed anti-Sovietism. For them, raised in an ethnically homogeneous and politically frustrated authoritarian postwar society, aggressive nationalism, anti-liberalism and anti-Semitism became part of a world view, offering a universal explanation and the hope of social elevation.[11] Ideologically allied with the conservative core of the party apparatus, this large section of the middle level of party cadres formed the social basis for the Communist populism under which banner the police faction prepared its quest for power.[12]

Part of the leadership of the police faction or, as they preferred to be called, the partisans, was composed of men with a past in the wartime Communist Polish resistance, who often were placed in secondary political positions in the Stalinist years. In the wake of Gomulka's return to power, they advanced to influential political posts, reinforcing and allying themselves with the remnants of the Natolin faction. By the mid-1960s, they had firmly established their power center in the Ministry of Interior and in the security and political services of the army. Partly due to their war- and postwar experiences, they harbored a deep animosity towards the "Muscovites" and Jewish Communists. They opposed the stagnation and the "little stabilization" of the Gomulka regime and, without ever crystallizing a positive political program, were deeply anti-liberal, authoritarian and nationalistic. To some extent they probably shared their supporters' anti-Soviet emotions. Unlike their supporters, however, they refrained from open anti-Sovietism, this both because of their political realism and their connections with the Soviet security services, which either masterminded or at least sanctioned the consolidation of their power.[13] Thus, their "whispered" anti-Sovietism was merely a tactic intended to raise popular support within and outside the ranks of the party.

As an alternative to the inexpressible anti-Sovietism, the partisans invoked the image of an allegedly threatening German revanchism even stronger than Gomulka himself, who utilizing this deeply rooted popular emotion had to take into account the existence of Communist East Germany. Much stronger than the Natolinians before them, in their propaganda they blamed Jews for all the evils of the Polish past and present. Coupling the "German

threat" with denunciations of "Zionism" as allied with "American imperialism" and "West German revanchism," and spreading suspicions against Jews as actual or potential "Zionist agents," the partisans sought to create an image of a beleaguered Poland threatened by both outer and inner conspiracy. Symptomatic for the mood they sought to spread was the sudden appearance of a Polish edition of the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" among party activists, students at the military academies and army officers, in 1966. Symptomatic of their rising ideological influence within the party was the speech held the same year at a meeting of Polish historians in Cracow by one of Gomulka's closest associates, the party theoretician Zenon Kliszko. Although he did not himself belong to the partisans, Kliszko praised the patriotic spirit of pre-war nationalists, warned against Jewish intellectuals, and called for national unity of true patriots," even if this involved, for some people, personal injustices or tragedies.[14]

Channelling various social frustrations into a single nationalist movement of discontent, the message and the moods which the partisans spread became increasingly similar to those of the prewar National Democrats, once the sworn enemy of all Polish Communists.[15] As was to be demonstrated in the events of 1968, the partisans and their social basis in the party and state cadres represented a fully developed hybrid of the Communist movement: nationalistic Communism.

The partisan controlled security service played an extremely important role in the faction's increasing influence and power. Initially demoralized by the thaw and disoriented by the post-thaw concept of national unity, the security apparatus had to replace its former working rationale with a new one in order to provide justification for its existence and operations. The former members of non- or anti-Communist underground and Communists with pre- or wartime contacts with Western Communist parties were no longer regarded as inherently suspect. Instead, with the retreat from the ideals of the thaw and the intensified campaign against revisionism, the security service gradually succeeded in building up an image of the "revisionists" and Jews as constituting an actual or potential threat and thus in need of constant surveillance. Hence, these categories replaced the former ones, providing a new rationale for the growing strength of the security service, which already in 1963 extended its network of secret informers to become twice as large as it was during the Stalinist years.

There is an extremely important difference between the modes of operation of the security service in these two periods. Acting through infiltration, pressure, disinformation and by advancing its own people to key positions, rather than through inciting actual or potential mass terror, the security service gradually penetrated a large part of the party organizations: the army, the civil service, mass media, centers of personnel policy and economic control. In short, it pierced and increasingly merged with a large part of the power apparatus, thus becoming a major political force. Controlling the flow and

content of confidential reports to the highest party leadership concerning the social, political and ideological situation in the country, the security apparatus built up an image of the "revisionist" and "Jewish" threat as a potentially serious security risk. In line with this development, at the beginning of the 1960s it was decided to regard Polish Jews as a group in need of close and constant surveillance. In 1961-1962 with the consent of the Politburo and on the suggestion of Soviet advisers, the Ministry of Interior Affairs was entrusted with keeping higher officials of Jewish origin under strict watch and began to prepare a card-index of Polish Jews as potential enemies of the state. By that time there were almost no Jews left in the civilian and military security apparatus and they were being quietly removed from "sensitive" posts in the administration. In 1964 the Jewish Section of the Ministry of Interior Affairs finished the preparation of this card index, including most of the "hidden" Jews, the converts, the mixed marriages, their children, addresses, places of work, inclinations, informal contacts *etc.* A similar list of all the remaining officers of Jewish or mixed Origin was prepared by the military counter-intelligence and submitted to the Ministry of Defence. After this preparation, in 1965 the Politburo reportedly accepted a secret plan to cleanse by 1970 Jews from the top administration, the army, the opinion-making media and all positions requiring unquestioned *afirmacja narodowa* (national allegiance). Thus, the ideological and organizational prerequisites of the final defeat of the generation were created long before it actually took place.[16]

Having at their disposal the entire capacity of the security apparatus, the partisans mobilized political support within the party cadres and in influential non-party circles by organizing semi-institutionalized, largely informal networks of lobbies, clubs, dinner meeting s and hunting parties, and promoted the careers of those found trustworthy. These networks spread the anticipation of radical change in the stagnating regime. Increasingly influencing the personnel policy of the party and state apparatus at both central and local levels, they prepared the groundwork for the partisans' thrust for power from below.

On a broader level of the general society the partisans exploited frustrated nationalist feelings of varying ideological colors and the growing dissatisfaction with the regime, channelling them into popular support for "restoring order." In 1964, when Moczar became president of the ZBOWID (the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy), this until then insignificant veterans' organization became one of the largest and most influential institutions in thecountry. Having a large amount of funds at its disposal and helping its members to receive decorations, pensions, jobs, apartments or medical care, the ZBOWID became a powerful front organization and the main institutional instrument for the mobilization of popular support by the police faction.

Another close ally of the police faction was the pro-Communist Catholic Pax movement. Led by Boleslaw Piasecki - one of the leaders of the prewar Fascist movement and who after the war was probably the highest Soviet

intelligence agent in Poland and an ally of the Natolin faction in 1956 - and with large financial means at its disposal, the Pax and its press developed into a major center for anti-liberal and anti-Jewish propaganda. Approximately half the Pax membership was formed by people under thirty,[17] who both demographically and ideologically belonged to the same generation as their peers in the party cadre. They too were anti-liberal and anti-Semitic, seeing in Jews and "revisionists" an anti-Polish threat and an obstacle to their personal careers.

Thus, with the police faction as the major force and center, the new, young party cadres were united in their world-view, goals and ambitions with their peers in the Pax, the conservative core of the party apparatus and the veterans of the older generation organized in the ZBOWID.

Gomulka's centralist reign[18] led to an increasing stagnation under whose surface unresolved conflicts and growing tensions were ticking like a time bomb. Never really comfortable with the initially overwhelming support of the population and in retreat from the promises of October, Gomulka attempted to win over the party apparatus which had distrusted him and despised the social forces that brought him back to power. In this way Gomulka, once the symbol of the thaw, sided with and increasingly took the lead of the conservative offensive against the liberals. However, as the cadres divided into competing factions, Gomulka never succeeded in carrying out his goal of the oft proclaimed unity of the party. When confronted with the rise of technocratic and conservative-nationalist trends, his team adopted a strategy of reaching an equilibrium by checks, balances and playing factions against each other. Although it worked for a while, this balance was only possible thanks to Gomulka's untouchable position resulting from the unequivocal personal support by the Soviet leadership. In addition, Gomulka was the only leader not unacceptable to all political factions. At the same time, however, divided in a loyalist centrum with preserving the *status quo* as the only program, the aggressive and increasinglypowerful conservative wing headed by the police faction and the technocratic orientation of Gierek, the party cadres increasingly questioned Gomulka's policies (and the manner of his rule); while the general society's initially enthusiastic support changed into disillusionment and discontent. Thus, the centrist policies of "stabilization" resulted in an exceedingly explosive situation of accumulating political tensions, social dissatisfaction and economic stagnation. Although apparently undisputed, Gomulka and his team found themselves in a political vacuum, increasingly isolated from both the main party factions and the general society. For the time being, however, it appeared that Gomulka sat safely in the saddle, firmly in control of the situation under the protective umbrella of the Soviet leadership.

The policies of the Gomulka team, the massive infiltration of social and political life by the security service and the ongoing campaign against all criticism and intellectual dissent had devastating moral effects. Expressed in

a widely practiced personnel policy, this situation produced mechanisms of negative selection in which initiative, honesty and independent thinking were punished, while mediocrity, opportunism and obedience were rewarded. Performed in wide spheres of social life and teaching the kind of virtues that led to a successful career, this mechanism of negative selection had a degenerating effect on social climate and on the quality of cadres at the middle and higher level. In the broad social strata outside the party and state administration, it led to a dispirited weariness, indifference and weakened social discipline, while at the same time breeding mounting dissatisfaction that was to explode at the beginning of the next decade. Both in the cadres and in the society at large, this cumulative social mood undermined the acceptance of leadership and stimulated a longing for change, thus creating important social prerequisites for the police faction's coming thrust for power.

These internal Polish factors which prepared the social, ideological and political conditions for defeat of the generation, were connected to and reinforced by an outside force of immense strength: the Soviet leadership's Middle East policy and its consequent distrust of Jews. The early Soviet hopes for an anti-Western Jewish state proved to be a miscalculation. As a result, particularly after 1956, the USSR actively sought to enlarge its influence in the Middle East by siding with the Arab countries against Israel. This policy had to be followed by Poland,[19] and the demands on its wholehearted implementation reinforced the view that Jewish Communists were potentially unreliable and also expendable. Expressed to the Soviet public in the form of an ongoing anti-Zionist propaganda[20] and strengthened by Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's resistance to political reforms, this distrust was transmitted to the Polish leadership and apparatus in a variety of ways ranging from confidential Polish-Soviet high level contact, "informal" conversations between the Soviet officials and their visiting Polish colleagues, and Soviet intelligence-directed anti-Jewish propaganda within the Polish party and state administration?[21] While during the thaw this Soviet attitude was largely ignored by the Polish party (as, for instance, was the case when Khrushchev - and the KGB - supported Nowak's demands to purge Jews from the Polish state and party apparatus), these suggestions were, over time, falling on increasingly receptive soil. With the rising influence of Moczar's faction, this Soviet attitude gradually led to a legitimization of anti-Jewish arguments in personnel policy, offering a potentially powerful weapon for the partisans and strongly undermining what was left of the generation's political influence.

The process of decreasing political influence of liberal Communists and of the generation was closely connected to the regime's ongoing anti-revisionist witch hunt and its increasingly nationalistic ethos. As it was taking place in the party and in the mass media, labelling criticism as revisionism and attributing independent thoughts to hostile propaganda, the nationalistic, anti-liberal and anti-intellectual dimensions of this offensive were increasingly interlaced. The campaign against free debate and intellectual liberty began

earlier in 1957 with repressions against the journalists and the closure of the weekly *Po Prostu*. The mysterious death of Henryk Holland in 1961 and the consequent "Holland affair"[22] symbolically marked the rift between Gomulka's team on one hand, and the intellectuals and the old KPP members on the other, as well as the rising power of the police faction. As the offensive against intellectuals gained impetus, in 1962 two important magazines covering political, social and cultural issues - *Przeglad Kulturalny* and *Nowa Kultura* - were closed down and replaced by *Kultura*, manned by an ideologically obedient staff. Attacking writers, film producers, sociologists and historians and accusing publishing houses of a "lack of fighting spirit in the struggle against revisionism," the party's ideological plenum of July 1963 clearly demonstrated the anti-intellectualism and increasing might of the conservative apparatus. This trend was further confirmed at the party congress in June 1964. Starting in 1965, the ambition to strengthen control over academic life took the form of new laws and rules that limited academic autonomy and increased party control over personnel policy in the institutions of higher learning.

As a result, intellectual life was largely terrorized. Still, some dissent occasionally manifested itself in collective protest actions. The most well-known manifestation of this was the "Letter of 34" in March 1964, in which a group of prominent intellectuals protested to Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz against excessive censorship and restrictions on newsprint. Although this letter took more the form of a petition than a sharp protest, officially ordered counter-declarations appeared throughout the entire propaganda apparatus, condemning the authors of declaration and attributing them various anti-state intentions. This conservative counter-reaction was relatively successful in terrorizing intellectuals and preventing future collective manifestations of dissent. However, intellectual dissatisfaction continued to produce limited opposition and conflict, particularly at the universities. Although they conducted theoretical discussions on political subjects in relatively isolated university circles and thus lacked immediate national political significance, the dissidents were (correctly) seen by the regime as a potential threat and therefore violently attacked.[23]

As the party's grasp of social and cultural life intensified, by the mid-1960s the hard-liners' offensive took an increasingly nationalistic and anti-Jewish turn. On the inner party level, this was demonstrated by the heated discussion surrounding Adam Schaff's book *Marxism and the Human Individual*. Although the book dealt with the issue of nationalism and anti-semitism merely *en passant*, it was condemned by leading party ideologists,[24] and the sense transmitted to the party cadres was one of a Jewish intellectual daring to accuse the Polish nation and its party of anti-Semitism. As the Polish intellectual milieu contained many people of Jewish origin, this ideological offensive increasingly focused on the alleged connection between revisionists and Jews. Against this background, the campaign against the State Scientific

Publishing House which began in 1964 had a symbolic character. Its general manager was accused (and tried) of all possible sins, ranging from financial fraud to revisionism and "Zionist conspiracy," and the team working on its largest project, the Great Universal Encyclopedia, was attacked for an alleged "Zionist" falsification of Polish history and for dishonoring the Polish nation. An important reason for this attack was that the team contained several Jews; ironically called the "Encyclopedists," they came to be treated in the propaganda as symbols of "Zionist" infiltration of Polish cultural life and of the "personal union of Zionism and revisionism." Similarly, press reports increasingly stressed the Jewish origin of dissidents and defectors.[25] At internal discussions about personnel policy, Gomulka's right hand, Zenon Kliszko, used to produce a special list of Jewish defectors,[26] and the rumors spread within the patty cadres made all Jews into security risks.

Oddly enough, the subjects of anti-Semitism and of the Holocaust were increasingly used to construct an image of threat to Poland and to Polish honor. One of the greatest outcries of official indignation was caused by the entry in the Great Encyclopedia on Nazi extermination camps, which stated that 99% of the victims of these camps - not to be confused with the inmates of concentration or forced labor camps - were Jews. This was interpreted as a purposeful attempt to depreciate the plight and offend the memory of the non-Jewish Polish victims of the Nazi occupation. In 1966, Jerzy Kosinski's novel *The Painted Bird* which, without naming the country or the ethnic background of its hero, describes the sufferings of a child somewhere in Eastern Europe during the war, sparked off a wave of attacks. Violently criticizing memoirs and novels published in the West dealing with the plight of Polish Jews during the Holocaust, the propaganda campaign claimed that "the dirty wave of anti-Polish publications is not accidental. It is inspired, directed and financed..." by West German money in order to "prepare the American nation psychologically for an armed showdown with the barbarous Poles and 'Communist Eastern Europe.'"[27] Connected to a parallel development in Soviet propaganda, these attacks increasingly pointed to "Zionist groups" as the hidden forces behind the "anti-Polish campaigns" of the "American imperialists" and "German revanchists." A parallel theme taken up in the partisan-controlled newspapers accused Jews of wartime cooperation with the Nazis, ingratitude, and "slandering the Polish nation."

Reaching the public in the form of press articles and books,[28] this campaign intensified in the second half of the 1960s. It sought to identify "Zionists" with Jews in the public conscience and to connect "the revisionist threat" and "Zionism" with various "anti-Polish forces." Implying that "Zionists" and "revisionists" were protected by people at the highest political levels and pose a sinister anti-Polish threat, this campaign prepared the psychological ground for "bringing order" to the country.

These tensions, processes and factors gradually led to the events which constituted the ultimate defeat of Polish-Jewish communists. As they still

persisted in their basic convictions and perceptions, the trends of the 1960s meant a widening gap between their *ego-* and *alter*=defined identity, and a foreshadowing of what was to come. However, when the decade began, the remnants of Polish Jewry seemed to be heading towards a relatively stable future. At the beginning of the 1960s there were some 30,000 Jews in the country, thus forming about 0.1% of its population. Shortly before the start of the all-out anti-Semitic campaign, the number might have decreased to some 25,000 due to a limited, yet ongoing emigration. (However, it also could have been somewhat higher due to the fact of successful ethnic conversions that concealed some Jews from the eyes of both authorities and researchers.) The "Jewish sector" with its cooperatives, press, book publishing, clubs, schools, social, cultural and youth work was quite active, organizing a group that together with their families might have amounted to some 20,000 people. The core of this group was formed by the "Jewish Jews." However, as discussed earlier, ethnic affirmativeness is not a stable category, and on the continuum between ethnic self-affirmation and assimilation there was a dynamic trend among the remnants of Polish Jewry towards the latter. Although the extreme and consequent assimilationists constituted a minority, a large and increasing proportion of the Polish-Jewish population, mainly represented among the intellectuals and the white-collar workers, regarded itself as part of Polish culture. As a rule, for this group, being Jewish was mainly the consciousness of the specific nature of their Polishness.

As the future was to prove, the members of the generation lived in a false sense of security and belonging. Blocked by their previous experience and commitments, and limited in their insight by their diminished sociopolitical position, they regarded themselves as an integral part of Polish society and failed to appreciate the significance of events and processes which worked towards their impending defeat. Their political experience taught them to see existing political realities as uncertain, fluctuating and changing, but their life-long affiliation with the party and their deeply rooted moral ideological image of what Communism and the movement essentially stood for prevented them from sensing the depth of the danger. Thus, despite their diminished position, the obviously increasing influence of, for them, despicable political and ideological trends and their varying degrees of disillusionment and misgivings, most regarded the signs as temporary aberrations. In this perception the concrete Polish reality of the 1960s might not be what they once had dreamed, but, with all its problems and sorrows, it was still their Socialism and their country, at least in part the fruit of their sacrifice and struggle.

Only seemingly paradoxically, as the time of their defeat approached they appeared more like their fellow citizens than ever before. With the exception of the intellectuals, the peak of their careers were behind them, and their social-political position had stabilized at a level lower than previously, which made their social-political position less different than that of the general urban population. Also, the ongoing assimilation made them all, even the "Jewish

Jews" and their children, culturally similar to most of their compatriots. As disappointments and frustrations decreased their ideological zeal and reinforced a critical attitude, even concerning ideological engagement they differed less from the average Polish man and woman than ever before.

However, seen as an entity, they were still relatively visible and divided from the general population on several important characteristics. Ideologically and politically they were all Communists, while in the population-at-large in the middle of the 1960s only one of eighteen Poles was a party member. Secondly, both compared to the population-at-large and to other party members, they were overwhelmingly urban: while all of them lived in the large or medium-sized cities, over 50% of the country's population lived in the countryside and more than one in ten party members was a peasant?[29] Thirdly, in addition to their intellectual interests and continuous self-study, the level of their formal education was substantially higher than average?[30] Fourth, despite the previously mentioned trend towards making their social-political position less dissimilar, there were still significant occupational differences between the generation of Polish-Jewish communists and the general population on one hand, and the generation and the Polish-Jewish population as such on the other. While most gainfully employed Poles and Jews were workers and craftsmen,[31] in the mid-1960s the majority of the generation held middle- high and lower managerial positions in administration and economy, and were highly conspicuous in intellectual and cultural professions. Fifth, while the overwhelming majority of the nation and at least a very significant proportion of party members were active Catholics, the members of the generation were atheists, with a varying consciousness of their Jewish origins. Finally, as subsequent events were to prove, independently of their own self-perception, the *alter*-defined identity haunted even those who opted for complete ethnic conversion: they were still regarded by a significant segment of their compatriots as different.

At the same time, some of these distinctive characteristics might also be viewed as not necessarily making the generation different from the nation as such, but rather placing it in its various social strata. Thus, if not regarded as a separate entity, in the 1960s the members of the generation formed a substantial part of the party membership with the longest tenure in the communist movement and were among the most urban and well educated people in the country, a large proportion of them belonging to the, broadly defined, intellectual, cultural and administrative strata.

The generation was still internally differentiated. To simplify the matter into a discernible pattern: at one extreme were the highly educated, assimilated and relatively affluent members of the intellectual elite and of the medium-high political-administrative strata; at the other, was the core of the less educated, less assimilated and hardly affluent "Jewish Jews." On the other hand, however, the ongoing de-ethnification moved the generation as a whole towards the pole of assimilation. In addition, a common trait was the

ambition to secure upward social mobility for their children through education. At the beginning of the 1960s the youngest of these children were approaching school age, while the oldest already attended secondary schools. By the middle of the 1960s, the latter had entered or graduated from institutes of higher education. With few exceptions, independent of their parents' occupation, degree of education, assimilation or affluence, most of the children prior to 1968 had studied, were studying or were planning to study at institutes of higher learning. Seen as a group, the children were even more rooted in Polish society and culture than their parents.

Thus, the total picture that emerges is of a generation which, although still set off from the rest of the population in ideological outlook, length of party affiliation, urbanity, education and occupational pattern, was as a whole becoming more like the general population than ever before. This pattern was reflected in the subjective perceptions of the individuals, causing them to regard themselves as an integral part of the Polish nation. The generation was still not homogeneous, but internally differentiated along the continuum of ethnic identity, education and social-political affluence. However, the trend towards increased assimilation, working across the generations of parents and children, reduced both its internal and external cultural differentiation.

They were approaching or in their fifties when the decade began. Throughout the previous years, most perceived ideological questions and political activity as superior to private career and family life. By the 1960s, however, their ideological intensity had diminished and their private lives became more important for them than ever before. So did their concrete, professional work and - especially for those on the lower levels and settled outside the capital - the practical questions and problems rooted in their everyday local settings, making the content of their everyday lives more similar to those of their average fellow-citizens. This normalization was undoubtedly in part due to the fact that they approached late middle age. However, it was above all strongly related to the growth of an alien ideological climate and political trends, as the result of which they became defensive and marginal in regard to both the ideological mainstream and the centers of political power. On the level of everyday life this ideological weariness and political marginalization resulted in an emphasis on professional as opposed to ideological motivation regarding work and career, and in the relative withdrawal into the domain of private life. Thus, ideological zeal and revolutionary hopes were largely behind them. As one put it: "The fire faded. The dreams were not realized and what was left was practical life. One worked in one's field and was a professional."

However, this marginalization and professionalization did not mean an ideological indifference or uniformity of attitudes and reactions to the realities of the decade. At one pole were those who still could not accept the divergence between their ideals, the promises of the thaw, and the current social-political situation. Such people refused to accept the climate and practices of the

decade, regarding it as their duty to protest and resist in the various available ways. This non-conformist pole is symbolized by those few who, acting on local party levels, already in the early 1960s consciously chose a course of non-opportunist defiance; or by those intellectuals who, acting in the academic milieu, placed their hopes with the next generation. At the other extreme were those who became not only disillusioned, but also cynical and opportunistic. These people regarded their earlier hopes as the romantic dreams of youth. Sometimes musing about whether they should not have chosen another course of life, they were among those who internally withdrew the most into the sphere of private life. If the public and private identities of the former were still closely interconnected, there was a growing disparity between them in case of the latter. The extreme of resigned opportunism and its disillusioned spirit is symbolically expressed in the phrase which used half-jokingly and only among one's closest friends, called the party card a "business book." Most of he generation appear to land somewhere between these two poles, closer, however, to the latter than to the former. A general opinion about the basic potential of the communist system as superior to capitalism and the cherished memories of heroic youth were more or less all that remained of their previous ardor. Thus, seen as a whole and despite the internal polarization, under the pressure of the realities, the generation moved towards a weary disillusionment.

A side-effect of their ongoing ideological and political marginalization was strengthened cohesion within groups of old comrades. The intensity of this tendency appears to have been inversely proportional to their social-political position, but it was observable within all the categories. No longer an integral and enterprising part of the dynamic present, increasingly defensive and with a growing sense of being bypassed in history, more than ever before they were inclined toward recollecting the moods, deeds and events of their shared past. Symbolically, the very term "old comrade" received a partly new meaning. An "old comrade" was not, as before, someone whose merits made for a reliable partner in a joint struggle, but rather someone with whom one had shared a common political past and who in the same way as oneself had become marginalized and estranged. Furthermore, an "old comrade" came to be a synonym for a true Communist, something which most of the new party members were not.

Were they conscious of moral defeat? Looking at the present reality and comparing it to their previous dreams, a handful realized and acknowledged such a defeat. Among them were some for whom the consciousness of defeat was strongly personal and thus particularly painful. After the defeat of the thaw, these people had the courage to demonstratively leave the party in protest. However, under the prosaic pressures of economic circumstance, they were compelled to moral capitulation, made to repent and ask to be readmitted. For them this was an act of conscious and painful moral surrender. As a rule, however, the consciousness of moral defeat was quite dim. Thus, repeating a

Russian saying, some would occasionally ask "*Za chto my barolis*?" (What have we been fighting for?) without, however, taking such thoughts to their utmost conclusion. A small group of stubborn dissidents retained hopes connected to their defiance. Most did not think in such terms at all. Although their sense of mission was gone, their emotions and thoughts were comprised of unclear hopes, opportunistic realizations and recollections of a revolutionary past which, mixed with a fundamental devotion founded on the history of their lives, hindered a conscious recognition of failure.

Some of such people were confronted with their children's idealistic critique of the present Polish conditions as being far from what true Socialism should be like. The root of such confrontations lay in the moral and ideological climate in which they had raised their children who, now seeking answers to their own questions, attacked their parents for the faults of the system for which they had fought. Although such confrontations reminded them of their own youthful idealism, to accept the criticism would have been equal to acknowledging their own failure. Thus, these people argued and explained, and in trying to convince their children at the same time defended their own remaining illusions and self-esteem.

Were they not conscious of what was approaching? They all were still deeply political and, despite varying degrees of withdrawal into private life, attentively followed the constellations, tactics, balances and conflicts behind official political events. Also, trained by their long experience, their delicate political sense still allowed them to easily smell the changes in the ideological spirit of the time. Hence, despite their generally marginalized position, as a whole they still possessed a considerable degree of political insight. The depth of their individual knowledge of what went on behind the scenes was, of course, socially structured, paralleling their formal positions within the system and the corresponding network of semi-official and private contacts. Thus, especially in the second half of the 1960s, most were seriously worried by the apparently rising influence of the police faction (which they clearly identified with the ideological heritage of the Natolinians) and by the corresponding increasingly chauvinist atmosphere in the party and the mass media. Some of those higher up had already been warned in 1966 by their friends about possible purges or advised to look for other jobs. Others, visiting or receiving guests from the Soviet Union or reading the Soviet press, gained a clearer insight into the anti-Jewish trends emanating from the USSR. Hence, those most in the know were deeply worried about the repercussions of the Soviet "anti-Zionist" line, the concrete Soviet pressures in regard to the ethnic aspect of personnel policy and the nationalistic mood spread by the police faction.

However, their ability to forecast what was coming was severely circumscribed by several factors. Restrained by their marginalization, their insights into what was going on behind the scenes were not what they used to be. Further, they were still captives of their perceptions of the Soviet Union as,

despite all, the bearer of the internationalist credo. In this connection their judgment was also affected and their reactions made ambiguous by their (basically correct) interpretation of the different dimensions of Polish nationalism. Knowing that the present nationalistic mood in the party was in fact as anti-Soviet as it was anti-Jewish, they counted on Soviet resistance to the former also to turn into resistance to the latter. Because of this, even those who knew that much of the present anti-Jewish mood originated from or was supported by the Soviets, tended to regard the USSR as their ultimate defense. However, the most important general reason for underestimating the danger was the record of their own deeds and perceptions of their life-membership in the party. From their perspective, some things were simply out of the question. Thus, although there were those who knew more and those who knew less, none could have imagined the full extent of what was to come.

III *The Earthquake: "Mir hobn gevigt a toyt kind"*

The events of 1968, where the forces and tensions that had accumulated and matured behind the apparent stabilization erupted with full force, have received systematic description in literature on the subject[32] and need not be repeated in detail. The preparatory stage, during which the official campaign against the "Zionists" and the "revisionists" was started, lasted between June 1967 and March 1968. Parallel with this stage, a planned and apparently centrally steered campaign of hidden propaganda intensified within the party cadres and the army, with smears and rumors directed against Jews and officials said to be Jews. Following the student demonstrations and the protests of intellectuals against the party's cultural policy, the storm broke out with full force in March 1968. It consisted of a violently anti-Jewish, nationalistic and anti-liberal propaganda campaign, a series of security service directed take-overs in the state and party administration, in the mass media, in cultural institutions and institutes of higher learning, and of massive purges. As it became apparent that this campaign was part of an attempted *coup d' état* from below, the highest leadership reacted by adopting the mood and the course of the campaign as a tactic to disarm it.

Following Israel's victory in the Six Day War and the spontaneous expression of popular joy at this outcome, on June 19, 1967, Gomulka held a speech in which he condemned those who "came out in favor of the aggressor," saying further, "Let those who feel that these words are addressed to them, irrespective of their nationality, draw the proper conclusions. We do not want a Fifth Column in our country." This speech was broadcast over radio and television and, although this last phrase was not reprinted in the mass media the following day, it was clearly heard throughout the country.[33] The "Fifth Column speech" became a starting signal for gradually intensifying a propaganda campaign and purges directed primarily against Jews, also against non-Jewish "revisionists" among intellectuals and scholars, and all those who in any way resisted. Rapidly strengthening the security service's grip on the

mass media and on the local party structures, the "anti-Zionist" campaign occurred on two basic levels.

At the official level the mass media built up an hysterical picture of the "Zionist" conspiracy against Poland. On the unofficial party level this was followed by a flood of "secret" brochures and pamphlets, all being different version's of the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" adapted to the present Polish conditions, and "confidential" oral information about Jews and "revisionists" involved in action against Poland. Soon, "Zionist" became synonymous with "Jew," and at local party meetings, manipulated by people connected to the security service, resolutions were passed calling for the instant dismissal of all "Zionists." Initially limited, the purges began. Some Jews were put on trial for "slandering the Polish nation"; more were harassed in their places of work, and some received telephone calls and anonymous letters urging them to leave the country.

Following the student and intellectual protests in the wake of the January 1968 ban on the theatrical production of "Dziady," a national drama by the great Polish nineteenth-century poet Adam Mickiewicz, the "anti-Zionist" campaign erupted with full force. As the student demonstrations spread in Warsaw and throughout the country (at least in part provoked and manipulated by the security service), and as the attempts to neutralize the discontent by showing Jews as the instigators[34] failed, the starting signal for an all out anti-Jewish campaign was given in the March 11 issue of the PAX paper *Slowo Powszechne*, and by the Warsaw Party Secretary Jozef Kepa. *Slowo Powszechne*, reputed as occasionally used by the KGB to put pressure on the Polish leadership, accused Jewish students of being leaders of the student unrest and serving foreign interests, and this theme was the next day repeated in the national and provincial press. In a speech held at a conference of Warsaw party activists, Kempa pointed to "bankrupt politicians" such as Stefan Staszewski and Roman Zambrowski (both Jews) and intellectuals affiliated with "foreign and domestic revisionists" as the real culprits behind the unrest. He also stated that most of the student unrest leaders could be traced to having Jewish origin, and that action would be taken again "those parents who occupy high positions but whose children actively participated in the organization of the recent disturbances."[35]

This line of attack was strengthened by Edward Gierek. In a widely quoted speech held at a gigantic mass meeting in Poland's industrial capital, Katowice, on March 14, Gierek followed Kempa's line of argument, threatening to "break the bones of all remnants of the old regime, revisionists, Zionists and imperialist lackeys"[36] who would dare to disturb the order in his province. Gierek's accusations and threats were soon repeated by other provincial party secretaries. Although on March 19 Gomulka listed several writers, university professors and "reactionary troublemakers" rather than the Zionists as the instigators of the students demonstrations, and declared that at the present "Zionism is not a danger to Socialism in Poland," it was too late to stop the

campaign. Combining anti-Semitism, chauvinism, anti-intellectualism and the ethos of a cultural revolution, this campaign of purge and intimidation gained scope and intensity that was much greater than the leadership had assumed. In open defiance to Gomulka and interpreting the recent unrest as a *coup d' état* by a "group of conspirators connected with Zionist centers," the campaign soon openly challenged Gomulka's leadership.[37] Initially singling out and dismissing several "politically frustrated, alienated and embittered" Jewish university professors and students, the propaganda attacks and purges soon became a broad campaign of almost indiscriminate persecutions at all levels of the social structure. The mass purges began. Already by mid-April, 1968 over 8,300 persons were purged from the party and 80 officials at the government level ousted.[38] The campaign, which was made to seem to express the repressed wrath of the nation, produced numerous press articles, speeches and "workers' resolutions" typically demanding that "...our authorities stop tolerating the activity of reactionary Zionist elements in the political, social, economic and cultural life of our country."[39] All over the country local "Zionists" were "unmasked," condemned and purged.

Facing the threat of closure, the officially sanctioned institutions of the "Jewish sector" were pressured to release "anti-Zionist" declarations. Although the TSKZ (Social-Cultural Society of Polish Jews) made such a declaration in language even more extreme than called for, it proved to be of little avail. Jewish cooperatives were once again merged with their non-Jewish counterparts or disbanded. Jewish schools, youth camps, and the publishing house of the literary magazine *Yiddishe Shriften* were suspended and later dissolved. Most members of the TSKZ's presidium were sacked and expelled from the party and the TSKZ itself was reduced to merely a faint shadow of its former self.

The essence of this campaign, as related to Polish Jews in general and the generation in particular, was specially highlighted in two documents: in a widely publicized interview given in April by Mieczyslaw Moczar[40] and in an article written in June by a leading party ideologist and Central Committee member Andrzej Werblan.[41] Describing Poland's present problems as rooted in the post-1945 situation, Moczar lamented "the arrival in our country... of certain politicians dressed in officer's uniforms, who later presumed that only they - the Zambrowskis, the Radkiewiczes, the Bermans - had the right to leadership, a monopoly over deciding what was right for the Polish nation." Moczar implied that had power been left not in hands of these people, to whom "patriots were dirt," but to ethnic Poles, Stalinist deviations could have been avoided.

Werblan's article was a pioneer attempt by a Communist theoretician to interpret the history of his party in racist terms. Instead of the customary Marxist analysis, Werblan analyzed the history and problems of the Polish Communist movement in terms of relations and tensions between Polish "patriots" on one hand, and Jewish "cosmopolitans" or "Zionists" on the

other. His conclusion was that throughout the history of the Polish Communist movement, its problems, *i.e.*, its weakness during the prewar period, the Stalinist excesses and the "revisionist tendencies" after the thaw, had all been due to the dominance of Jewish Communists. The present campaign thus received ideological justification as an attempt to solve a long delayed problem of Jewish domination within the apparatus, administration, mass media and higher education, and by the incompatibility between the Jewish "cosmopolitans" or "Zionists" on one hand and the non-Jewish "patriots" on the other. As postwar problems were rooted in a cadres policy which "ignored the changes in the ethnic structure of society," these problems, Werbal stated, would find their solution when the "abnormal ethnic composition" in important fields of society was corrected. Thus, his treatise provided an ideological justification for a Communist version of *numerus clausus* and, acquiring the weight of an official party statement, became the guide for further purges.

These events had several aspects. Seen in the historical perspective of the Polish Communist movement, they symbolized a definite end to the prewar Communist ethos and its spokesmen. Also, they formed a logical outcome of the party's post-1945 history and the legacy of forcing a Communist regime onto a deeply anti-Communist society. Abandoning the underground and taking over exclusive political power, the numerically small Communist party had been forced to assimilate into its cadre non-communist ideological influences and people who at the end "gave the old Communists a true pogrom."[42] From the point of view of tensions between "natives" and the "Muscovites," these events represented the ultimate triumph of the former over the latter. On the level of the present relations between the party and society at large, they formed the attack by the party apparatus on the student population, and an assault against the liberal intelligentsia as an attempt to relieve social discontent through the classical method of channelling it against a scapegoat. Also, these events may be viewed as an attempt by a powerful party faction to bridge the gap between the ruled and the rulers through chauvinism, anti-liberalism, and populist anti-intellectualism - or, in a closely related perspective, as an attempt to revive and merge a prewar Polish nationalistic ideology with communist supremacy. Viewed in the context of the emergence of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia and the dissident movement in the USSR, it was an effort to discipline and intimidate society in order to prevent or counteract similar developments on the Polish scene.

On the level of the power struggle within the Polish party, these events marked the police faction's and the ambitious second-level functionaries' full-scale thrust for power, where aggressive nationalism, anti-Semitism and anti-intellectualism would channel social discontent into popular support or, at least, passivity. Seen in the same perspective, these events mirrored the party leadership's defence, which met the assault with neither submission nor confrontation, but with an attempt to disarm it through adopting its tone and assimilating its program. Thus, behind the smoke screen of the "anti-Zionist"

campaign there were several other objectives and struggles.

Whatever this amounted to in regard to others, for the generation of Polish-Jewish Communists, these events formed a total existential defeat: the sudden slide down the social ladder, the bankruptcy of their moral, ideological and political life investment and, in the end, their forced emigration. Whether they worked in the party apparatus, state administration scientific institutions, universities, publishing houses, in local industrial management, factories, cooperatives or the institutions of the "Jewish sector," almost all were personally highly affected. Both collectively and as individuals they were singled out, slandered, ostracized, degraded, threatened and intimidated with breathtaking intensity and a malignity that could not be compensated for by rather sporadic and discreet individual expressions of sympathy and support. They were made suspect, accused of being servants of various "anti-Polish forces," purged from the party and from their jobs. A large proportion of their children was expelled from the universities (some imprisoned), and those still in school were often persecuted or harassed in various ways. During the course of these events, their world fell apart.

Can a collective existential defeat of this magnitude be measured? Can individual tragedies and reactions to a collapse of such vastness and depth be extricated from the tangled tissue of accumulated experience, complex image, perception and pain? Can they be compared or typified? This seems hardly possible; only some directions can be pointed out. Thus, despite the basic unity of their defeat, their reactions to this traumatic experience varied in nuance, content and extent. Most were dismissed from the party. Leaving a party to which their lives and identities had been so closely connected was a tragedy for them all. However, their moral reaction and concrete behavior varied, ranging from, at one extreme, those who attempted to save their party membership, position or world view through humiliating acts of public "anti-Zionist" declarations, to those who, profoundly enraged and deeply offended, forestalled the approaching dismissal and left the party on their own initiatives. In the middle were those, probably the majority, who at first were not able to say "the party is wrong," merely said "the accusations are undeserved," hoping to weather the storm and retain what was left of their convictions.

All were badly hurt, but the depths of their wounds varied. On an individual level, worst off were those who had believed the strongest. They were the least prepared for the total collapse of their vision,and the depth of their defeat caught them by tragic surprise. It was among this group that the suicides took place. In a different way, almost equally badly hurt were those who had opted for complete ethnic conversion. Having raised their children free from awareness of their Jewish origin, they faced the additional tragedy of their sons' or daughters' deep identity crises. Badly off also were those who had been "nothing but Communists," and the most devoted careerists who, in a parody of the self-perception of the former, had been "nothing but managers": both were suddenly denied the very foundations of their existential

identity. Least caught by surprise and thus relatively least hurt were those who doubted the most. Only seemingly paradoxically, among them were those who had been most resigned and cynical, and those who had been most rebelliously resistant during the post-thaw period. Compared to the others, such attitudes had, in a way, prepared them and lessened the shock. Attempting to simplify the myriad of individual tragedies and reactions to a discernible pattern, it appears that the "non-Jewish Jews" were, as a rule, more hurt than the "Jewish Jews"; and that the depth of the shock and the intensity of the pain paralleled one's former devotion (and, though not necessarily, one's former social-political position) to the party or the country.

All such differences aside, they were all in a state of bottomless embitterment and humiliation. Although some were comforted by expressions of moral support from friends and colleagues, others received abusive telephone calls or anonymous letters urging them to "stop eating the bread of Poland" and "go to Palestine." On the corridor walls in the apartment houses where some of them lived were painted slogans: "Here live Jews" or "Judases go home." Whether caused by indifference or fear, a vacuum suddenly appeared around many of them: they were avoided by their former colleagues and collaborators as if contaminated. Communist Poland, for which they had given their best years and which they had helped to shape, suddenly turned its wrath on them, appearing as they had never seen it before. The Communist Party, their former frame of reference, the pivotal point of their lives and the core of their identities emerged now as a semi-Fascist, nationalistic movement, similar to the prewar anti-Semites and Communist-haters of the Endeks (National Democrats). What they perceived as their deeds and sacrifices for the Communist cause was now declared to have been of no value or even harmful. Their party newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu* now published articles and declarations that caused many of them to refer to "*Voelkischer Beobachter.*" The leading political journalist of the Communist state's television, Karol Malcuzynski, commented on an "anti-Polish campaign conducted in the West by the Zionists" remarking that against this background it would not be surprising if Poles reacted by "ruffian anti-Semitism," *i.e.*, pogroms. The movement which had given meaning to their lives now expelled them, denying them membership in the nation in which their forefathers had grown up. This was the ultimate confrontation through which their hopes were proven empty, their image of the world and themselves in it false and their lives, as they had lived them, tragically wrong. It was an earthquake with no end, and their world fell apart. As one remarked, "*Wszystko wzielo w leb*" (Everything fell through).

Thus bankrupt, they faced the fateful choice: to remain despite all the degradation, humiliation and realization, or - as the government opened and pushed them towards the doors of emigration - to leave. In favor of emigration spoke their deeply wounded pride, the collapse of their world view and self-perception, their ousting from the party and from their jobs, their badly hurt

identity and the prospects for their children. Against emigration spoke their life-long investment in terms of deeds, thoughts and emotions, their identification with the culture, language and traditions, and a pride which urged a defiant determination to retain the right to self-identification. To accept reality and leave required acknowledging the definitive failure, the defeat of their entire life course. Leaving, they could either go to Israel, built by their Zionist peers and former rivals, or to the Western capitalism they had fought. In addition, several had non-Jewish spouses or children who refused to leave. Moreover, approaching or in their sixties, some ill and most without a profession that could be exported to the West, most feared the prospects of becoming refugees and starting anew for yet another time in their lives. Thus, there were different, parallel and most often contradictory motives present in each individual life situation. The overall outcome was that some members of the generation stayed, but the large majority left in an emigration that closely resembled a forced expulsion.

In this, the generation followed the overall reaction of all remaining Polish Jews. Surrounded by a massive wall of official hostility and a largely intimidated or indifferent society, for most there was nothing else to do but leave. The forms of their exodus were as humiliating as the events that led up to it: all emigrants were forced to renounce their Polish citizenship and, paying the equivalent of more than two average monthly salaries, receive a travel document for the stateless, valid for a one-way trip to Israel. Renouncing their citizenship, they also had to state that they felt bound to Israel rather than to Poland, that they would disavow all claims to pensions or compensation of any kind, and would pay to the state treasury the estimated equivalent of the costs of their children's studies.[43] The net result of this emigration, which reached its peak between 1968-1969 but continued at a slower pace until the mid-1970's, was the end of Polish Jewry. Most probably, nearly 20,000 Jewish refugees left Poland, leaving a mere 5,000, mostly aged, behind.[44]

Thus, defeated, embittered and largely disoriented, beginning to reinterpret the past or discover new perspectives, regretful or stubborn, they left. Their private tragedies - the loss of friendships, anticipation of loneliness and cultural estrangement, sometimes divorce, leaving or being left by their children - added to the acrimony of their downfall. Although their individual perceptions of the depth of their defeat varied, in emigrating they all left behind the dreams of their youth, the beliefs that had guided them through the turmoil of their lives, the core of their identity and most of their deepest convictions. In addition to leaving the country which had been their native land, they left their political hopes, the party and the movement that had formed the existential framework and meaning of their lives. Although several still regarded themselves as Communists, the last true of the kind, and a few nourished some unclear hopes of rehabilitation and return, for most their former convictions and faith had proven to be illusion and their previous hopes hardly more than self-deceit.

In a way, the wheel had come full circle. They had entered upon the road of becoming Polish-Jewish Communists when they were not much more than youngsters. Now, four decades later, they stood empty-handed. As one of them said: "I gave forty years of my life, and now I was where I once started." Thus, leaving Poland, often on board the Chopin Express to Vienna (baptized by a correspondent of the British *Daily Mail* as "the heartbreak train"), those who realized the extent and finality of their defeat were thinking "*Kolysalismy martwe dziecko*" or, if they still thought in Yiddish, "*Mir hobn gevigt a toyt kind*" ("We have cradled a dead baby").

IV *Looking Back*

Here the story of the generation ends. Defeated and disoriented they spread around the world, most of them to Sweden, Denmark and to Israel.

At the beginning they were greatly bewildered. Stunned by their defeat and choked with bitterness, they could not find answers to the questions that were tormenting them. Had they been wrong all along, deaf and blind? Or had they been right, at least at the beginning? What went wrong, when, and why? What had they done with their lives? Thus, in the first years after the defeat they were uncertain, violent and imprecise, their thoughts and emotions haunted by the ghosts of the distant and recent past. Torn between their past perceptions and situations, their uprooted present and the uncertain course of the future, they entered a painful process of reevaluation and reorientation, the ethnic and political compartments of their identities aching and fermenting in the search for new balance and content. In other words, they were in the process of internalizing and adapting to their new existential situation. Gradually, through the years, they accepted this outcome, drawing conclusions from their biographies and from the historic events in which they had participated.

What happens at the end of a road is remembered best, and the burden of their defeat, its circumstances and the paths that led to it overshadowed other memories, coloring their interpretation and evaluation. The members of the generation have adjusted themselves in their new countries, but - especially those outside Israel - have not become wholly integrated into the new cultures. Today they live in the present, much through their children and grandchildren, but the peaks of their lives lie far in the past. In a way, their present lives are, as one put it, a *post scriptum.*

In retrospect, their Jewishness [45] appears to them as a factor which strongly influenced the course of their lives. Thus taught by experience, they have become more conscious and more affirmative, perceiving their Jewishness in terms of interdependence, of sharing the same "Jewish fate" and looking at the world through "Jewish eyes." Still atheistic and having retained their materialistic view on the world, they do not perceive being a Jew in terms of religion, but rather as sharing a collective memory, a history and a heritage of ethics and culture.

They are former Communists and former Poles: thus, the Jewish compartment of their identity has, as a rule, become its central core. Their Polish sub-identity still exists but, being an open wound and source of pain, has lost its previously independent and central position. For those living outside Israel, the sub-identity derived from their new countries is largely devoid of ethnic content, forming a civil framework of citizen's rights and duties and a vessel for their Polish-Jewish ethnicity. Against this background, their Polish and Jewish sub-identities have reversed: while previously their Jewishness marked the specific quality of their Polishness, today their Polishness functions as a closer specification of their Jewishness.

Reinforced by their life experience, the shadow of anti-semitism plays a central role in their current Jewish identity. Closely connected to this, their perception of Israel currently occupies a very important place in identity and concern. It is in view of the importance of Israel (and what they now see as the basically correct course of their Zionist peers and former rivals) that the most radical change in their identity has taken place.

Do they regret what they have done and been? Yes and no. Although in retrospect many would fully agree with the Yiddish phrase "*Mir hobn getanz oyf a fremde hasene*" (We have been dancing at a stranger's wedding), they are not ashamed of the past course of their identity and action, understanding its determinants in the contemporary conditions, circumstances and perspectives. Such understanding aside, many grieve their past perceptions, attitudes and conduct. Also, knowing how it all ended, many regret that they did not join (or remain in) the Zionist movement and some that they did not avoid politics altogether. Above all, they regret that they did not see it happening and did not depart at a much earlier stage: if not already at the time of the Moscow trials, then after the Soviet experience or in the mid-1950s.

Today most of them express varying degrees of anti-communism, in terms of an evaluation of the social, political and moral realities of what used to be the Soviet block. However, this should not be misunderstood. Their lives have forced them to realize the impossibility of the Communist vision, not its moral falsity. In this light, these former millennialists have become resigned pragmatists. Now suspicious of all utopias they are still convinced that a life without dreams and visions would merely be vegetation.

At least until recently a few still held on to their former dreams. Looking back into the history of the Communist movement and analyzing the present political situation, they look for crucial turning-points where the degeneration began, and for possibilities of a return to the right path. Most who hold this view, see the beginning and the source of deviation in the Stalinization of the Soviet Union, *i.e.*, in the rejection of Lenin's New Economic Policy in the 1920s and the elimination of factions and free opinion within the party. Although very few, this group proves not only the persistence of a Communist vision as the backbone of their personal existence, but also the deep existential significance this vision once had for them all. They prove, as one said, that

"Communism is easy to swallow, but hard to spew up."

Although many of these people had great problems coming to terms with the balance of their lives and their new reality - some ending their lives in emptiness or despair - the collective defeat of the generation meant in another way the possibility for revival to many of the members. In every defeat there exists the seed of resurrection; in their collective defeat there were seeds of individual liberation from deeply rooted stereotypes, compulsive views and traditional perspectives. This is what happened to many of them: they survived, coming out of their defeat wiser and, in a way, strengthened.

However, did they survive as a generation? In its collective downfall the generation was scattered, spread around the world, the remains of its vision, shared present and common sociopolitical location stolen away from it. Are they, then, still a generation?

A sociological generation is formed by contemporaries inspired by a sharing of the same historical experience and the same "existential terms of reference"[46] that, ensured by the same set of social institutions, produces and demonstrates the same typical identity. If a generation is formed by a flow of decisive and relevant experiences "producing a collective mentality and morality," which results in its members feeling "themselves linked by a community of standpoints, beliefs and wishes,"[47] it lasts until new experiences nullify the value of the earlier system of meanings. In addition, a common geographical and sociopolitical location, identity and action are essential for a generation to be an actuality. Also, a generation expresses itself in being perceived as such by its members and by others.

What today these people have still in common is a shared past location, identity and action, a consciousness of it, a largely common self-definition whose core is focused on the past, an identity that to a large degree has a root of commonality, and outside perception of their life career as shared and common. On the other hand, they do not share the same present location in terms of geography, society, political vision and action. In addition, they lack their previously shared future perspective. In short, they share a common past, but lack a shared present and common future, the lack of such commonality being the consequence of their defeat. Hence, it would appear that even if they still define themselves as members of a generation, they are, as it were, less so than before. Moreover, if the present state of their identity is primarily defined as having been, but no longer being, Polish-Jewish Communists, then even this contemporary sense of sameness is defined in a negative manner, *i.e.*, through a shared fate of not being what they once were. In other words, their sense of continuing to be members of a generation is defined through the end of a generation as an actuality. In this view, even if their defeat in one sense meant for many of them a subsequent rebirth as individuals, it also meant the definite, although incomplete, downfall of their collective.

Spread all over the world, the surviving members of the generation are today in their eighties. Many of their comrades have already died. As the

common history of Poland and Jews is over and as they, in their own way, were the last to carry it on, they are not only the last Jewish Communists of Poland but also among the last Polish Jews. Looking back on their lives and at the contemporary world, it appears that they were also the last genuine millennialists of their kind or, as they would prefer to say, the last true Communists.

* This article is based on a research project depicting the lives of a generation of Polish-Jewish Communists from the 1920s-1930s until the end of the 1960s. See: Schatz, J., *The Generation. The Rise and the Fall of the Generation of Jewish Communists of Poland*, University of California Press, 1991.

NOTES

1. Sfard, 1974: 784. However, Glikson (1977: 243) estimates the number of Polish-Jewish emigrants to Israel during 1956-1960 to be 42,289 persons, with almost 30,000 coming in 1957 when emigration reached its peak.
2. Cf. Sfard, 1971: 784; Checinski, 1982: 130; Kwilecki (1963: 87) estimates the size of the Jewish population in Poland at the beginning of the 1960's to be 31,000.
3. Glikson (1977: 243) states the number of Jews who returned to Poland from the USSR with this repatriation to be 18,000 persons, out of which 6,000 are said to have left Poland for Israel. It should be noted that Checinski (1982: 129) estimates the number of repatriates at 40,000, and Sfard (1971: 784) at 25,000. However, even this latter number is disputed by some of our initiated respondents as probably too large, while the former seems to be totally out of proportion.
4. Moczar himself is the best illustration of this accumulating resentment. As mentioned in other contexts, he was deeply frustrated as a local guerrilla leader during the war when he found himself subordinated to the Jewish political commissars parachuted in from the USSR. Serving as Commander of the Public Security Office in Lodz from 1945-1948, he was frustrated by his subordinate position and by the fact that most of his superiors in the Ministry of Public security were Jews, most often with Soviet wartime experience. Although he denounced Gomulka in 1948, in the wake of this latter's defeat he was transferred from the security service to the post of provincial governor, and bitterly blamed Jews for what he considered this humiliating demotion. During the thaw, he joined the Natolinians and shared their anti-Jewish stance. He was further frustrated when Gomulka did not consistently avenge all his former prosecutors. When appointed Deputy Minister of Interior in charge of the security service in 1957 and Minister in 1964, he was finally able to get on with settling old

debts. Cf. Kolomejczyk, Malinowski, 1986: 202-203; Checinski, 1982: 157-159.

5. From 1964 on, the Party apparatus stabilized at about 7,000 full-time employees. Despite improvement, they were still relatively poorly educated: only 17.8% had higher education (half of them received this education while being fully employed Party staff members), while about one third had an education not exceeding the primary school level. Over half of the apparatus had been employed for five years or longer. Over 70% had joined the Party before 1948 and 15% during the war or earlier. Cf. Weydenthal, 1978: 109, 111-112.
6. Cf. Bienkowski, 1971: 21, 36, 46-47, 65.
7. Several reformers and several Jews, were purged from the Central Committee in 1959. This process continued and in 1963 Roman Zambrowski, the last member of the Pulawska group and the last Jew in a top position, was purged from the Politburo. Still more reformers and Jews were forced to leave the Central Committee at the congress of 1964, ousted under the slogan of bringing young and well-educated cadres in the Party leadership.
8. Weydenthal, 1978: 107-109, 178.
9. Bienkowski, 1971: 50.
10. Cf. Wiatr; Ostrowski, 1967:148; Bauman, 1967 (a): 29, 31-32; Bauman,1967 (b): 168—174.
11. Cf. Sartre, 1965; Kolakowski, 1960: 159-169; Bauman, 1968: 12-21.
12. Cf. Anonymous (Checinski), 1971: 23-25, 29-30; Bienkowski, 1971: 74-78.
13. Cf. Checinski, 1982: 147-148, 159, 163, 165-166, Anonymous (Checinski), 1971: 27-28.
14. "Kliszko's lecture was so dangerously outspoken that its full text has never been published and he ordered the destruction of the tape recording" (Lendvai, 1971: 226).
15. Zbigniew Brzezinski remarked in 1965: "In a curious way, (the) emerging new Polish communist elite resembles the pre-World War II extreme right-wing groups in Poland more than it resembles either its Comintern-reared Stalinist predecessors or the earlier, internationalist founders of the Polish Communist Party. The program of the prewar rightists had typically included advocacy of a close alliance with Russia against Germany, the desirability of a homogeneous Polish state (and not one containing many minorities), a certain dose of anti-Semitism for mass-consumption, violent emphasis on nationalism, and contempt for liberalism. Quite striking, and characteristic of the general decay of Marxism-Leninism, is the fact that many of the surviving prewar neofascist youth activists are now to be found among the most outspoken enthusiasts of the new Polish 'communist' state - for the first time in history nationally homogeneous, allied with

Russia against Germany, domestically authoritarian, and increasingly nationalist" quoted in Rozenbaum, 1972-1973: 90.

16. Cf Lendvai, 1971: 144; Rozenbaum 1972-1973: 83-85, 89; Anonymous (Checinski), 1971: 20-23; Checinski, 1982: 146—152, 165-167, 201; Bienkowski, 1971: 54-63.
17. Lendvai, 1971: 230.
18. On Gomulka, see Raina, 1970; Bethell, 1972. On the characteristics of his reign during this period, see, also, Bienkowski, 1971.
19. Despite the fact that several members of the Polish leadership regarded Soviet Middle Eastern policies as opportunist, in the beginning of the 1960s Polish mass-media were directed a pro-Arab stance in reports from the Middle East. Poland was also forced into the joint Soviet block supply of the Arab armies. In addition, in connection with the economic relations with the Arab states, there were increasing pressures not to employ Jews in Poland's foreign trade organizations. Cf. Anonymous (Checinski), 1971: 26.
20. This propaganda began in the 1950s. For a description of some of its early expressions, see, Schechtman, 1978: 126-129.
21. For a description of this propaganda, see, for instance, Anonymous (Checinski), 1971: 19—20; Checinski, 1982: 131-132:

    In this context some of our respondents recall several tragicomic *quid-pro-quo* situations. When visiting Moscow or receiving official Soviet visitors who did not identify themselves as Jews, they were warned that Jews had too much influence in Poland, that they could not be trusted and that Poland should be governed by "real Poles."

22. Henryk Holland was a prewar Polish-Jewish Communist, a Soviet refugee and a soldier in the Communist Polish First Army. A popular journalist and a well known figure among Party intellectuals, he was arrested in December 1961. Despite the official report that he later committed suicide by jumping out of a window during a search of his apartment, it was widely believed that he was murdered. The affair shook liberals and old Communists. Despite the secrecy and the presence of plain-clothed policemen, his funeral turned into a symbolic demonstration. About one hundred of Holland's old Communist comrades, among them some Central Committee members, gathered at the cemetery and sung the *Internationale* at his grave. In the wake of this affair, the last remaining senior leaders of the Pulawska group were purged from central Party positions and the partisans assumed control over the entire Ministry of Internal Affairs.

    There are different accounts surrounding Holland's death. Some connect it to the alleged fact that he reported Khrushchev's drunk

Warsaw story to a French journalist about the way he and the rest of the Soviet Politburo outsmarted Beria, lured him to attend a meeting in Kremlin and collectively strangled him (Kott, 1985: 138-139). Others connect his death to an alleged intervention on behalf of the wife of Polish diplomat of Jewish origin, Jerzy Bryn. Following Bryn's defection to the West, his wife was kidnapped in France and smuggled back to Poland. Bryn then changed his mind about defecting and returned to Poland, to be sentenced to life imprisonment (Checinski, 1982: 152—153).

23. The best known manifestations of this dissent are the "Open letter to the Party" written in 1965 by two young assistants, Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, and Leszek Kolakowski's speech held at a student meeting at Warsaw University in October that year. The "Open letter" was a political manifesto which called upon the Party to abolish its bureaucratic elite and to establish a true "workers' democracy." Kolakowski's speech contained a severe criticism of the economic, social and cultural policies of the Party, analyzed authoritarianism and called for democratization. Kuron and Modzelewski were arrested and sentenced to prison, while Kolakowski and his supporters were expelled from the Party.
24. Dealing with the problem of nationalism and anti-Semitism (on two out of 358 pages), Schaff, 1965, claimed that antisemitism had not automatically disappeared in Socialist countries, that its existence should be acknowledged and that it should be fought. At a debate organized by the Party theoretical organ *Nowe Drogi* on October 12, 1965, Schaff's book was strongly criticized as "distorting reality" and demonstrating "lack of political responsibility." For this debate, see, *Nowe Drogi*, 1965: 57-186.
25. For instance, the Jewish origins of Colonel Władysław Tykocinski who defected to the West, and of four Warsaw students detained and subsequently suspended from their studies in connection with the Kuron Modzelewski case, were repeatedly stressed by the mass media and in the rumors spread by the security service.
26. Lendvai, 1971: 144.
27. *Prawo i Życie*, April 10, 1966, December 4, 1966; *Forum*, June 12, 1966.
28. For a description of the arguments used in this campaign, see, for instance, Szac (Schatz), 1974: 3-15.
29. Calculated from data in Rocznik Statystyczny, 1966: 35; Weydenthal, 1978: 178. In 1965, out of a population of 31.6 million, 15.9 million lived in the countryside. The Communist Party had 1,775,000 members, out of whom 11.7% were peasants, 40.1% workers and 42.7% represented the white collar professions.

30. The overwhelming majority of all those gainfully employed in Poland (8.61 million out of totally 8.74 million in 1965) worked in the state-owned sector of economy and administration. Out of these: 79% had primary or vocational education, 17% secondary or post-secondary education and only 4% higher education in 1965 (Rocznik Statystyczny, 1966: 61, 68). No quantitative data on formal level of education for all the members of the generation are available. However, nearly every second respondent had an education exceeding the secondary level. Another indication as to their relatively high level of formal education is that the parent generation, a group that included both the members of this generation and their Polish-Jewish peers, which left Poland and emigrated to Sweden following the March 1968 campaign, contained 26% females and 37% males with a higher education (Ilicki, 1988: 133).
31. In 1965 approximately two-thirds of all those gainfully employed in Poland were defined as workers (Rocznik Statystyczny, 1966). As for the Polish-Jewish population, in 1958 52% were workers, 12% craftsmen and 20% white-collar workers (clerks, officials, civil servants, and so on). 8% were conspicuous in free professions and another 8% in other areas (Kwilecki, 1963: 90-91).
32. See, for instance, Alsterdal, 1969; Banas, 1979, especially 97-185; Checinski, 1982: 209-253; Lendvai, 1971, especially 89-239; Rozenbaum, 1978, Silberner, 1983: 257-264; Wiesenthal,*Wydarzenia marcowe*, 1968.
33. It should be noted that contrary to accepted Communist habit, this speech, or at least its last sentence, had not been cleared with the Politburo, and that two of its members, Edward Ochab and Adam Rapacki, strongly protested against it. However, their protests were ignored and, eventually, both left the Party leadership.
34. Police agents distributed a series of anti-Semitic leaflets among students. One of these, for instance, was entitled "Whom are you supporting?" - the message being that innocent Polish students were being manipulated by ill-minded and rich Jews who, as the leaflet said, were "leaders by their tribal birthright, free from financial troubles and cares "
    For student demands and their responses to propaganda, see*Wydarzenia marcowe* 1968," 1969.
35. *Trybuna Ludu*, March 12, 1968.
36. *Trybuna Ludu*, March 12, 1968.
37. This challenge against the Gomulka team (clearly formulated in Kazimierz Kakol's article "Sprawy i ludzie" in the March 24, 1968 issue of *Prawo i Życie*) expressed itself also in the form of a consequent rumor campaign and accusations of Jewish origin, Jewish connections and pro-Israeli sympathies directed against several top

Party leaders, among them four Politburo members.

38. *Trybuna Ludu*, April 19, 1968.
39. Resolution adapted by the Party cell at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, published in *Trybuna Ludu*, March 13, 1968.
40. *Trybuna Ludu*, April 13-15, 1968.
41. Cf. Werblan, 1968.
42. Zambrowski, 1986: 128.
43. "It has been estimated that the final exodus enriched the Polish state by some 250 million zlotys" (Checinski, 1982: 254, note 10).
44. There are no completely reliable figures as to the number of those who remained and those who left. Thus, in June, 1969 the PAP announced that 5,864 Jews had emigrated between July 1, 1967 and the end of May 1968. However, according to Rozenbaum, 1972-1973: 91, in approximately the same time over 20,000 visas were issued by the Dutch Embassy, who represented Israel's interests in Poland. According to Glikson, 1977: 244, nearly 15,000 Jews left Poland in 1967-1972, while Adelson, 1985: 175, appreciates the number of Jewish refugees to 30,000. As for those who stayed, Checinski, 1982: 246, estimates their number to be 5,000—6,000 and Rozenbaum, 1977: 340, to 3,000-7,000. Probably the most reliable estimate comes from Dr. Akiva Kohane of the AJDC's European office, who in several discussions with the author estimated the number of refugees at about 20,000 and the number of those who remained - mostly the elderly - at approximately 5,000.
45. Cf. Schatz, 1988.
46. Abrams, 1982: 248-249.
47. Heberle, 1951: 119.

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